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Chapter 1: Inflation Targeting as a Framework for Monetary
Policy: Between Rules and Discretion
1.1 : The Rules Versus Discretion Debate
The question whether or not monetary policy can affect the real economy has been one of the
central themes in monetary economics. Clearly, the classical dichotomy (i.e. a strict separation
between the nominal and real side of the economy in which the latter is only affected by real
variables) will hold in a world in which all agents have access to the same information set and
in which prices are perfectly flexible. The supply of goods and services will then be
determined by the availability of production factors and the state of technology. Aggregate
demand will automatically adjust to absorb all goods and services produced through
movements in the general price level. As a result, on the assumption that the demand for
money is non-stochastic and stable, a change in the supply of money will cause an
instantaneous and equiproportionate change in the general level of prices without affecting
real output. In this situation price stability can be achieved by allowing the money stock to
grow at the same rate as output supply.
Based on this notion, most economists now agree that money is neutral in the long run in the
sense that monetary policy cannot systematically affect real variables such as output and
unemployment. Nevertheless, changes in the monetary policy stance generally receive a great
deal of attention from the public. There are at least two reasons  for this. First of all, monetary
policy can systematically affect the rate of inflation which is something the public does care
about. In the real world many assumptions underpinning models which feature the classical
dichotomy do not hold. For instance, there seems to be a clear positive empirical relationship
between the rate of inflation and its variability. Under conditions of imperfect information
about the general price level, the latter may diminish the information content of changes in
relative prices thus distorting economic decisions (see e.g. Cukierman (1984)). Next, inflation
will cause arbitrary transfers of wealth from net lenders to net borrowers and it may not be
possible to insure oneself against this. Even if agents try to insulate themselves from the
effects of higher and more volatile rates of inflation it is reasonable to assume that the amount
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of resources they will devote to such hedging activities (e.g. through the use of financial
innovations) will be positively related to the rate of inflation as well. These efforts will
diminish the pool of resources available for directly productive activities. Also, as non-
indexed financial instruments are still widely used, an increase in inflation uncertainty will
cause investors to demand a higher risk premium leading to an increase in long-term real
interest rates.'
The second reason why the public cares about the monetary policy stance is that monetary
policy may not be neutral in the short run due to the existence of nominal rigidities and
information asymmetries.2 Therefore, monetary policy can at least in principle be used to
stabilise real variables such as unemployment even though the long run values of these
variables will be fully determined by real factors.
Given the fact that monetary policy has a considerable impact on the mean rate of inflation
and on the variance of several real variables, both of which affect social welfare, the question
then becomes: what is the best way to conduct monetary policy? Traditionally, the answer to
this question has divided economists into two camps, those who favour a discretionary policy
which can actively react to shocks affecting inflation and output and those who advocate non
feed-back time-invariant rules. Basically, discretion implies setting monetary policy optimally
in every period given the circumstances prevailing in that period and without paying attention
to the implication of the current monetary policy stance for future periods. This view was
prevalent especially  in the 1960's and early 1970's  when  it was believed that governments
should play an active role in achieving optimal macro-economic outcomes. As far as
monetary policy is concerned, it was believed that there existed a permanent and stable trade-
off between inflation and unemployment. Hence, the policymaker could pick the socially
optimal point on the inflation-output frontier and use a large scale carefully specified macro-
econometric model of the economy to determine the monetary (and fiscal) policy stance
required to reach this point. However, discretionary policy lost a lot of its appeal as a result of
the   period of stagflation experienced   in   the late 1970's and early 1980's. This caught
i Related to these arguments, another reason why the public cares about the monetary policy stance is that it may
have a considerable effect on financial markets and therefore household wealth (even though of course monetary
 olicy
cannot systematically affect the fundamental value of e.g.  stock prices).
For instance, producers may partly interpret an increase in the general price level as an increase in the relative
price of their product which will elicit a temporary increase in production (see Lucas (1973)). The same will
happen if an increase in inflation temporarily reduces real wages because nominal wage contracts are signed for
a few periods ahead.
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proponents of this view by surprise since a simultaneous increase in unemployment and
inflation is inconsistent with the afore-mentioned Phillips-curve trade-off.
By contrast, economists who favoured non-activist rules generally placed a lot of faith in the
ability of the market mechanism to achieve socially satisfactory results and believed that
activist government interventions would more often than not be counterproductive. In other
words, due to lags between changes in the instrument of policy and its effect on the economy
and due to the fact that policymakers are faced with a lot of uncertainty concerning the
workings of the economy and the shocks hitting it, they believed that activist policies may
actually end up increasing rather than diminishing the variability of real variables. Moreover,
they argued that a simple time-invariant rule would act as a nominal anchor inducing low and
stable inflationary expectations thereby helping to maintain a low and stable actual rate of
infation.
The insistence on the importance of inflationary expectations for macroeconomic outcomes
also provided the theoretical underpinnings for a successful challenge to the Keynesian notion
that there is a stable long run trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Instead,
Friedman (1968) argued that the Phillipscurve will be vertical in the long-run in the sense that
any gain in output obtained from an increase in inflation will only be temporary. For instance,
if workers expect the current price level to be equal to the price level in the previous period,
any increase in the nominal wage rate stemming from an increase in the money supply will
cause their perceived real wage rate to go up. As a result, workers will supply more labour.
Simultaneously, employers, who are assumed not to be subject to this kind of misperception,
can offer what amounts to a lower real wage rate which causes the demand for labour and
hence employment to go up as well. However, as soon as workers realise that the price level
has risen, they will demand higher nominal wages to restore the real wage that prevailed
before the monetary shock. Eventually, this will cause the rate of unemployment to return to
what Friedman termed its natural level, i.e. the level of unemployment that prevails in the
absence of inflationary surprises and which is determined purely by real (or supply side)
factors. Consequently, an increase in the money supply will in the long run only induce a
permanently higher rate of inflation without the gain o f a reduced unemployment rate.
The realisation that inflationary expectations are highly relevant was further enhanced by the
rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics (see e.g. Lucas (1973)). In particular, it
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led economists to emphasise that the central bank's credibility in delivering a low and stable
rate of inflation is a very important asset. Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon
(1983) showed that monetary policy can be seen as a strategic game between the central bank
and wage setters. Insofar as the socially optimal rate of unemployment lies below the natural
rate, a policymaker acting under discretion will be faced with a time-inconsistency problem.
Since the policymaker is aware of the fact that any policy action which is anticipated by the
public will have no real effects she will find it optimal ex ante to announce a rate of inflation
which is equal to the socially optimal rate. However, if the public believes this announcement,
the policymaker will have an incentive to cheat ex post and engineer a surprise inflation to
bring about a decrease in unemployment: Since the public will be aware of the policymaker's
incentives and since it has the same information as the policymaker, it will anticipate this
increase in inflation when signing nominal contracts. This will cause the economy to end up
with an inflationary bias in the sense that inflation will exceed the socially optimal rate
without even a temporary reduction in unemployment. In this setting, the credibility of the
central bank and social welfare could be significantly improved if the policymaker were to
commit to an ironclad and time-invariant fixed inflation rule.
Hence, both from a practical and a theoretical perspective the balance of opinion seemed to
tilt in favour of non-feedback rules as an antidote to  the high rates of inflation observed in  the
1970's and 1980's.  One  of the most practical proposals  in this respect  is the fixed money
growth rule proposed by Milton Friedman which was used as a framework for disinflation
notably in the US under Fed Chairman Paul Volcker and in the UK under Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher. However, this framework was not without problems. From a practical
perspective, maintaining the growth rate of some chosen monetary aggregate within pre-
announced bands was greatly complicated by large and unpredictable shifts in the demand for
money caused by financial liberalisation and financial innovations.4 Another example of a
fixed rule for monetary policy is the adherence to a fixed exchange rate. This strategy worked
very well for the small and very open economy of The Netherlands which tied the guilder to
the Deutschmark and (after 1983) geared monetary policy entirely towards the maintenance of
3 At the point where inflation is equal to the socially optimal rate, the marginal  cost of a surprise inflation will  be
zero while the marginal benefit will be strictly positive since the natural rate of unemployment exceeds the
socially optimal rate.
4 This velocity instability problem may have been partly brought about by the intention to adhere strictly to the
pre-announced monetary targets which caused this strategy to fall victim to Goodhart's law which states that
'..any   statistical   regularity   will   tend   to   collapse   once   pressure   is    put   upon   it   for   control    purposes..'   (see
Goodhart (1989)
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the fixed parity. The fact that De Nederlandsche Bank reacted quickly and without hesitation
whenever the foreign exchange markets showed any attempt to test the parity resulted in a
very high degree of credibility.  This, in turn, allowed the Dutch economy to benefit  from the
Bundesbank's well-established tradition of monetary stability. However, for many other
countries which tried to tie their currencies to the Deutschmark the concomitant inability to
respond to particular domestic circumstances proved to be an insurmountable problem.
Sooner or later this led to doubts about the credibility of the exchange rate arrangement,
increases in interest rate differentials and ultimately the abandonment ofthis kind of monetary
policy rule.
Moreover,    in    the mid 1980's developments in economic theory also challenged    the
presumption that a non-feedback and time-invariant rule would be optimal from a social point
of view. First of all, within the class of models involving the Lucas supply function (where
the ability of the policymaker to affect output in the short run depends on whether or not she
has private information) economists began to recognise that the policymaker will have an
information advantage over the public. This is because nominal wage contracts will remain in
place for a prolonged period of time once they have been signed. Effectively, this means that
the policymaker will be able to stabilise unexpected output shocks that occur after contracts
have been signed because she can generate a surprise inflation (see e.g. Rogoff (1985)). As a
result,  on the assumption that society cares about the variability of output, a situation in which
the rate of inflation reacts to unexpected output shocks may be more conducive to social
welfare than the maintenance of a fixed time-invariant inflation rule. 5
Next, the notion that output is demand determined (at least in the short run) was revived by
the New-Keynesian school in macroeconomics which provided explicit micro foundations for
the existence ofnominal rigidities.6 Apart from the Lucas supply function this led to two other
specifications of the economy's aggregate supply relationship which are now widely used in
the literature. First of all, the accelerationst Phillipscurve in which price setting is purely
backward looking was revived by Svensson (1997b) who used it to analyse the
5 Rogoff (1985) introduced the notion of private information about supply shocks to show that society gains  from
appointing a conservative banker (i.e. a central banker who is more inflation averse than society). In particular. in
this model the supply shock is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and both the central banker and
society have an output target which exceeds the natural rate. The commitment solution then involves the absence
of an inflationary bias (in the sense the the expected rate of inflation will be equal to the socially optimal rate)
and stabilisation of supply shock in accordance with society's preferences. In the absence of a credible
commitment mechanism the optimal degree of conservatism will be determined by the balance between
crediblity (i.e. the need to reduce the inflationary bias) and flexiblity (i.e. the need to stabilise ouput in
accordance with social preferences).
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implementation of inflation targeting. Secondly, Calvo (1983) developed a model in which a
fixed fraction of firms acting in a monopolistically competitive environment are allowed to
reset their prices in any given period. This will cause firms to base their price setting on
expected future marginal costs. As a result the current rate of inflation will be determined by
the expected rate of inflation in the next period and the current output gap. The implications of
this New-Keynesian Phillipscurve are surveyed in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). Since
monetary policy is generally agreed to be a major determinant of aggregate demand, these
developments further enhanced economists' interest in the question to what extent monetary
policy should be used to stabilise real variables.
In sum, both in economic theory and in real world policymaking attention has shifted back
and forth between discretionary monetary policy and a policy based on rules. Discretion
yields flexibility to respond to particular economic circumstances but because of a lack of
commitment and its concomitant credibility problems inflationary expectations may be high
and volatile. By contrast, non-feedback rules have the advantage of providing a clear anchor
for inflationary expectations but do not have any flexibility to respond to idiosyncratic (and
possibly severe) shocks which hit the economy from time to time. Consequently, it would
seem optimal to design and implement a monetary policy framework which is, in a manner of
speaking, 'between rules and discretion', i.e. such that it combines the advantages of both
'extremes' and therefore by definition avoids most of the problems associated with both
approaches. The strategy of direct inflation targeting provides  such a framework. 7
1.2: The Implementation of Inflation Targeting
Starting in the late 1980's many countries which had previously experienced severe problems
with other monetary policy frameworks began to see direct inflation targeting as means to
achieve monetary stability. Although there are differences in the implementation of this
regime across these countries, every inflation targeting regime nevertheless to some extent
displays three crucial elements. First of all, the legislative authority assigns an explicit
quantitative inflation target to the central bank. Next, the central bank is granted instrument
6 For an overview see Mankiw and Romer (1991))
i For excellent surveys of inflation targeting see Leiderman and Svensson (1995), Haldane (1995) and Bernanke,
Lauback, Mishkin and Posen (1998).
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independence to achieve this target over the medium term. Finally, the central bank is held
accountable to the legislative authority for achieving the inflation target.
1.   An Explicit Quantitative Target
Most governments now realise that the only macroeconomic variables monetary policy can
affect systematically are nominal variables such as the rate of inflation and the nominal
exchange rate. In order to tie down the  long run values of these variables any monetary policy
regime needs a nominal anchor. In other words, the real general equilibrium of the economy
will determine the long-run values of all real variables but in itself does not yield a solution
for the long run rate of inflation.8 As a result, agents need a clear reference point on which
their inflationary expectations can be focussed. In a regime of direct inflation targeting the
explicit inflation target serves the purpose of providing a simple and clear nominal anchor.
Central banks are expected to achieve this target over an appropriately defined horizon.
Which horizon is appropriate in this respect will depend on the control lag (i.e. the amount of
time it takes before a change in monetary policy feeds through into the rate of inflation) and
the extent to which the central bank cares about stabilising real variables around their long-run
natural rates. A concern for stability in the real economy may warrant a temporary deviation
of the inflation rate from the target but in essence this concern  will only determine the speed
with which inflation is returned to target after the economy has been hit by a shock. In other
words, a successful implementation of inflation targeting will cause the average rate of
inflation over a prolonged period  of time to be equal  to the assigned target.  In this respect,  an
explicit inflation target will introduce a rule-based aspect in monetary policy.
2. Instrument Independence
Of course, the credibility of such an 'inflation target rule' will be vital to its successful
implementation. It is widely agreed that this credibility can to a large extent be achieved by
granting the central bank instrument independence. In other words, the central bank should
have the freedom to set the interest rate to achieve the assigned policy objectives without
political interference. However, the fact that most inflation targeting central banks are
essentially subjected to an objective function assigned by the government means that they do
8 Other nominal variables such as the nominal exchange rate and the nominal interest rate basically consist of a
real and a nominal part where the latter is directly influenced by the rate of inflation.
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not enjoy goal independence. The reason for this is that many countries which implement
inflation targeting feel that goal independence would diminish the democratic legitimacy of
monetary policy which in itself is after all a public good. Central bank independence has
attracted a great deal of attention in the academic literature (for a survey see De Haan and
Eij ffinger  (1996)).   One  of the most robust results stemming  from this literature  is that there
appears to be a negative correlation between the degree of central bank independence (CBI)
and the average rate of inflation.' This may be one of the reasons why so many countries
experienced an increase   in the degree   of CBI since   the mid 1980's.   From a theoretical
perspective, CBI may be modeled in several different ways each of which highlights another
aspect. For instance, Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998) argue that the degree of CBI will be
equal to the influence that a conservative central banker can exert on monetary policy relative
to the influence exerted by the government (which is assumed to share society's preferences).
In this respect they show that there will be a trade-off between independence and
conservativeness. Alternatively, Lohmann (1992) argues that the degree of CBI will be
positively related to the cost incurred by the government when it decides to override the
decision of the conservative central banker. In this model there will be a range of shock
realisations for which the central banker can set monetary policy according to her own
preferences. However, for relatively extreme values of the shock the central banker will be
forced to partially accommodate the government's preferences to avoid being overridden, i.e.
outside the region of independence monetary policy will be determined by a convex
combination of the conservative central banker's and the government's preferences. Next,
quite recently some economists (e.g. Blinder (1998)) have asserted that the essential
difference between a politically subservient and an independent central banker is that the latter
will not try to push output above the long-run natural rate systematically. In this view, central
bank independence can be seen as a situation in which the government assigns a loss function
to the central bank which features the stabilisation of inflation around the assigned target, the
stabilisation of output around the natural rate and some relative weight on both of these
sometimes conflicting objectives.10 Even if politicians realise that there is no long run trade-
off between inflation and unemployment, they may nevertheless be tempted to push output
9 Of course, this correlation need not imply a causal relationship. For instance, it has been argued that both may
be the result of the degree to which society cares about low and stable rates of inflation.
10 As noted by Cukierman (2000) in practice there is a lot of opaqueness concerning the exact value of this
relative weight even though central bank laws do provide some indication of the differences between countries.
For instance, the fact that the Maastricht Treaty mentions price stability as the only objective for monetary policy
whereas  the  Bank of England Act passed  in 1998 mentions price stability  and the obligation to support  the
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above the natural rate when seeking re-election. Obviously, this temptation is not present for
central bankers whose term in office is not determined by opinion polls. In this approach the
credibility of monetary policy is significantly enhanced since the absence of a temptation to
push output above the natural rate systematically implies that there will be no average
inflationary bias in monetary policy. Hence, the introduction of an explicit inflation target
combined with CBI in the sense described by Blinder (1998) will ensure that the economy has
a clear and credible nominal anchor for monetary policy.
Moreover, this kind of CBI also allows the beneficial elements of discretion to be introduced
in the conduct of monetary policy." To attain the goals assigned to her the central banker will
have to take all relevant information into account when setting the interest rate. As a result,
the interest rate will have to respond to all shocks hitting the economy. Hence, the rule-like
elements embodied in the assigned loss function will be translated into an endogenous optimal
instrument rule. In this respect Blinder (1998) argues that an instrument independent central
banker will (intuitively) follow the Dynamic Programming Approach. Given the long tags in
monetary policy, the policymaker will select an entire path of current and future interest rates
which is optimal given all the information she has today.  I f this in formation set changes  in the
next period, she will simply select an entire new path for interest rates. In other words, a
policy base on the DPA will, on the one hand, be systematic and forward-looking, but it will
at the same time also display the flexibility to respond to particular circumstances.
3.  Accountability and Transparency
As mentioned before, price stability as well as a low variation of real variables over time are
important to social welfare. Therefore, the central bank should be held accountable to
Parliament for achieving its assigned goals. 12 According to Cukierman (1999) the concept of
accountability has two distinct aspects. Narrow accountability refers to a situation where (as
in the case of the ECB) the main objective of monetary policy is the achievement of price
stability  and  where   '.. the central  bank is  responsible for  its performance on this objective to a
higher authority..' (see Cukierman (1999, p. 4)). In this respect, the assignment of an explicit
quantitative inflation target constitutes an important element of accountability since it
government's objectives for growth and unemployment may be seen as an indication that the relative weight on
output stabilisation in the UK exceeds that of the ECB.
" After all, the detrimental effects of discretion are largely connected to the temptation to systematically exploit
the inflation-output trade-off.
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provides an unequivocal yardstick by which the public can judge the central bank's
performance over a prolonged period of time.
Broad accountability, on the other hand, refers to a situation where the central bank clearly
has multiple objectives and in which there is a mechanism through which Parliament can in
some specifically prescribed situations alter the central bank's trade-off between the inflation
and other objectives. Eijffinger, Hoeberichts and Schaling (1999) refer to this concept as
'accountability through final responsibility' and model it in the tradition of Lohmann (1992)
as the cost the government will incur when it decides to override the conservative central
banker's decision. Both Cukierman (1999) and Eijffinger et al. (1999) argue that the concept
ofbroad accountability implies a trade-offbetween CBI and its concomitant credibility bonus,
on the one hand, and accountability, on the other. In particular, the latter authors show that an
increase in the cost of overriding (which increases CBI and reduces accountability through
final responsibility) will lower the inflationary bias at the expense of less stabilisation of
supply shocks.
Nevertheless, accountability can also be enhanced in ways that do not reduce CBI. For
instance, many elements of central bank transparency (i.e. the degree to which the central
bank releases private information about its own preferences and/or shocks hitting the
economy to the public) will make it easier to monitor the central bank, thereby increasing the
degree of accountability. Cukierman (1999) argues that transparency will become more
important when the central bank has multiple objectives. This is because in the short-run there
may be a trade-off between these objectives. This may warrant a temporary deviation of the
rate of inflation from its assigned target in the sense that inflation is not returned to target at
the shortest possible horizon. However, observationally such a discrepancy may also arise
when the policymaker deviates in some respects from the policy goals announced to the
public and, for instance, tries to attain a level of output which exceeds the natural rate. More
transparency about the central bank's preferences will then make it easier for the public to
ascertain that the observed difference between the inflation rate and its target is indeed caused
by a short-run conflict between the democratically assigned and announced objectives rather
than by an attempt to cheat them. In this respect, Eijffinger et al (1999) model the degree of
transparency as being inversely related the variance of the central banker's preference shocks
and show that the inflationary bias will decrease ifpreferences become more stable over time.
I2 For an elaborate exposition and quantification of the concept of accountability across different countries see
De Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1999).
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However, the academic debate on the optimal degree of transparency is far from settled.  On
the one hand, Nolan and Schaling (1996), Faust and Svensson (1999) and Geraats (1999)
show that more transparency is beneficial to social welfare for much the same reason as stated
in Eijffinger et al. However, Cukierman (1999) shows that a regime of limited transparency
may be more conducive to social welfare than a regime of full transparency because in the
latter the policymaker will relinquish an important information advantage that could be used
to    stabilise real variables.1 1 The differences    of opinion regarding the optimal degree   o f
transparency as well as the different particular circumstances facing central banks are to some
extent also reflected in the degree to which various central banks release information to the
public. For instance, the Bank of England displays a very high degree of transparency through
the publication of conditional inflation forecasts, early publication of the minutes of MPC-
meetings, regular inflation reports, Parliamentary Select Committee hearings etc. This practice
may be explained by the relatively high degree of importance attached to accountability
within the British political system, the emphasis on individual responsibility of MPC-
members for monetary policy performance and the fact that the Bank of England's remit
clearly points to output stabilisation  as a secondary obj ective for monetary policy.
On the other hand, the ECB seems to be more inclined to take the view that accountability
implies that it should be judged on its ex post record on achieving price stability causing it to
display a more limited degree of transparency. This could be explained by the fact that the
drafters of the Maastricht Treaty, by giving the ECB some degree of goal independence (in
the sense that the operational translation of price stability was left to the ECB Governing
Council), attached relatively less importance   to   what Eij ffinger   et   al.   (1999) have termed
accountability through final responsibility. Within the Euro area this probably makes sense
since, unlike in the case of a single country, it is not clear which higher authority within the
European Union should give instructions to the ECB. Next, the fact that the Maastricht Treaty
only mentions price stability as the objective of monetary policy causes the need for elaborate
ex ante explanations of monetary policy to be less pressing. Finally,  the ECB argues that early
publication of minutes would impair discussion which can be explained from its emphasis on
collective rather than individual responsibility and the fact that it may cause national central
bank governors to be criticised within their own countries. Nevertheless, the ECB does make
a clear effort to increase its transparency in ways it feels will not impair its independence and
l 3 Eij ffinger et al (1999) also show that increased transparancy will lead to less stabilisation of supply shocks.
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credibility (e.g. regular press conferences and interviews and, recently, the publication of
forecasts).
1.3:     Outline of this Thesis
As indicated by its title, this thesis will address several issues in the implementation of
inflation targeting and its implications for how the central bank sets the interest rate. Given
our general discussion in the previous sections it is instructive to clearly outline the specific
interpretation of inflation targeting used in Chapters 2-5 of this thesis. First of all, we assume
that the government decides on the goals of monetary policy. Hence the central bank does not
have goal independence but it does have complete instrument independence in the sense that
we abstract from mechanisms by which the government can override the central banker's
decision ex post. As far as the goals of monetary policy are concerned, the government
determines the explicit inflation target, instructs the central bank to stabilise output around the
long run natural rate and specifies the relative weight the central bank should attach to these
two objectives. Hence, throughout Chapters 2-5 it is assumed that the central bank is fully
transparent about its objectives. As far as transparency about economic shocks is concerned
we will discuss situations in which there is no information asymmetry in this respect
(Chapters 2 and 4) and in which the central bank may have private information (Chapters 3
and 5). The reason for this is mainly that Chapters 2 and 4 deal with sticky price models in
which output is demand determined. By contrast, Chapters 3 and 5 deal with models in which
we implicitly assume that prices in the goods market are flexible. In other words, in these
chapters the monetary transmission mechanism involves the Lucas supply function because of
which the central bank needs private information to be able to affect output in the short run.
When such an information advantage is present in these chapters this can in principle stem
from two different sources. First of all, it may arise in the presence of sticky nominal wages
because of which the central bank's reaction to unexpected shocks which occur after nominal
contracts have been signed will engineer a surprise inflation. Hence, implicitly, it is assumed
that the central bank and the public possess the same information at contracting time. It has to
be said that in this case the central bank can in principle still be completely transparent about
shocks hitting the economy. Since nominal wages are assumed to be fixed and since the
interest rate is set after they have been signed, releasing such information will have no effect
on macroeconomic outcomes. This interpretation   is most appropriate for Chapter  3.   On  the
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other hand, a surprise inflation can also be brought about if nominal wages and interest rates
are determined simultaneously and if the public and the central bank have access to different
information sets. In particular, the central bank may have private information about upcoming
supply shocks. In that case the central bank has a choice between revealing this information
(thus impairing its ability to affect output in the short run) or maintaining its information
advantage. This situation is more applicable to Chapter 5 of this thesis in which we study
macroeconomic outcomes under both a full and a limited transparency regime. 14
In Chapter 6 we will implicitly take this inflation targeting framework as given and study the
conduct of foreign exchange interventions in a large open economy in which the nominal
exchange rate has relatively little effect on the domestic objectives of policy. In this model,
the central bank displays a limited degree of transparency in two distinct ways. First of all, it
retains private information about its own preferences concerning exchange rate movements
and, secondly, it provides the market with a noisy signal o f the actual intervention volume.
The rest of this thesis is divided into three parts each of which will start with a short
discussion of the issues at hand. The first part deals with some (largely positive) issues in the
implementation of inflation targeting. In particular, we will study the consequences of
inflation targeting for the term structure of interest rates (Chapter 2) and we will provide an
explanation for and explore the consequences of the well-established practice of interest rate
stepping (Chapter 3). The second part discusses the normative issue of the optimal degree of
output stabilisation in an inflation targeting regime. To this end, Chapter 4 presents a sticky
price model which is amended with uncertainty about the potential level of output. Chapter 5
discusses a model with flexible prices and determines the optimal degree of output
stabilisation under a convex Phillipscurve. Part III of this thesis will discuss the conduct of
sterilised foreign exchange interventions in an inflation targeting regime in which the
policymaker does not wish to allow his exchange rate objective to interfere with his objectives
for inflation and output (Chapter 6). Finally, Chapter 7 concludes.
14 However, we will not deal with the question which of these regimes is optimal but rather take them as given in
order to focus on the main issue o f this chapter which  is the socially optimal degree of output stabilisation.
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Part I: Some Issues in the Implementation of Inflation
Targeting
A substantial part of monetary economics deals with the question how to translate ultimate
policy goals into current instrument levels. Within the specific context of inflation targeting
one of the seminal contributions in this respect was made by Svensson (1997b) who argued
that because of lags in monetary policy inflation targeting implies inflation forecast targeting.
In other words, the central bank's inflation forecast, conditional on all information available
today and chosen at an appropriate horizon will become the intermediate target of monetary
policy. Which horizon is appropriate in this case may depend on several issues, the most
important of which are the time lag between changes in the instrument of monetary policy
and its effect on inflation and output and the degree to which the central bank seeks to
stabilise output around potential. Svensson argues that the conditional inflation forecast can
be seen as the ideal intermediate target since it is by definition closely related to the ultimate
goal of monetary policy and since it can be influenced instantaneously by the central bank's
instrument.
As argued more elaborately in Chapter  1, an appealing feature o f this framework is that  it can
be seen as a framework with both rule-based elements and the discretion to react to new
developments in the economy (see also Bernanke et al (1998)). The explicit inflation target
itself and the central bank's optimal conditional inflation forecast provide a clear anchor for
inflationary expectations. Of course, the forecast may deviate from the target at any given
point in time. However, if monetary policy is conducted optimally, there will be no
systematic deviations between the forecast and the inflation target. Moreover, in practice
inflation targeting central banks such as the Bank of England display a large degree of
transparency by making a substantial effort to explain why the inflation forecast differs from
the target. For instance, the reasons for this may be that the central bank feels that squeezing
the effect of inflationary shocks out of the economy at the shortest possible horizon entails
too large a cost in terms of output volatility. Alternatively, the central bank may feel that the
risks surrounding the central forecast are asymmetric.
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Next, in constructing the conditional inflation forecast the central bank will be forced to take
all relevant information into account. Technically, this means that the forecast will be
translated into an endogenous optimal interest rate rule in which the interest rate will be a
function of all the determinants of future inflation and output. As a result, shocks to these
determinants will ultimately be reflected in the interest rate.
The Svensson (1997b) model provides a succinct description of the implementation of
inflation targeting, outlining principles which apply irrespective of the specific circumstances
with which different countries are faced. Nevertheless, as indicated in Chapter 1, these
specific circumstances as well as different preferences regarding, for instance, the degree of
accountability will cause the details of the implementation of inflation targeting to vary
across countries. This has led to a large literature which tries to explain these differences and
which aims to ascertain how monetary policy should be conducted in the face of particular
circumstances. For instance, recent literature discusses how monetary policy should react to
exchange rate movements, model uncertainty, different specifications of the economy's
aggregate supply relationship etc. In the second part of this thesis we will address two of
these particular issues. First of all, in Chapter 2 we will assess the implication of the
implementation of inflation targeting  for the term structure of interest rates.  In this respect we
find that variables such as the duration of long-term bonds and the central bank's relative
weight on output stabilisation may have very different implications for short and long term
interest rates. In Chapter 3 we rationalise the well-established practice of not changing the
interest rate in the face of continuously changing circumstances by assuming the central bank
suffers a small loss in utility every time it decides to change the interest rate. Subsequently,
we relate differences in the size of interest rate step and the expected time period till the next
interest rate step to underlying macroeconomic variables. Finally, we show that an
inflationary bias may emerge if preferences are asymmetric even though the central banker
does not try to push output above the natural rate systematically.
The Term Structure of Interest Rates                                                                                17
Chapter 2: Inflation Forecast Targeting and the Term
Structure of Interest Rates
2.1: Introduction
Since the early 1990's the conduct of monetary policy  in many countries has switched  to  a
regime of direct inflation targeting. This change was triggered either as a result of the
breakdown of the relationship between money growth rates and inflation (New Zealand and
Canada) or because of the disappointment following the use of exchange rates as an
intermediate target (United Kingdom, Sweden and Finland). The use of explicit inflation
targets derives its theoretical rationale from the fact that they can be used to overcome
credibility problems since they can mimick the results of optimal performance incentive
contracts (see Walsh (1995) and Svensson (1997a)).Is However, these theories assume that
central banks can instantaneously choose the rate o f inflation. Contrary to this assumption, in
practice central banks can only affect inflation imperfectly and after a considerable time lag.
Virtually all central banks implement monetary policy by setting the price at which the
banking system's systematic shortage of central bank balances on the interbank money
market will be relieved. This gives the central bank near-perfect and instantaneous control
over the day-to-day interbank interest rate. From a theoretical perspective this raises the issue
as to how explicit inflation targets should be translated into monetary policy instruments. A
first contribution to this question was made by Svensson (1997b) who has shown that,
because of lags in the transmission process, inflation targeting implies inflation forecast
targeting. In this analysis the inflation forecast produced by the central bank's structural
model of the economy16 becomes an ideal intermediate target since it is by definition closely
related to the ultimate policy goal and since it can be perfectly controlled by the central bank.
15 For an analysis that looks at the implications of preference uncertainty for the equivalence of linear Walsh
(1995) contracts and (quadratic) Svensson (19973) inflation targets, see Schaling, Hoebenchts and Eijffinger
(1998).
16 Bemanke and Woodford (1997) have argued that inflation forecast targeting can only work if the inflation
forecast is based on the central bank's own structural model of the economy. They show that responding to
private sector forecasts may lead to indeterminacy or non-existence of a rational expectations equilibrium.
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Furthermore, the inflation forecast will lead to an endogenous optimal interest rate reaction
function which has the same form as the Taylor rule (Taylor (1993)). Also, the past few years
have seen a revival of interest in the importance of the term-structure of interest rates for the
transmission of monetary policy (e.g. Turnovsky (1989) and Goodfriend (1997)). When
short-term inflationary expectations are given, a particular level of the central bank's key
interest rate will pin down the short-term real interest rate. According to the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure, the current short-term real rate and market expectations
concerning future short-term real rates then determine the long real rate. This long-term real
rate term will, in turn, affect the determinants of aggregate demand. Recently, research on the
term  structure has focussed on explanations  for the failure of predictive content of long-short
spread for future movements in interest rates (McCallum (1994) and Rudebusch (1995)), and
on the interaction between the term structure and shifts in the conduct of monetary policy in
VAR-models (Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Fuhrer (1996)).
The purpose of this chapter is to incorporate the term structure of interest rates into the
Svensson (1997b) inflation forecast targeting framework. To this end, Section 2 presents a
model in which monetary policy affects the real economy via the term structure. In Section 3
we derive the endogenous optimal interest rate reaction function. We show that the optimal
short-term interest rate will be more responsive to the underlying state of the economy as the
lifetime of the long-term bond, as measured by its duration, increases.  Next, in Section 4 we
discuss the implications of inflation forecast targeting for the long-term real interest rate and
the long-term expected inflation rate. We show that the long-term nominal interest rate will
be less responsive to the current state of the economy as a result of an increase in duration.
Moreover, the effect of the relative weight on output stabilisation  on the responsiveness  of the
long-term nominal interest rate turns out to be ambiguous. Finally, in Section 5 we examine
the implications of inflation forecast targeting for the spread between short- and long-term
interest rates. In particular, the optimal conduct of monetary policy will induce a positive
relationship between the nominal term spread and future output. It is shown that this
relationship will become stronger if either the duration of the long bond increases or if the
relative weight on output stabilisation decreases. Section 6 concludes.
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2.2: Monetary Policy and the Term Structure
The purpose of this section is to incorporate the term-structure of interest rates in the
Svensson (1997b) inflation forecast targeting framework. To this end we assume that the
short-term nominal interest rate (i,)  and the long-term nominal interest rate (I,) are related by
the following version of the Pure Expectations Hypothesis (PEH):
-                                         D4= (1-k)Ek -'E,i.    i    k - - (2.1)
T=l 1+D
Here It represents the nominal yield to maturity on a bond with maturity m (>1) while i,
denotes the nominal yield on a one period bond which is traded on the interbank money
market. This means that   i, is under perfect control of the central bank and can therefore be
seen as the instrument of monetary policy.
Schiller, Campbell and Schoeholtz (1983) have shown that any finite maturity bond can be
approximated by an infinite maturity consol bond provided the (geometric) weights ensure
that the duration of the consol is equal to the duration of the finite maturity bond. Assuming
the duration of the long bond is constant and equal to D yields the linear approximation in
equation (2.1)." An increase in duration will cause the weighting pattern to decline less
rapidly because of which, relatively speaking, the long-term interest rate will to a greater
extent be determined by expected future short-term interest rates.
For our purposes it turns out to be convenient to rewrite (2.1) in its equivalent first-order
form:
I. = (1-k)4 + kE,4.1 (2.2)
17 The concept of duration allows for a comparison between the holding period returns on discount bonds and coupon
bonds. The duration of a discount bond is equal to its maturity. Because a coupon bond can be seen as a package of
discount bonds each of which  has a different maturity, its duration, which is intended to be a measure of the length of time
an investor invests his money, will be a weighted average of the maturities of the underlying discount bonds. The weight on
each maturity is then the present value of the discount bond using the coupon bond's yield to maturity as a discount rate.
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Note that the long and short real interest rates will be equal  if the parameter k is equal  to zero.
In that case the model will collapse into the original Svensson (1997b) model in which there
is no distinction between short and long-term interest rates.
Following the well-known Fisher decomposition, the short-term nominal rate can be written
as the sum of the real short-term interest rate (r,) and expected inflation in the next period
conditional on the information available in period t (E,Tr„,):
i,        =         r,        +         E,Ir,+1 (2.3)
Plugging equation (2.3) into (2.1) and rearranging we can decompose the long-term nominal
rate into a long term real interest rate (R,) and a long-term expected inflation rate conditional
on the information available in the current period (Ilt')




[I;   =  (1 -k)Ek'-'E,;r,*1
.=f
Following Svensson (1997b) we assume that inflation and output are linked by the following
short-term Phillips-curve relationship:
I 8
lE  ,+,      =      Tr ,      + a,y, (2.5)
where 4  - p, - p,t , the inflation rate in period t (p, is the (log of the) price level). The
variable y, represents the (log of the) output gap in period t where potential output has been
normalised to zero. Finally, the parameter a
1
measures the slope of the Phillips-curve. The
output gap is determined by the following dynamic relationship:
18 This equation can either be seen as representing a situation of purely backward-looking expectations or as a
reduced form of the following equation: ;r,+1  =(1 - 0)E,lr,+1 + 8:r, + (oy, in which case it holds that a, =
(0/0.
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Y,+, = B,y, - R. + x,*, (2.6)
Following Svensson (1997b) we assume that output is serially correlated (0 5 Bt < 1).
However, whereas in the Svensson model output is decreasing in the short-term real interest
rate with a lag of one period, here we assume that next period's output gap is decreasing in
the long-term real interest rate (R,). This assumption can be justified on the grounds that the
interest rate sensitive components of aggregate demand generally do not depend directly on
the day-to-day interbank money market interest rate but rather on the yield on some financial
• 19         ·     · •asset with a longer maturity.  For simplicity we assume that there is only one long-term
interest rate in the output equation. Finally, output is increasing in an exogenous demand
shock (x,+t) which is also serially correlated and stationary (05113<1)
XIA = 132x, + E,+1        ' 44 NAGS (2.7)
Having described the structure of the economy it remains to specify the preferences of the
central bank. Monetary policy is conducted by a central bank with an explicit inflation target
Tr' which aims to minimise deviations of inflation from this assigned target, on the one hand,
and fluctuations of output around the natural rate (which is normalised to zero), on the other. 20
Consequently, the central bank will choose a sequence of current and future short-term
nominal rates to minimise the following loss function:
Lca    =    E,Xor-,[1(  ;r,-,r')2    +    Ayi ] (2.8)2      2r
19 Of course, there will be many interest rates which pertain to debt instruments of both short and long
maturities which affect aggregate demand. In this respect, the parameter D can be seen as an indicator of the
relative share of long-term private debt in the economy.
20 As noted by Svensson (1997b) this means that the central bank does have a long run inflation target (Ir') but
no long run output target (other than the natural rate of output). In other words, even though the central bank
wishes to limit short-term output variability, in the long run its only objective is price stability.
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Here k represents the central bank's relative weight on output stabilisation while the
parameter 6 (which fulfils 0<6<1) denotes the discount factor (i.e. a measure of the policy
horizon). The expectation is conditional on the central bank's information set in period t
which contains current output (y,) the current inflation rate (:r,) and the structure of the
economy as described by equations (2.3) - (2.7).21
2.3:     Derivation of the Optimal Instrument Rule
Following Svensson (1997b), the model can be solved by dynamic programming. In this
respect, next period's conditional  expectation  for output (E,y„,) can be regarded  as an indirect
control variable for the central bank. First of all, since next period's expected rate of inflation
is predetermined by the Phillips curve (2.5), perfect control over the short-term nominal
interest rate (i,) implies perfect control over the one period real interest rate (r,). Next, by
assumption the central bank is committed to the (time-invariant) loss function specified in
equation (2.8) and economic agents face no uncertainty about the parameters of this loss
function. This means  that the central  bank' s  plan for future instrument levels is fully credible
in the sense that there is no discrepancy between the central bank's planned path of future
short-term interest rates (conditional on all information available today) and the public's
perception ofplan. In other words, all expectedfuture short-term real interest rates (i.e. EAj,
j=1,2,...) will be unambiguously pinned down by the expectation that in every future period
the central bank will implement monetary policy so as to minimise its loss function.22
Consequently, for the central bank it only remains to set the current short real rate (4) so as to
attain that specific value of current long real  rate (R,) which is optimal  from the point o f view
of minimising its loss function. Hence, in a fully credible inflation targeting regime the
21 Note that here the central bank is conducting monetary policy from a clear forward looking perspective. This
means that - as elegantly stated by Greenspan in his Congressional testimony on 22 February  1995 - "..monetary
policy will  have a  better chance  of contributing  to  meeting  the  nation's  macroeconomic  objectives  if we  look
forward as we act,  however  indistinct our view of the road ahead..  "
22  Of course the expectations will be formed by the private sector. However, we do not have to take this into account
explicitly since there is no information asymmetry in the model.
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central bank will be able to control the long-term real interest rate perfectly.13 From the
dynamic output equation (2.6) it can be seen that this implies perfect control over E,y„,
Hence, as in Svensson (1997b) the central bank's problem can be reformulated as follows:
F(E,x,*1)  -  Mili  1(E,;r,*:-ir')2 + (E,y,+1)2  + E,  F(E,+114.1)1
E' "' · ,      l L Z
subject to (2.9)
E..,1[.+2 = ir..1 + a, y.*,
As shown in Appendix A, the first-order condition for the minimisation problem in equation
(2.9) will yield a rule for the central bank's conditional one-to-two year inflation forecast
(E,At.2)· This conditional inflation forecast thus becomes the central bank's intermediate
target for monetary policy and can be expressed as follows:
A
E,x,+2   =  ;r'   +  n[E,AM - A'l         ·        n _ (2.10)
6aill + A
The reduced-form parameter p  is a function  of the parameters  ai,  6  and  k (see Appendix  A).
If the central bank engages in strict inflation targeting (i.e. if the relative weight on output
stabilisation (1) is equal to zero), it will set its intermediate target equal to the inflation target.
However in the more realistic case offlexible inflation targeting, it will allow Eft.2 to adjust
gradually towards the assigned inflation target 1r: The speed of adjustment will then depend
negatively on the central bank's relative weight on output stabilisation (i.e. Dn/81 >0, see
Appendix A).
23 It may be argued that this is not in line with reality. it is, however. the logical implication of the present framework in
which the public believes that the central bank will always react predictably and optimally to economic shocks. This
suggests that uncertainty about the preferences of the central bank may be one of the reasons for imperfect control over the
long-term real rate interest rate. By this we mean imperfect control at any given moment in time. Of course, even if it had
perfect control, the central bank would not be able to engineer a systematic deviation of the actual  long-term real rate from
the equilibrium long-term real rate determined by such factors as thrift and productivity. In our model the latter is assumed
to be constant and is normalised  to zero.
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From equations (2.5) and (2.6) it can be seen that the actual one-to-two year inflation forecast
given by the structure ofthe economy will be equal to:
E,lr,+2      =      ir 1 + ai (1 + B,)y, - a,R, + a,Blx, (2.11)
In Appendix B we compute an expression for R, which is based on the assumption that the
central bank seeks to attain the optimal intermediate target in each and every period (i.e.
(2.10)  holds  for  all  r  k t) Substituting this expression  into  (2.11) we obtain an equation  for
the actual one-to-two year inflation forecast in terms  ofperiod t state variables  and the central
bank's instrument:
E,"'.2 - 1 I :,1(l    1]1.,  3,6' 1 ('. -·.) I ail '- l    ').,
(2.12)
at                                                             ai(1-k)
i [(1+#,)(1+k#,)+01(1-k)-k(n(1 -n)+Pi)ly i.
(1 + kBi) J   '      (1 + kBi)   '
Obviously, the central bank will choose i, such that the one-to-two year conditional inflation
forecast in equation (2.12) will be equal to the optimal intermediate target specified in
equation (2.10). Hence, by combining these two equations we find the following endogenous
optimal instrument rule which expresses the optimal short-term nominal interest rate as a
function of all variables that characterise the current state of the economy (henceforth to be
referred to as economic fundamentals):
F         (1- n)
i,      =     x  + I l l
(1 + k#t  - kn) Or, -,r')     +L      40-k)
(2.13)
(1 + B  -n)(1+ k#i) + al (1-k)-k(n(1 -n) + Bll) B20-kBAx.Yt  +
(1 - k) (1 - k)         '
This equation has the same form as the Taylor rule and explicitly allows for an effect of the
term structure of interest rates on the optimal instrument rule (see Proposition 2.1 below).
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Note that this endogenous interest rate rule will collapse into the Svensson rule if the output
gap is directly determined by the central bank's instrument (i.e. ifk=0).24





(1 + k/1  - kn)(,r, -,r')     +
ai (1 - k)
(2.14)
(1 + A  -n)(1 + k/7,)-k(n(1 - n) + #12) 111(1-kil,)
(1- k) (1 - k)
y, + -  XI
The effect of several parameters on the extent to which both the short-term nominal and
short-term real interest rate will respond to the indicator variables can be summarised by the
following proposition:
Proposition 2.1:
The responsiveness of the short-term interest rate (either nominal (i,) or real (r,)) to
economic fundamentals will increase if:
1. the duration ofthe long-term bond (D) increases
2. the relative weight on output stabilisation (X) decreases
3. the degree of output persistence (BI) increases
ProolE see Appendix E
The first part of Proposition 2.1 summarises the effect of the term structure on the central
bank's optimal reaction function. The interest rate will respond more strongly to economic
fundamentals if the lifetime of the long-term bond increases. This is due to a decrease in
policy leverage over the long-term interest rate as the latter will now to a greater extent be
determined by expected future short rates. However, provided central bank preferences are
24 In that case we obtain: i, = 74 + [(1-n)/at](Q,-ir') + (1+13,+a,-n)y, + 1 2 x, which can easily be shown to be the
solution to a particular variant of this model where it holds that R,=r,  .
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constant over time, a change in duration will not alter the central bank's optimal intermediate
target as expressed in equation (2.10). Therefore, the central bank will have to manipulate its
instrument more actively in order to attain the same desired effect on the long-term real
interest rate.
The second part of this Proposition is equivalent to Svensson's finding that the extent to
which the central bank's instrument will respond to the current state of the economy will
decrease as the central bank cares more about short-term output stabilisation. The intuition is
that this will reduce the speed with which the central bank plans to return inflation to its
target after the economy has been hit by a shock. Hence, the short-term interest rate will
respond less strongly to the current economic situation. This result is insensitive to the
question whether or not the term structure of interest rates constitutes an important part o f the
monetary transmission mechanism.
Finally, an increase in output persistence (B,) will increase the effect of current exogenous
shocks (xj on next period's output gap (y,+1). To offset this effect, interest rates will have to
be manipulated more actively if the central bank is to attain its objectives for output and
inflation stabilisation.
2.4:    Implications for the Long-Term Interest Rate
This section will study the implications of the optimal monetary policy rule (2.13) for the
long real rate (RJ and the long term expected inflation rate (Il,7. First of all, substituting
equation (2.14) into the expression for R, obtained in Appendix B we can derive:
(1-n)
R, = -(ir,-,r') + (1+B -n)y, + Bix, (2.15)
at
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Proposition 2.2:
The optimal long-term real interest rate (Rj will be more responsive to economic
fundamentals if:
1.        the relative weight on output stabilisation (A) decreases
2. the degree of output persistence (B,) increases
The proof follows immediately from equation (2.15) where we realise that an/al > 0. The
intuition is that in our model the long term real interest rate is exactly the same as the ex ante
real short term interest rate (it - aty, - ,r,) obtained in the model where the term structure is
absent (i.e. if k=0, see footnote 11). This result should not be surprising since in both models
the central bank seeks to attain the sarne value for E,7r,+2 which implies that in both models
Ety,+1 will be the same. The only difference is that Ezy„t will be directly influenced by i, in the
absence of the term structure while in our model the central bank will set i, such as to attain
that specific value of R, consistent with its intermediate target.
In Appendix C it is shown that, under the optimal rule, long-term expected inflation will be
determined as follows:
ni = ;r (1 - k) 01(1 - k)+                  (,r.-,r')    +                     y,                                                     (2.16)(1 - kn)
'
(1- kn)
From this expression we can infer the following proposition for the extent to which long-term
inflationary expectations will react to changes in the underlying state ofthe economy:
Proposition 2.3:
The long-term expected rate of inflation (IIt') will be more responsive to economic
fundamentals if:
1.       the duration ofthe long-term bond (D) decreases
2.        the relative weight on output stabilisation (1) increases
Proof see Appendix E
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An increase in the lifetime of the long-term bond as measured by its duration will cause the
rate of inflation expected to prevail over the lifetime of this bond to be less sensitive to
current economic fundamentals. This is because expected (one period) inflation rates in the
distant future will exert more influence on the long-term expected rate of inflation. For a
given expected path of future inflation rates as given by the central bank's optimal target rule
(2.10) this will cause the long-term expected rate of inflation to be more stable over time.
Next, an increase in the relative weight on output stabilisation will decrease the speed with
which the central bank will bring the conditional inflation forecast back in line with the
assigned target. As a result, current shocks will to a greater extent feed through into expected
future one period inflation rates and consequently into the long-term expected inflation rate.
Finally, using equation (2.4) we can express the long nominal interest rate as the sum of
equation (2.15) and (2.16).
I,    =   x'    +   a,(1 -k) + (1-n)(1-kil) (7 , - ,r,)   +
ai (1- kn)
(2.17)
a,(1-k) + (1- kn)(1 + B,  -n) y' + 02x,
(1 - kn)
Using the results obtained in Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 we can summarise the effect of several
parameters on the responsiveness of the long-term nominal interest rate to economic
fundamentals in the following table:
Table 2.1: Effect of several parameters  on the sensitivity  of  the  long  nominal  rate  to
economic fundamentals
4                          Ilt'                         I,
D        0 <0 <0
1 <0 >0           ?
B)                    >0                                  0                                >0
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This table presents the sign o f the partial derivative o f the variables listed in the first row with
respect to the parameters in the first column. First of all, an increase in the duration of the
long-term bond will induce the long-term nominal rate to be less sensitive to economic
fundamentals. Consequently, while an increase in duration will elicit a more vigorous
instrument response, this increase in central bank activism will impart a greater degree of
stability to the interest rate which affects aggregate demand. Under a fully credible inflation
targeting regime (i.e. a regime in which there is no uncertainty about the objectives of the
central bank) this effect is entirely induced through the effect on long-term inflationary
expectations.
Next, the effect of an increase in the relative weight on output stabilisation (X) on the long-
term nominal rate turns out to be ambiguous. On the one hand, a greater concern for output
stabilisation will lead the central bank to eliminate the effect of an inflationary shock more
gradually which will translate into a less vigorous response of both the current and future
expected short real rates to the state of the economy. On the other hand, this decrease in
activism will  lead to an enhanced effect o f this shock on future expected inflation rates which
will increase the expected inflation component in the long-term nominal rate.
Finally, the effect of an increase in degree of output persistence (Bt) works entirely through
the induced increased responsiveness ofcurrent and expected future short real rates.
2.5: The Behaviour of the Term Spread under the Optimal Rule
This section will look at the implication of an inflation targeting regime for the spread
between long and short-term interest rates. The real term spread can be computed by
subtracting equation (2.14) from equation (2.15). For simplicity we will assume that there is
no persistence in the exogenous demand shock (i.e. 112 = 0):
k(1 - n)(1 + Bt  - n) k(1 + 2#,  + n[n-(2 + Bi)])
Or,-  Ir'          -                                                                                 y,
ai (1 - k) (1 - k)
(2.18)
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Next, the inflation term spread can be found by subtracting E,Trt. t= 4 +aty, from equation
(2.17):
k(1- n) a1k(1 - n)
11 i  - E, n„        = - , (ir,-,r')      -                                  y,                                                                   (2.19)
(1 - Kn) (1- kn)
Of course, the nominal term spread is now simply the sum o f equations (2.18) and (2.19) so
we have: I, -it = R, - r,  + Il,' - E,lt„I .
The effect of the underlying cyclical position of the economy on the term structure can be
summarised by the following proposition:
Proposition 2.4:
If the economy experiences a boom, i.e. if 4 > T[' and y, > 0, the real term spread, the
inflation term spread and therefore also the nominal term spread will be inverted, i.e.
it will hold that: R t-r, <0,  I-It' - E,lr,+,<0  and I t-i t<0 respectively.
Proofi see Appendix E
If the current rate of inflation exceeds the target  and  i f the output  gap is positive there will be
an increase in the future rate of inflation. The central bank will not allow inflation to deviate
systematically from its target and, therefore, output will not systematically differ from
potential. If the central bank cares about output stabilisation (i.e.  if k > 0) the optimal target
rule (3.2) implies that the central bank will disinflate the economy gradually. Consequently,
expected future short-term real rates will decline gradually towards zero and expected future
inflation rates will decline gradually towards the assigned inflation target. 25
Since the long-term real rate is a weighted average of expected future real short rates and
since the long-term inflation rate is a weighted average of expected future one-period
25 In the steady state it holds that 1rt =Tr* and yt = 0. This implies that the steady state values of both the short-term and the
long-term real rates are zero and the steady state values of both the one-period and long-term expected rate of inflation are
equal to w*.
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inflation rates, both the real and the inflation term structure will be inverted as a result of
optimal monetary policy. Furthermore, this will induce a positive relationship between both
the real and the inflation term spread in period t and the output gap in period t+1. Formally
this can be inferred from the expression for Cov[ (I,-i,)y,+t  ]  = Cov[ (R,-rjy,+,  1 + Cov[  (Ilt'-
E,Tr„t)y„, 1. In Appendix D we show that this will be equal to:
  k(1 + 2#1  -
n) atk(1- n)2    1   2
Cov[(1,-i, )y,*1 1             =                             I                               a
l (1+n)(1-k) (1-nz)(1-kn) (2.20)
This result lines up with the literature on the effect of monetary policy on future output (e.g.
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Fuhrer and Moore (1995)) and is essentially the consequence
of the systematic 'leaning against the wind' policy described in this section.16 Even though
these studies indicate that the term spread predicts future output growth, they also show that
are substantial differences between countries. For instance, Smets and Tsatsaronis (1997, p 4)
present evidence that  '(...)  the correlation  between  annual  output  growth  and  the  lagged  term
spread  is  higher  in  Germany  than  in  the  United  States(...)'.  They  attribute  part  of  this
difference to the fact that the influence of inflation scares on the US nominal term spread is
much more significant than in Germany as a result of the fact that the Bundesbank enjoys a
higher degree of credibility. Furthermore, they present evidence that the Bundesbank reacts
more vigorously in real terms to various shocks than the US. While inflation scares do not
play a role in this modelii we can investigate some factors which affect the sensitivity of the
nominal term spread to current economic indicators. A more vigorous response of the real
term spread and/or the inflation term spread to current indicator variables will lead to a
stronger relationship between movements in the nominal term spread and future output. The
results are summarised in the following proposition:
26  Since in our model this predictive ability is induced by monetary policy it follows that the central bank cannot base its
policy on this predictive abillity. In reality, probably both monetary and non-monetary factors influence this relationship but
even then the central bank will have to give a structural interpretation to movements in the yield curve. indeed, following an
instrument rule of the form it = X(It - it) as proposed by McCallum ( 1994) may lead to multiple equilibria (see Bernanke
and Woodford (1997)).
27 Since the central bank is credibly committed to the loss function, the path of expected future inflation is unambiguously
tied down by the optimal target rule (3.2).
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Proposition 2.5:
The nominal term spread (I,-ij will react more strongly to economic fundamentals and
as a result the covariance between this spread and future output (Cov[(I,-ijy„,])  will
increase if:
1.        the duration ofthe long bond (D) increases
2.        the relative weight on output stabilisation (k) decreases
3.         the degree of output persistence (11,) increases.
Proof. see Appendix E
An increase in the duration of the long bond will induce an increase in the responsiveness of
both the real term spread and the inflation term spread. While an increase in duration will not
affect the long-term real rate itself, the induced decrease in policy leverage will cause the
short-term real rate (r,) to respond more strongly to current economic fundamentals. In other
words, as far as the real term spread is concerned, the increase in responsiveness to current
indicators and the concomitant increase in its predictive ability with respect to future output
can be entirely ascribed  to 'the short  end'  o f the (real) yield curve.
By contrast, an increase in duration will make 'the long end'  of the inflation term structure
(Il,7 less sensitive to current economic fundamentals while the one period expected rate of
inflation will not be affected. Both effects will cause the nominal spread to be more
responsive to economic fundamentals. The increased responsiveness of the nominal spread to
inflationary shocks is also entirely responsible for the increase in the covariance between the
nominal term spread and future output. This is because a change in duration will not affect
the speed of disin flation.28 The practical implication o f this result is that under a fully credible
inflation targeting regime the duration of the debt instrument which affects aggregate demand
will be one of the determinants of the response of the nominal term spread to economic
developments. Because of this, the financial structure o f the economy (i.e. the relative extent
28  In Appendix D it is shown that optimal monetary policy will yield the following reduced form dynamic equation for
output: yt+1 = -(1-n)yt - ((1-n)/al) (Trt-Tr') +Et+
1
Consequently, the effect of current monetary policy on future output is
fully captured by the parameter n in the optimal target rule (2.10)
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to which spending depends on long term interest rates) will influence the observed correlation
between the term spread and future output growth. Hence, the fact that many VAR-studies
(e.g. Estrella and Mishkin (1997), Smets and Tsatsaronis (1997)) indicate that the real term
spread seems to be more strongly related to future output in Germany than in the US could
also partly be explained by the fact that the financial structure of the German economy
incorporates a larger relative share of long-term debt than the US.
Next, a larger relative weight on short-term output stabilisation (X) implies a more gradual
path of disinflation after the economy has been it by an inflationary shock This will be
reflected   in  a 'flatter' inflation term structure.   As  for  the  real term structure this means  that
the current short-term real rate will be lower than it would have been in the presence of a
smaller relative weight on output stabilisation. By contrast, since inflation will be eliminated
at a lower pace, expected future short-term real rates will be higher than they would have
been for a smaller value of X. On account of these factors the real term structure will be flatter
as well. Hence, the nominal term spread will be less sensitive to indicator variables and its
predictive value for future output will diminish because of the fact that monetary policy will
exert less influence on next period's output gap.
Finally, an increase in the degree of output persistence (flt) will increase the effect of current
inflationary shocks on output in the next period and on inflation two periods into the future.
To offset this effect for a given optimal target rule (i.e. for a given planned path of
disinflation) the central bank will display a more activist response to current indicator
variables. This will  be reflected in an increase in the responsiveness of the real term spread
with respect to these indicator variables while the inflation term spread will remain
unaffected.
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2.6:   Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper incorporates the term structure of interest rates into the Svensson (1997b) inflation
forecast targeting framework. We assume that aggregate demand is not directly influenced by
the central bank's instrument (i.e. the one period nominal interest rate) but rather by the real
yield to maturity on a long-term bond. According to the Pure Expectations Hypothesis (PEH),
the nominal yield to maturity on this bond will be equal to a weighted average of expected
future instrument levels where the weights  are a decreasing function o f time. The weights can
be expressed as a function ofthe lifetime of the bond as measured by its duration.
Using the time-honoured Fisher decomposition, the model allows us to assess the effect of
inflation targeting on the short-term interest rate, the long-term real interest rate and the long-
term expected rate of inflation. An increase in the duration of the long bond will increase the
responsiveness of the central bank's instrument to the current state of the economy both in
nominal and in real terms. However, we also show that this will cause the nominal long-term
interest rate (i.e. the interest rate which affects spending) to be less sensitive to changes in the
state of the economy. This effect arises because an increase in duration will cause long-term
inflationary expectations to be less volatile.
The explicit distinction between the instrument of monetary policy and the interest rate in  the
aggregate demand equation also turns out to be crucial when we examine the effect of a
change in the central bank's relative weight on output stabilisation. If the central bank pays
more attention to output fluctuations, the short-term interest rate will respond less to changes
in the current indicators of future inflation. However, the effect on the long-term nominal
interest rate is ambiguous. Because an inflationary shock will be eliminated more gradually,
the long-term real interest rate will be less sensitive to economic fundamentals. By contrast,
since it will take longer for the inflationary effect to be eliminated, the long run expected rate
of inflation will become more sensitive to the current state of the economy.
The assumed transmission mechanism in this model implies a positive relationship between
the nominal term spread and future output which is induced by the optimal response of
monetary policy  to the state  of the economy. In particular,  i f the economy experiences  a
boom, both the real and the inflation term spread will be inverted. As for the first one this is
because the central bank will raise the short-term nominal interest rate to curb spending and
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because short-real rates are expected to fall below their current level in future. The inflation
term spread reflects the central bank's desired path towards the assigned inflation target
which is fully credible to the public. The positive covariance between the nominal term
spread and future output arises because a tightening of monetary policy is assumed to affect
output with a one-period lag. We also investigated the parameters that affect the
responsiveness of the term spread to current economic fundamentals and the strength of the
relationship between the term spread and future output. In general, factors which cause the
short-term interest rate to become more responsive to indicator variables will also serve to
increase both the sensitivity of the term spread to these variables and the correspondence
between movements in the term spread and future output.
One crucial assumption in the model is that the public does not face any uncertainty about the
parameters of the central bank's objective function. This means that the planned path of
future expected inflation rates is fully credible. Moreover, as a result the central bank will
have perfect control over the long-term real interest rate because all expected future short-
term interest rates will be pinned down by the market's expectation that the central bank will
follow its optimal instrument rule in each and every future period. Since perfect control over
long-term interest rates is not observed in the real world, one possibly interesting area for
future research would therefore be to assess the implications of uncertainty about the central
bank's objective function for the term structure of interest rates.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the Optimal Intermediate Target
This appendix provides a brief description of the derivation of the optimal intermediate target.
For a more elaborate treatment see Svensson (1997b). First of all, from equation (2.7) we
realise that the indirect loss function will be of the general form:
1
F(E,;r,*,)   =   po   +   i#(E,x.., - ir')2 (A.1)
Here, Fo and B are coefficients which remain to be determined. Next, using equation (2.7) in
the main text, the first-order condition for the central bank's optimisation problem will read
as follows:
AE,y'.i +
«,8E, 31 :t ,)} =  0                                  (A.2)
Using equation (A.1) to find an expression for the partial derivative between brackets, we can
write:
·                   AE ':r,+1   -   :r     =   --E,y,*, (A.3)
6aip
From equation (2.4) the conditional forecast of next period's output will be equal to:
EYw   =  - (E,x ,+2 - E.1r,*,) (A.4)
at
Plugging this equation into equation (A.3) and rearranging will yield equation (2.10) in the
main text.
Next, in order to identify the coefficients Bo and B in equation (A.1) we realise that using
equation (2.9) we can compute:
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al/(E,;r,+,) Fav(E,*t,r
= E, 1r :.1 - 1r + 6 E,       aE     x  '.2 )  2.1 :'.3  .1                        (A.5)BE,irm /+1 ,+2 I+1 t+I J
As far as this equation is concerned we note that from equations (A.1) and (2.4) respectively,
we can derive:
dF(EAK,+2)   =  #(E,*t,r,+2 - ;r')8E,*,ir /+2
(A.6)
DEMA,+2   =   1
8E,*ix /+1
Plugging these equations into (A.5) and using the expression obtained for (E,Tr:.2 - Tr') in
equation (2.10) we can rewrite (A.5) as follows:
«721} -  1.8.3,]CE....1 - ..)            CA.71
Identification for the coefficient for (Etir„1 - Tr') yields:
B = li +     18B    1   = F(B) (A.8)L     &1&,t +  ]
From this equation it can be seen that for B E [O , 00 ) it will hold that F(01) E [1, 1/az). Using
this it can be shown that the unique positive solution for kt will be:
1'      =                1      -       '1(1 - 6)       +       -  1.1
+ It 3- Itt     (A.9)       1(1- 8)  2     4,1    1 al              a2 / ai  j
To prove that @n/81 > 0 we first realise that we can write:
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1                 an           da n=   = <0 (A.10)
'S«  f.1                      ''(1:10                  'P      ,(da 1  1 +1)
Furthermore, using equation (A.9) we can compute:
< (1-5)   I    1,
-4 a26   A
2
< 1
aiAl         Al
\ ,1= -.
-   -.      <      0                      (A.11)8% 2 4 12                   A 
211  (1 -0
Ill + --4£1216   1,   alA
Consequently, it will hold that: &1/8% = 211/2(11/X) * 8(11/X)/8)l > 0.
Appendix B: Derivation of the Long Real Rate under the Optimal
Monetary Policy Rule
Leading equation (2.6) by one period, using equation (2.6) in the resulting expression, taking
expectations conditional on the information in period t and rearranging we obtain:
E,R,.,   =   flly,   -   E,y,+7   -   fl,R,   +   fl2(B, + 131)x, (B.1)
Furthermore, by leading equation (2.5) one period and taking expectations conditional on the
information in period t. E,y,+2 can be expressed as follows:
1
E,Y,+2 =  -[ E,;r,+J - E,;r,+21 (B.2)
al
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Since the central bank will follow its optimal target rule in every period we can find an
expression    for    the term between brackets by leading equation    (2.10) one period    and
subtracting equation (2.10) from the result:
E,x,*3  -  E,K,*2  =  -,1(1- n)[E,;r,4 -,r'] (B.3)
Using equations (B.2) and (B.3) we can rewrite (B.1) as follows:
n(1-n)
E,R,*, = (,r,-,r')     +     (,1(1 -n) + Pi)y,     +
at
(B.4)
Bl(Bl + BAL   -    AR,
Casting the expression for R, obtained in equation (2.4) in its first-order equivalence (see
equation (2.2) )and substituting (B.4) in the resulting expression yields:
1-k kn(1 - n)
A = n k5
+ (,r, -A ' )       +
a, (1 + kA)
(B.5)
k(n(1 -n)+Al) k#z (Bi + #2)
1+ kB      y'    +                      41 + k 
Substituting this expression into equation (2.11) using the fact that rt = i,  - S - aty, will yield
equation (2.12) in the main text.
Appendix C: Derivation of the Long-Term Expected Inflation Rate
Repeated substitution in equation (2.10) yields:
E,ir,.i  =  ;r'  +  ni-'LE,;r,+, -,r· (C.1)
Using this in equation (2.4) we have:
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[Ii  =  (1 - k)[E,;r,*, + k(ir' + n(E,ir,*1 - ir')) + k 2 (,r' + n 2 (E,;r,+1 -,r' )) + ....1  (C.2)
Solving for the infinite summation and rearranging this can be rewritten as follows:
(1 - k)
rl          =       :r' + [E,er,.1 -,r'] (C.3)
(1- kn)
Using the fact that Eter,+ 1 - At + ot i Yt we obtain equation (2.16) in the main text.
Appendix D: Derivation of the Covariance between the Real and the
Inflation Term Spread and Future Output
Plugging the equilibrium solution for R, obtained in equation (2.15) into the dynamic
equation for output (2.6) and subtracting x' on both sides of the Phillips-curve relationship
(2.5)  we have the following two-dimensional VAR(1) system:





A     =       -(1 -n)            a i                ;    0'+1      -     L  O  2
TE,* 1
.1
'r,-X  J                                                 1a 1
The system has two distinct and real Eigenvalues: e, = 0 and ez = n, which indicate that the
system is stationary provided n is strictly smaller than one (implying a finite value of X). Let
vec(*) = (a.2 0 0 0)' be the vector form of the variance-covariance matrix of $ and let vec(V)
- (ayz GAY a„y 0"2)' be the vector form of the variance-covariance matrix of Z. Assuming O f n
< 1 we can compute:








From this equation it can be seen that: aa,3/an <0, Bc„,/Dn <0 and 80,1/2n >0, i.e. k (and
therefore n) affects the trade-off between inflation variability and output variability (see Ball
(1997))
The expression for Cov[ (Rt-0 y„1] can be obtained as follows: First of all, we compute the
product o f the expression  for y<.t found in equation  (C.1)  and the real term spread in equation
(2.19). Subsequently, we take the unconditional expectation of the resulting expression where
we use the fact that: E(irt-,r')2 - a.2 , E(y,2) - ayl and E((Ir,-:r') y,) = a.y and the fact that E„, is
exogenous with respect to (A,-ir') and y, Similarly, Cov[ (I"It'-E,Tr,.1)Yt.1 ] can be found by
computing the product of equation (2.19) and the afore-mentioned expression for yt,t . The
summation of these two expression then yields equation (2.20)  in the main text.
Appendix E: Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 2.1:
Define:29





29 The proof pertains to the reaction coefficients of it . However, since r  =  it - Et7[t+ I and since the one period expected
inflation rate is predetermined the results carry over to the reaction coefficients of rt .
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B2(1-kBi)
ai  =       (1 -k)
Then it can be shown that
dio  =  (1-n)(1+#: -n)  ,     ;  dia_  =  (n-1)2 +B'(2-n) > 0
a           a, (k-1)'                    8              (k-1)2
81.     =     #2(1 - #2)     >     0
a         (k- 1)1
Since it holds that ak/aD = 1/(1+D)2 > 0 it follows that 84/DD > 0 for i = 0,1,2
Next, as far as the parameter n is concerned, we can compute:30
80         1+k(1+B,-2n)   <        ;     diL  =    1+k(1+B,-2n)=                  <0
th                               ai (1 -k)                                                      291                                 (1 - k)
In Appendix A it is shown that On/OX > 0. Therefore, we can conclude: Bao/81 < 0 and Bat/81
< 0. Finally, we can show:
k(1 -n)       ,     0            ;             .01.      =      1+ k(1 -n)      ,      0
aft                at (1 - k) 491 (1 - k)
Proposition 2.3:
Define:
(1 - k) b     =    a'(1-k)b o=      ;   1(1-kn) (1 - bi)
30 Note that the inequality 1+k(1+B,-2n) > 0  can be rewritten as  , > 2n - (1/k) -1. The RHS of this expression
is strictly increasing in both k and n. Since in addition it holds that O s k s l a n d 0  S n g l,  we know the
inequality will always be satisfied if it holds for the specials case in which k=n=1. Substituting this into the
inequality yields:  B, > 0.
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Then it can be shown that:
Dbo                    (1 -n)
=                                                 <        O                       ;                                abo         =          k(1  -k)->0
Dk (1-kn)2   Dn (1-kn)'
*1 = 4(1-n)          fAL  atk(1-k)<0 ;   =    >0ak (1-kn)2   an (1-kn)2
The proofthen follows from the fact that 81</DD > 0 and 811/8X > 0.
Proposition 2.4:
As for equation (2.18), the coefficient for (Tr, -Tr') will be smaller than or equal to zero since
05 n< 1.   Next, for the coefficient for y, to be negative, the denominator of this coefficient
needs to be positive, which will be the case since this condition can be rewritten as follows:
B,(2-n)  >  -1-ni +2n A> -(n-1)2
(2 - n)
As for equation (2.19), the proof follows immediately from noting that both k an n are
restricted to lie within the unit interval. Since the proof holds for the real and in flation term
spread it must also hold for the nominal term spread.
Proposition 2.5:
As far as equation (2.18) is concerned define:
k(1 -n)(1 +A -n) k[1 + 2#1 + n(n - (2 + Bi))]
4
=
; Cl   =
a:(1 - k) (1 - k)
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Then it can be shown that:31
80       (1-n)(1+#t-n)  >  0           50  =    k(2(1-n)+#.)=                                   '<021 a,(k-1)2  ' th  a, (1-k)
&1     =     1+2#1  + n(n- (2+B. ) )                            ti:.                  k(2(1 -n) +A)     <     0' >0' '
(k-1)'                            di                 (1-k)
80       -       k(1 -n)       >     0             ;            .ki.     =      k(2 -n)      ,     0
 2              4(1 -k) 41 (1-k)
Since it is shown in Appendix A that 8 n/81>O,we conclude that Dc, /81 <0 for i= 0,1 .
Similarly, since aD/ak> 0 it will hold that Bc,/OD > 0 for i = 0,1 .
Next, as far as equation (2.19) is concerned, define:
k(1 - n)do =       ·   d, - a,k(1-n) = aldo(1 - kn) (1 - kn)
Then we can compute:
fdo = 1-n > O -ado    k;                                                                <0ek   1-kn           an    1-kn
Here we realise that Ddt/Bk = a,Ddo/Ok and &11/Dn - a,Ddo/Dn.
Next, using equation (2.20) we can compute:
OCov[(R, -r,)y,+1]  -  (1 + 2#, -n)0-2 as°vI(R.-r.)y 2ka2
6> ,
.1 1 = .          >O
8                                       (k- 1)2(1 + n)                                                        B:                                     (1-k)(1  + n)
trov[(R, - r,)y,*t]
= 2k(1 + # )(:Tj, <0
d                                    (1 -k)(1 +n' )
31 Note that it holds that: O g k  5 1   ;  O f n s 1   ;  0< 112<1  and that the proof that the denominator in the
expression for Ba,/ak is greater than zero is given  in the proof of Proposition 2.2.
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8Cov[(Ili - E,;r,.1 )y,* j 1    _       4 (1 - n)a£2-       >0
ak                                  (1 - kn)(1 + n)
BCov[(ni - E, „, }y„, 1 - 24ka <  0
an                   (1-kn)(1 + n)2
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Chapter 3: A Theory of Interest Rate Stepping: Inllation
Targeting in a Dynamic Menu Cost Model
3.1: Introduction
" ...In  sum.  given  that  inflation  was  forecast  to  be  close  to  the  target   in   two  year's  time  and
that the outlook beyond then was highly uncertain, the Committee could sensibly wait to
gather  more  information  before concluding  that  policy needed  to  be  changed... "
Minutes ofMonetary Policy Committee Meeting, 5 and 6 August  1998
As a result of the disappointment with monetary targeting and/or fixed exchange rates, many
countries have now adopted a regime of (direct) inflation targeting. The use of explicit
inflation targets derives its theoretical rationale from the fact that they can overcome
credibility problems since they can replicate the results of optimal performance incentive
contracts (see Walsh (1995) and Svensson (1997a)). From a theoretical perspective this has
also stimulated the research on monetary policy rules which deal with the question how these
explicit inflation targets should be translated into monetary policy instruments (see e.g.
Taylor (1993,1998), Svensson (1997b) and Haldane (1997)). This literature explicitly
recognises the fact that, because of lags in the transmission mechanism, the actual future rate
of inflation will not be under direct control  o f the central bank. Rather, central banks will  use
their ability to manipulate the (short-term) interest rate to target the expected future inflation
rate conditional on all information that is currently available. Consequently, these models
also prescribe the appropriate response to a shock to one of the determinants of inflation. In
particular, on the assumption that the central bank only cares about inflation stabilisation it
should assess the impact of the shock on the conditional inflation forecast and subsequently
change the interest rate so as maintain the equality between the conditional inflation forecast
and the assigned inflation target.12 As a result, the optimal conduct ofmonetary policy implies
32  For a formal treatment of this point see Svensson (1997c).
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that the short-term interest rate will inherit the time-series properties of the determinants of
inflation. However, a stylised fact of actual monetary policy making is that central banks do
not immediately change the interest rate in response to new information about the state of the
economy.11 Rather, the instrument of monetary policy tends to remain constant  in the  face of
a changing environment and tends to be changed by discrete amounts while the variables
which appear in the central bank's reaction function (e.g. inflation and output) change
continuously. Following Bhundia and Yates (1997) we will refer to this phenomenon as
interest rate stepping. It should be emphasised that this is not the same as interest rate
smoothing. The latter can be defined as the well-established practice of implementing a
desired change in the monetary policy stance in a series of small steps in the same direction
rather then taking one single large step all at once.
The purpose of this paper is to reconcile interest rate stepping with optimising behaviour on
the part of the central bank and to explore the economic implications of the resulting discrete
interest rate changes in a continuously changing environment. To this end we introduce a
small 'menu' cost which is incurred every time the central bank changes the interest rate.
Following the literature on the impact of such costs of decision making on the behaviour of
monopolistic price setters (see e.g. Mankiw (1985) and Akerlof and Yellen (1985)), under
these conditions it is no longer optimal for the central bank to respond to small deviations
from the optimum. Moreover, in a dynamic setting these costs will induce the central bank to
take the option value of the status quo into account. Obviously, this option value will be
irrelevant if action can be taken at no cost since in that case there is nothing to prevent the
central bank from keeping inflation equal to the assigned target continuously. Since the cost,
once incurred, will not be reversed by an interest change in the opposite direction, there is an
incentive for the central bank to wait and see whether or not the economy will move inflation
back towards the target o f its own accord.  As a result, the central bank will allow the inflation
rate to fluctuate freely within a certain range.
The chapter proceeds as follows, Section 2 outlines a simple closed economy and provides a
number of reasons for the existence o f menu costs. In Section 3 we present the solution to the
33 For useful surveys of this phenomenon see Rudebusch (1995), Goodhart (1996) and Bhundia and Yates (1997).
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model under three different scenarios; a benchmark case where menu costs are absent, the
case where the central bank solves a string of unrelated 'period' problems and finally the case
where the central bank explicitly recognises the intertemporal aspect of its problem.
Subsequently, we examine the factors which influence the width of the inflation band.
Section 4 examines the implications for the dynamics of short-term interest rates in the light
of the empirical literature on this subject. Section 5 solves for the expected rate of inflation
and assesses under which conditions the economy will suffer from an inflationary bias.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
3.2:   A Simple Closed Economy Model
Consider the following economy in continuous time. Aggregate supply (y,9 is given by the
familiar Lucas-supply function .
y''  =   Or,  - ire') (3.1)
In this equation the natural rate of output (y') has been normalised to zero. The parameter P
measures the slope  o f the Lucas supply function,  Tr,  is the (instantaneous)  rate  of inflation  rate
and Tre denotes inflationary expectations. As indicated by the absence of a time subscript
inflationary expectations do not depend on any particular point in time.  One can think of this
as the result of the existence of fixed nominal wage contracts. More precisely, agents will
determine the expected rate of inflation using the long run probability density function of
inflation conditional on the central bank's optimal monetary policy.34 The exact factors which
determine lr' will be discussed in Section 3.5. For now we note that the central bank will take
inflationary expectations as given when setting the interest rate. Aggregate demand (y,d) is
modelled as follows:
34 Formally, let F be the information set available to private agents containing the information they have about optimal
monetary policy and let g(TrIF) be the long run probability density function of inflation conditional on this information set.
Then we have:
CO
;r' = E(,r I F) =  jsgOr I F)d,r
--
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yf  = -ati, - ir,) + 71, (3.2)
Here i, is the instrument of the central bank, i.e. the nominal interest rate which expresses the
monetary policy stance (e.g. the UK base rate, the US Federal Funds Target or the ECB's
repo rate). The parameter a measures the sensitivity of aggregate demand to the ex post real
interest rate and n, is an exogenous demand shock which follows a driftless Brownian
motion:
dq= adw (3.3)
There is no particular economic reason for assuming a continuous time random walk on the
demand shock. However, unlike more sophisticated processes (e.g. exhibiting mean-
reversion) this assumption will allow us to compute a relatively simple analytic solution to
the central bank's problem.
As far as the preferences of the central bank are concerned,  it is assumed that there is a basic
trade-off between deviations of the rate of inflation  from the assigned target (Tr'), on the  one
hand, and costs which are incurred whenever the interest rate is changed, on the other. In
view of this trade-off the central bank will minimise the following intertemporal loss
function:
LOr)=E< e-a(,r,-ir')2dt+I,Ce-a'llro =,r                              0.4)
Here 6 is the central bank's discount rate (which is inversely related to the policy horizon)
and tj denotes the instants where the central bank decides to change in the interest rate. Each
time this happens the central bank will incur a cost which is equal to 'C' for which it holds
that C is small (i.e. C - h). Apart from these costs, the central bank is assumed to engage in
strict inflation targeting.15 While this may seem a restrictive assumption since virtually every
35  in reality, the actual future rate of in flation will of course never be under perfect control by the central bank. However,
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central bank also cares about output fluctuations (at least around the natural rate of output) it
should be emphasised that in our model, which features only demand shocks, inflation
stabilisation implies output stabilisation.
The presence of a small cost of changing the interest rate in the central bank's loss function
can be rationalised on a number of grounds. First of all, the central bank could partly
internalise the costs incurred by agents who are bound into fixed nominal interest rate
contracts. For instance, Cukierman (1990, pp. 113) argues that the central bank will be "...
concerned with  the predictability  of interest rates  rather  than with  their  level.. ".   The reason
for this resides in the traditional task of the banking system to provide liquidity by
transforming short-term liabilities into long-term assets. This implies that the interest rates
charged on the asset side of the balance sheet are fixed for relatively long periods while the
interest rates paid on the liability side are likely to change every time the official interest rate
changes. Stable official interest rates will therefore reduce the probability of an interest rate
mismatch .
Secondly, as argued by Crockett (1994) central bankers may also face a 'psychological' cost
when they change their minds, for instance since this makes them vulnerable to allegations of
inconsistency or incompetence. As argued by Goodhart (1999) this cost is likely to be
prohibitive when the need for a change in the monetary policy stance is not very obvious to
outside observers (i.e. when inflation or the inflation forecast is close to the target and output
is close to potential). In that case, given the random walk nature of news about these
variables, there is a considerable chance that an interest change that is optimal today will have
to be reversed in the near future. This might give the impression that the central bank is
uncertain about the appropriate direction for monetary policy. Moreover, despite a
considerable degree of formal independence, the central bank may still be under pressure
from politicians not to raise interest rates. As a consequence, the central bank will also be
reluctant to lower interest rates because once they are lowered it may be 'politically difficult'
to increase them again.
36
Svensson (1997) has shown that inflation targeting implies that the conditional forecast of inflation becomes the
intermediate target of monetary policy. The latter can of course be perfectly and instantaneously controlled by the central
bank.
36 According to Huizinga and Eijffinger (1999) there is also a strategic argument for not changing the monetary policy
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Finally, there is an argument related to the way the interbank money market works. The Fed,
for instance, announces a target for the Fed Funds Rate. Unpredictable shifts in the demand
curve for central bank balances will cause the Fed Funds Rate to fluctuate randomly around
this target (this is because the Fed subsequently corrects these shifts through open market
operations to maintain the Fed Funds Rate equal to the target on average).   If the Fed were to
react optimally to every bit of economic news that comes in it would have to change the Fed
Funds Target frequently by probably only a few basispoints. Given the afore-mentioned
volatility ofthe actual Fed Funds Rate this would reduce the information value of interest rate
changes which presents an incentive to the Fed to economise on the number of steps to be
taken.
3.2: Solution under Static and Rational Expectations
3.2.1 No Menu Costs
As a benchmark we will first solve for the equilibrium  in the absence of menu costs (C = 0).
From equations (3.1) and (3.2) we can derive the following reduced form for inflation:
f, = -B-,r'     a   i, 1    1   11,                                                           0.5)
B-Ol B-a B-a
In order to rule out a perverse response of inflation to its determinants we need to assume that
11>a. Obviously, the central bank's intertemporal loss function (3.4) will be minimised if it
sets i, so as to ensure that the condition irt = ** holds continuously.17 Substituting this
condition in equation (3.5) and solving for i, yields the following endogenous instrument rule
i,   =,r'  + f Or'  -,r ) + 1'1, (3.6)a a
This equation is very similar to the Taylor rule (Taylor (1993)) in the sense that it expresses
stance in response to every (supply) shock since this will lower inflationary expectations.
37 Following Svensson (1997) this equality is simply the optimal (intermediate) target rule.
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the optimal value of the central bank's instrument as a linear function of the determinants of
inflation. In particular, the interest rate will inherit the time-series properties of the demand
shock and will therefore also follow a driftless Brownian motion. 18 It appears that the afore-
mentioned stability condition concerning the ratio of the slope of the Lucas supply function
and the interest rate sensitivity of aggregate demand (B/a) implies that the response-
coefficient for (Tr'-Tr') will be strictly greater than one. This is a well-known and robust
condition for stability in the literature on monetary policy rules (see Taylor (1998)).
Plugging the optimal rule (3.6) back into the reduced form for inflation (3.5) yields: Trt=A'
Since wage setters know that the central bank will always keep inflation equal to the target
they will determine the expected rate of inflation as follows: 7[' = E(Tr) = Tr'. As a result, the
economy will permanently be at the equilibrium where it holds that A, = A' =  Tr' and y = y' =
0.
3.2.2 Positive Menu Costs
If changing the interest rate is costly, it will no longer be optimal to do so  if the deviation of
the inflation rate from the target is small (in a manner to be made more precise later). In other
words, there will be a trade-off between losses arising from deviations of inflation from its
target, on the one hand, and losses stemming from interest rate adjustments, on the other. As a
starting point for the analysis we will compute the solution for the inflation rate under the
condition that the interest rate is kept constant. Immediately after a change in the interest rate
(at, say, t=0) the economy will be in a situation where the inflation rate is equal to the target
(Tro-ir'). Without loss of generality we normalise the initial value o f the demand shock to  zero
(no = 0). Inflationary expectations are fixed and equal to Tr'. Plugging these parameter values
into the optimal instrument rule (3.6) yields the following for the nominal interest rate at t=0:
io =  12   +  (,te  -  A') (3.7)a
38 As we will show later, even in the presence of menu costs this rule describes the long-run behaviour of the interest rate.
Since the demand shock follows a continuous time random walk and since in flation will be stationary as a result of optimal
monteray policy it follows that both the nominal and the ex post real interest rate will be non-stationary.
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Substituting this expression into the reduced form equation for inflation (3.5) we obtain an
expression for 4 which holds as long as the interest rate is maintained at the value specified
in equation (3.7). Since we can repeat this procedure for every instant the interest rate is
changed we can derive the following general expression for the rate of inflation which holds
for all periods between interest rate changes:
•                                             
     1
lr, - K   EX,= 86,        ,       0 -
(B -a)
(3.8)
dE = adw ·, 4 =E, = 40 = O
Here 4 is defined as the stochastic shock to the inflation gap (xj, This shock can be thought
of as a re-normalised value of the demand shock (n,). Starting from t-0 the shock to the
inflation gap will be equal to the demand shock (i.e. 4 = 9, for i, = io ). Now suppose that at
t=r the central bank decides to change the interest rate. Obviously, the new interest rate will
be set so as to bring inflation back to the target (i.e. it will hold that i, - A' + (Bia) (,r'-TI') +
n,/a ). Since at the time of resetting we need to have 4=0 in equation (3.8),  it will hold that:
4 = Tl, - 4, for i,  = i.. Of course, this normalisation of the demand shock can be applied to all
instants in which the interest rate is changed (i.e. for all tj )
Now suppose the central bank ignores the fact that it is dealing with a dynamic optimisation
problem and simply solves a string of unrelated 'period' optimisation problems instead. In
other words, the central bank will treat 4 as a 'once and-for-all shock' or, equivalently, it has
static expectations in the sense that it does not take the stochastic properties of st into account.
At each point in time, the central bank will then compare the discounted present value of the
flow  cost (x,2/ 6)  to the cost of changing the interest  rate (C). Hence, under static expectations,
the central bank will set i, according to the optimal rule (3.6) if the following condition is
met:
/2 El-L>C <=> (BE,)2     =    Or, - ;r' )2     >    S =C O (3.10)6
Consequently, even under static expectations 'menu' costs which are of second-order
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smallness (C-h2) will lead to a range of inaction which is of first-order smallness (s-h) . As
noted by Dixit (1991) it is in this sense that small menu costs produce relatively large effects.
Under rational expectations the central bank will recognise the intertemporal aspect of its
problem and will explicitly take the stochastic process driving the demand shock into
account. In other words, if the loss stemming from the inflation gap passes the 'static
expectations threshold' in equation (3.10) it is no longer optimal to change the interest rate
and  incur the cost o f doing so.  This  is because the central  bank  has the option to wait and see
whether or not the economy will move inflation back to the target level of its own accord.
Similar to the case where the central bank has 'static' expectations, the optimisation problem
boils down to choosing a threshold level for the inflation gap (b) which will trigger a change
in the interest rate. On the assumption that the cost of raising the interest rate is equal to the
cost of lowering it, the upper and lower threshold levels imply a symmetric band within
which inflation is allowed to move according to the process defined in equation (3.8).
Moreover, because the cost of changing the interest rate does not depend on the magnitude o f
the change (i.e. these costs stem simply from the fact that there is a change in the interest rate)
the inflation gap will be set to zero whenever it hits one ofthe thresholds.
First of all, to solve the central bank's problem (3.4) we now have to translate the stochastic
properties of the shock to the inflation gap (E,) into stochastic properties  for the inflation gap
itself (x,). Applying the rules of stochastic calculus to equation (3.8) we can write:19
dx = eadw (3.11)
Next, we would like to find an expression for the loss function (3.4) which can be minimised
with respect to the central bank's choice variable (b). We realise that the interest rate will not
be changed as long as the inflation gap is strictly within the band. Hence, for any x € (-b, b)
we can express the RHS of equation (3.4) by means ofthe Bellman equation:
39 When x = g(£) , where E follows a driftless Brownian (see equation (3.3)),  it will hold that:
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L(x) = xidt + e-ad,E{ L(x + dr)} (3.12)
Expanding the RHS of this equation and using Ito's lemma (see Appendix A) yields a
second-order differential equation:
1-82a2L (x) - 6L(x) + xi = 0 (3.13)
2
In Appendix A it is shown that the general solution to this equation can be expressed as
follows:
XZ         elal 4/8
L(x)= 1- + -32     + ACe" + e-")                 ;                 7
-- ; A =A(b) (3.14)
0a
The first two parts on the RHS denote the expected present value of the loss function under
the condition that the interest rate is never changed. Consequently, the third term on the RHS
captures the value of being able to make interest rate adjustments. In particular, the effect of
the threshold level b on the intertemporal loss function L(x) will be fully incorporated in the
constant of integration (A).
It now remains to solve for the constant of integration A and the threshold level b
simultaneously. Following Dixit (1991,1993) there are two conditions which pin down these
parameters. First of all, the Value Matching Condition (VMC) which says that in the
optimum the reduction in the value of L(x) obtained by exercising control should equal the
cost of changing the interest rate. In other words, the optimal choice of the threshold level
implies that there are no discontinuities in the intertemporal loss function (if there were
'discrete jumps' in L(x) for a particular choice of b this choice would obviously not be
optimal). Applying this to equation (3.14) we obtain:
dr =   g"(E)al dt + g'(E)arlw
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L(b) - L(0) = C # .4(,4 + e-0 -2) =C- b' (3.15)6
Secondly, the Smooth Pasting Condition (SPC) which requires the graphs o f the L(x) and C-
functions to meet tangentially at the point where x=b. This can be understood by observing
that, for expression (3.14) to be minimised, we need the first order condition A'(b)=0.




L (b) -0           4           }91(e#-e  k )---3- (3.16)
Since both equation (3.15) and (3.16) are highly non-linear, A and b can generally only be
solved numerically. However Dixit  (1991) has shown  that the solution  for  b  can  be
approximated analytically (see Appendix A), this yields:
<  6£02  14b=I (3.17)
l(#-a)2 J
Hence, under rational expectations fourth-order menu costs (C-W) will have a first-order
effect on the band of inaction (b-h). The reason is that under rational expectations the
policymaker will take the option value of the status quo into account. In particular, when the
inflation gap hits the 'static expectations threshold' specified in equation (3.10) it is no longer
optimal for the central bank to reset the inflation gap back to zero by incurring the small cost
equal to C. Instead at this point the central banker will wait for a small amount of time (dt)
during which he will receive new information about the state o f the economy. More precisely,
the central bank will be able to see i f the inflation gap moves back towards zero of its own
accord.
40 Note that this condition proves that barriers will reduce the value of the loss function (relative to the value
obtained in the situation where control is never exercised) since equation ( 16)  will  only hold  for A < 0.
Chapter 3                                                               58
Consequently, the there will be a trade-off between the 'period' flow cost stemming from the
inflation gap, on the one hand, and the cost of exercising control plus the option value of the
status quo, on the other.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.1 in Appendix E which depicts the situation immediately after
an interest rate step has been taken. The aggregate supply curve (ys) is drawn for the situation
where x'=n: The demand shock has the effect of shifting the aggregate demand curve (yd)
randomly along the aggregate supply curve. If there are no costs to changing the interest rate
(C=0) the central bank will offset each shock so as to preserve the situation where inflation is
equal to the target. However, if changing the interest rate is costly, the demand curve will  be
allowed to shift around until the rate of inflation hits one of the thresholds.
Equation (3.lD allows us to examine the effect of structural and preference parameters on the
threshold level for the inflation gap:
Proposition 3.1:
The inflation gap threshold (b) will increase if:
1.        The cost ofchanging the interest rate (C) increases
2.         The volatility of the demand shock (c) increases
3.         The slope of the Lucas supply function (B) decreases
4.             The interest rate sensitivity o f aggregate demand (a) increases
The proof of this proposition follows immediately from equation (3.17). Obviously, an
increase in the cost ofchanging the interest rate will induce the central bank to accept a larger
inflation gap before taking action. Next, the effect of the volatility of the demand shock, the
slope of the Lucas supply function and the interest rate sensitivity of aggregate demand can
be understood from the way they affect the volatility of the stochastic process driving the
inflation gap as described in equation (3.11). This is because an increase in the volatility of
the inflation gap will also increase the option value ofthe status quo.
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First of all, since the in flation  gap is driven by the demand shock, an increase  in the volatility
of the demand shock (a) will spill over into higher inflation gap volatility. Next, a decrease in
the slope ofthe Lucas supply function (B) will enhance the effect of a given demand shock on
inflation since now a larger part of this shock will be absorbed by inflation at the expense of
the effect on output. Finally, if aggregate demand becomes more sensitive to the ex post real
interest rate (it-,r,) this will enhance the well-known 'vicious circle of instability' by which an
increase in inflation will increase aggregate demand through the erosion of real interest rates
thereby fuelling a further increase in inflation.
3.4:      Implications for the Dynamics of Short-Term Interest Rates
The behaviour of the central bank's key interest rate  and the implication  of this behaviour for
longer-term interest rates has been extensively studied in the empirical literature.4' For
instance, Rudebusch (1995) provides a survey of empirical tests of the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates, the upshot of which is that term spread
predicts future movements in interest rates fairly well in the very short-run (up to 1 month)
and in the long run (2 years and longer) . The first finding can be attributed to the tendency of
many central banks to smooth interest rates   (i.e. to implement the required increase   or
decrease in a series of small steps rather than all at once). The second observation can be
explained by the fact that in the long run the level of interest rates will be determined by the
central bank's desire to achieve its ultimate monetary policy goals. Since the latter are to a
considerable extent known to the public, agents will be able to predict interest rate
movements over long horizons with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
However, in the medium run the predictive ability of the term spread is very poor which led
many researchers to reject the rational expectations theory of the term structure. Mankiw and
Miron (1986) have argued that the lack of predictive ability can be explained by explicitly
taking the manner in which the central bank controls interest rates into account. In particular,
41 Recent examples are Rudebusch (1995), Balduzzi, Berola and Foresi (1997) and Balduzzi, Bertola, Foresi and Klapper
(1998).
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they suggest the Fed imparts random walk behaviour to the Federal Funds Target in which
case the hypothesis of rational expectations implies precisely that future short-term interest
rates should not be predictable. This idea has been extended by Rudebusch (1995), Balduzzi
et al (1997) and Balduzzi et al (1998). These authors explicitly model the process generating
the central bank's target interest rate by postulating that on any given day within the sample
period, there will a relatively small but equal probability of a target change of fixed size in
either direction.42 Moreover, Balduzzi et al (1998) document a new stylised fact, namely that
the volatility and persistence o f the spread increases with the maturity o f the  loan.  They show
that spreads of longer-term (e.g. 3 or 6 month) rates from the target are mainly driven by
expectations of future target changes. When a target change takes place, all 'adjustment
pressures' will be released. However, immediately thereafter the market starts to receive new
information which leads to partial predictability of the next target change. Obviously, in view
of the fact that the central bank engages in interest rate stepping, the impact of this
information on the spread will increase with the maturity o f the debt instrument.
In view of this description of interest rate stepping in the empirical literature it is interesting
to investigate the factors which determine the size of the interest rate step, the expected
duration till the next target change and the extent to which the next target change is
predictable. First of all, in our model interest rate steps will always be of a given and fixed
size.41  This is because the interest rate will be reset at a new optimal level i f and only if the
inflation gap hits one of the thresholds (i.e. i f it holds that Ix,1 = b). Suppose that starting from
t=0, the inflation gap first hits one of the barriers at t = T . From equation (3.8) it can be seen
that this implies that 141 = b (B-a) Plugging this expression into the optimal interest rate rule
(3.6) yields: Ii, i- Tr' + (B/a) (7['-7[') + b(B-a) /a. Subtracting the expression for io obtained
in equation (3.7) and using the expression for b in equation (3.17) will yield the following
expression for the absolute value ofthe interest rate step:
42 This formulation abstracts from interest rate smoothing considerations since these will induce a relatively high
probability of a target change in the same direction during the first month after a target change (see Rudebusch ( 1995)).
43   Rudebusch (1995) shows that in reality the size of the interest rate step is drawn  from a discrete probability distribution.
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The absolute value ofthe interest rate step ( I i, - io I ) will increase if:
1.        The cost ofchanging the interest rate (C) increases
2.             The volatility o f the demand shock (a) increases
3.               The  slope of the Lucas supply funtion (11) decreases
4.           The interest rate sensitivity of aggregate demand (a) increases for 11/a< 3/2  or
decreases for B/a > 3/2
Prooti see Appendix D.
The intuition is that an increase in C, an increase in a or a decrease in B will induce an
increase in the threshold level (b). Hence, a larger interest rate step will be needed when the
inflation gap hits one of the barriers.   As far as an increase in a is concerned there are two
opposing effects. On the one hand this will cause the threshold level (b) to go up. On the
other hand, since aggregate demand will be more sensitive to interest rate changes, a smaller
step will be needed for any given value of the threshold which will tend to decrease the size
of the interest rate step. The model predicts that the first effect will dominate if the reaction
coefficient for (Ir'-ir') in the optimal interest rate rule (6) is 'relatively low' (i.e. for 1 < 11/a <
3/2).
Next, we can investigate the factors which affect the expected period of time that will elapse
before the next interest rate step is taken (T(x)) . In Appendix C it is shown that for
symmetric threshold levels (-b, b) this is given by:
_              (B- a)$68     _      (B-a)2 xi1 (x) =                                  Z                                                                  (3.19)
G G
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The following proposition summarises the effect of several model parameters on T(x):
Proposition 3.3:
The expected time period that will elapse before the next interest rate step is taken
(T(x)) will increase if:
1.       the cost ofchanging the interest rate (C) increases
2.           the slope of the Lucas supply function ([1) increases for Ixl < b/42 or decreases
for Ixl > b/42
3.         the interest rate sensitivity of aggregate demand (a) decreases for Ixl < b/42  or
increases for Ixl > b/42
4.             the volatility o f the demand shock (a) decreases for Ixl   < b/42 or increases  for
Ixl > b/42
Proof: see Appendix D
An increase in the costs of control (C) will increase the threshold level (b) because of which it
will take longer before the inflation gap reaches one of the threshold levels. The result for the
parameters B,a and a is basically the outcome of two opposing forces. On the one hand, an
increase in B, a decrease in a and/or a decrease in a will reduce the volatility of the inflation
gap (see equation (3.11)). This will increase the expected time period that will elapse before
the interest rate is reset for any given value of the threshold level (b). However, there is also
an indirect effect since a decline  in the volatility o f the stochastic process driving the inflation
gap will reduce the threshold level itself (see Proposition  1).  All else equal,  this will reduce
the average time till the next interest rate step.
Which one of these two effects dominates depends on the current value of the inflation gap
(x). The model predicts that a decrease in volatility will increase the expected duration of the
current monetary policy stance if the inflation gap is relatively small (i.e. if Ixl < b/42). In
particular, this will hold for the average duration between two consecutive interest rate steps
(T(0)) which is equal to the first term on the RHS of equation (19). In the empirical literature
the probability of a target change during any given day in the sample period is usually
estimated using the empirical frequency of target changes (i.e. the number of target changes
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divided by the number of business days in the sample, see e.g. Balduzzi et al (1997)).
Consequently, our model identifies some of the factors that determine this probability since
the latter will be inversely related to T(0).
Corollary 3.1:
The average duration between consecutive interest rate steps (T(0)) will be increasing
in the slope of the Lucas supply function (B) and the cost of changing the interest rate
(C) and decreasing in the interest rate sensitivity of aggregate demand (a) and the
volatility o f the demand shock   (a)
Finally, to obtain an indication of the predictability of the next interest rate step we can
compute the probability that the interest rate will be lowered next time Q(X). Suppose that in
general the cost of raising the interest rate (Ch) di ffers from  the cost of lowering  it (Ci).44   This
will lead to an optimal range of inaction in the interval (-a, b) where a, b > 0. An asymmetry
in the cost technology may arise because of the interaction between the desires of politicians
and the central bank. For instance, when the latter is to some extent politically subservient,
the cost of raising the interest rate may very well exceed the cost of lowering it. Raising the
interest rate is politically unpopular while lowering it may yield electoral benefits. The
reverse situation may arise when the central bank wants to assert its independence in the face
of politicians clamouring for interest rate cuts. In Appendix C it is shown that for x     (-a, b),
the probability that the interest rate will be decreased when it is reset (Q(x)) is given by:
45
14 This would imply: L(,r) =  E  -je-°' (,r, -,r')2 dt + XE Che-04  + I. C,e-d'.  ,r0  = ir 
lo
where t denotes the instants where the interest rate is raised and the central bank incurs a cost equal to Ch while tm denotes
the instants in which it is lowered yielding a cost equal to Ci . In that case we have two Value Matching Conditions ( L(-a)-
L(O»Ci and (L(b)-L(O»Ch ) and two Smooth Pasting Conditions
( L'(-a»L'(b»0 ) to determine the two barriers a and b and the two constants of integration. It can easily be shown that
b'(Ch) > 0 and that a' (Cl) > 0 and therefore Ch > Ci implies b > a.
45   Ofcourse the probability of an interest rate increase at the next step is simply the complementary probability:   P(x) =1-
Q(x)




First of all, from this equation it can be seen that interest rate changes are perfectly
anticipated by the time they occur (i.e. Q(-a) = 1 and Q(b)=0). This is because in our model
the central bank does not have an information advantage over the public. In particular, this
means that there is no uncertainty on the  part of private agents concerning the position of the
thresholds which allows them to anticipate interest rate changes with certainty the instant
before they are implemented.   Next, the effect of the cost of raising and the cost of lowering
the interest rate (Ch and C respectively) on the probability of an interest rate decrease at the
next step is summarised by the following proposition:
Proposition 3.4:
The probability of an interest rate decrease at the next step (Q(x)) will increase i f the
cost of lowering the interest rate (CI) decreases and/or i f the cost of raising the interest
rate (Ch) increases.
Proof see Appendix D.
The intuition is that the absolute value of the upper threshold will exceed the absolute value
of the lower threshold if the cost of raising the interest rate exceeds the cost of lowering it.
This means that the probability that the inflation gap will first reach the lower threshold will
increase  for any given rate of inflation.
3.5: The Effect of Dynamic Menu Costs on Inflationary Expectations
Since the expected rate of inflation is locked into nominal wage contracts it will not respond
to short-run fluctuations in aggregate demand and/or any one particular interest rate response
to these fluctuations. In other words, the expected rate of inflation will be determined by
agents' beliefs concerning the long-run characteristics  of monetary policy. In particular,  they
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know the preferences of the central bank from which they can deduce the range of inaction
and, consequently, the long run probability density function for inflation conditional on the
thresholds chosen by the central bank. This, in tum, allows them to compute a rational
expectation of inflation.
In Appendix C it is shown that for thresholds -a and b, the long run probability density
function for the inflation gap $(x) will be as follows:
2(a + x) for -asx<o
a(a + b)
2
0(X) = - for x=o (3.20)
(a + b)
2(b - x) for 0<xsb
b(a + b)
This probability density function is depicted in Figure 3.2 in Appendix E. Using this we can
compute ir' = E(x) + 7[; where the expected value of the inflation gap (E(x)) will be equal to:
bz- az
E(x) =  jx0(x)dr = (3.21)3(a + b)-«
From this we can infer the following relationship between the inflationary bias and the costs
o f raising or lowering the interest  rate:
Proposition 3.5:
The economy will suffer from an upward (downward) inflationary bias (Tr' :  Tr')  if the
cost of raising the interest rate exceeds (is smaller than) the cost of lowering it (Ch :
C,).
Proof: see Appendix D
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In most models an inflationary bias arises because the policymaker faces a systematic
temptation to create surprise inflation once nominal contracts are signed. This is because
unanticipated inflation enables the policy maker to pursue various real objectives46 (e.g. an
output level which is higher than the natural output level). In this model the central bank is
not tempted to cheat the public since its only ultimate monetary policy goal is to stabilise
inflation. The introduction of a small menu cost does not alter this basic fact, even though it
means that control will no longer be exercised continuously. In that case, provided the cost
structure is symmetric (implying a = b) inflation will not deviate systematically from its target
(A') because of which the latter will feature as the expected rate of inflation which is locked
into nominal wage contracts. All this implies that observationally the economy will move
along a stable Phillips curve of the form TI, - lr' + (1/11)y,. This relationship is stable precisely
because the central bank does not systematically try to take advantage of this relationship47.
However,  if for reasons mentioned earlier the  cost of raising the interest  rate is higher than  the
cost of lowering it, the probability mass to the right of the point where the inflation gap is
zero (4(0)) will exceed the probability mass to the left of this point (this is the situation
depicted in Figure 3.2). Taking  this into account wage setters realise   that the tendency   to
maintain the current policy stance longer in the face of upward inflationary pressures will
produce an average rate o f in flation which is higher than the target.  At the risk of repetition  it
should be noted that this inflationary bias arises even though the central bank does not face a
systematic temptation to generate surprise inflation. The optimal instrument rule (3.6) is fully
credible (in the sense that the public faces no uncertainty about this rule) and implies that the
inflation gap will be set equal to zero every time the central bank decides to 'switch this rule
on'.  Moreover,  changes  in  the  monetary  policy  stance  (i.e.   the  interest  rate)  are always fuity
anticipated the instant before they occur.
46 For a survey see Cukierman (1992, Chs. 2-7)
47  Of course, if the central bank were to try and take advantage of this relationship it would break down as a result of the
Lucas critique. in other words, this stable Phillips curve would fall victim to Goodhart's law that '..any statistical regularity
will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes...' (Goodhart ( 1989))
Interest Rate Stepping                                                         67
3.6:   Summary and Conclusion
This paper studies a simple model of inflation targeting in which inflation stabilisation
features as the only ultimate goal of monetary policy. In addition, the central bank incurs a
small cost every time the monetary policy stance (i.e. the short-term interest rate) is changed.
Since this cost will induce the central bank to take the option value of the status quo into
account it will have a considerable effect on the inflation outcome. In particular, costs of
fourth-order smallness will have a first order effect on the band within which inflation is
allowed to fluctuate without a change in the interest rate. This band provides an explanation
for the well-documented central bank practice of interest rate stepping. We examine how the
width of this band depends on the cost of changing the interest rate and the volatility of the
inflation process. The latter will be determined by the volatility of the underlying demand
shocks, the slope of the Lucas supply function and the interest rate sensitivity of aggregate
demand.
In the empirical literature interest rate stepping has been used extensively to offer a 'rational
expectations consistent' explanation for the failure of the term spread to predict future
movements in short-term interest rates. In view of these results we assessed the factors that
determine the size of the interest rate step, the expected time till the next interest rate step  and
the probability that interest rates will fall next time the central bank decides to take action.
Some of the propositions we derive in this respect lend themselves to empirical testing.  For
instance, the model predicts that the size o f the interest rate step will be increasing  in  the cost
of changing the interest rate and the volatility of the demand shock and decreasing in the
slope of the Lucas supply curve. Similarly, the average duration between two consecutive
steps will be decreasing in the interest rate sensitivity of aggregate demand and the volatility
o f the demand shock and increasing  in the slope o f the Lucas supply function  and  the cost o f
changing the interest rate. Finally, we examine the effect ofthese 'menu' costs on inflationary
expectations. We show that the economy will suffer from an inflationary bias if the cost of
raising the interest rate exceeds the cost of lowering. This result is interesting since it shows
that an inflationary bias can arise even if the central bank does not try to create surprise
inflation in pursuit of various real objectives.
In line with the literature on monetary policy rules, our model clearly distinguishes between
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the interest rate as the control variable and the rate of inflation as a state variable. However, it
differs from most other models in assuming that inflation is instantaneously and perfectly
controllable, i.e. it abstracts from lags in the transmission process. Nevertheless, in these
models the conditional inflation forecast, which serves as the intermediate target of monetary
policy, can be perfectly and instantaneously controlled. Hence, in our view the rate of
inflation in our model is best viewed as the conditional inflation forecast when considering
the implications of the model for the real world.  In this sense the model provides an
explanation for the existence of bands for the intermediate target of monetary policy even i f
this intermediate target itsel f is perfectly controllable.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the optimal band of inaction
Using the fact that e- i .1- 6dt  we can rewrite equation (3.13) as follows:
L(x) = xzdt + (1 - dit){L(x) + E(L(x + dr) - L(x))}
(A.1)
= L(x) + x2dt - aL(x)dt + E(dL(x))- altE(dL(x))
Since dx = 0adw, by Ito's Lemma it holds that:
E(dI,(x)) =  e2a2L"(x)dt (A.2)
Substituting this equation in (A.1), ignoring terms which are small relative to dt and
subsequently dividing by dt will yield the second-order differential equation (3.13) in the
main text. The solution to this equation consists of the sum of a particular solution (Lp(x))
and the general solution ofthe homogeneous part:
L(x) - Lp(x) + Aeq"  + Beq" (A.3)
Here A and B are constants to be determined and 0  and qz are the roots of the characteristic
equation ofthe homogeneous part.
Since the forcing term is quadratic in x, we try the following particular solution:
Lp (x)  = doxz + dix + di (A.4)
Plugging the resulting expressions for L" (x) and L(x) in equation (3.13) and subsequently
equating coefficients across equations (3.13) and (A.4) yields: do = 1/6. d, = 0 and dz =
  2Q2)/62 . As in Dixit (1993) the resulting particular solution can be thought of as the present
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value of the intertemporal loss function under the condition that control is never exercised48.
Consequently, the effect ofbarriers will be fully captured by the complementary function. To
find this function we solve the characteristic equation of the homogeneous part to obtain the
following expression for the characteristic roots:
1/20.2 2 _  .        **       1.2 =t- (A.5)
Jiz
2                         GO
Next, regarding equation (A.3) we note that the threshold level (b) will only affect the
constants A and B, since the band is symmetric we therefore must have: A=B. Defining y =
qland substituting the particular solution and equation (A.5) into (A.3) yields equation (3.14)
in the main text.
Finally, we can solve for b using the analytical approximation developed by Dixit (1991).
Dividing the VMC-condition (3.15) by the SPC-condition (3.16) yields:
('* + e-*-2)=1[1 -(51 (A.6)
'6(t- e-0 }        2[         b'  1
Provided yb is sufficiently small in a manner to be explained, the LHS can be approximated
by a fourth-order Taylor expansion around yb = 0:
48 This can easily be seen by plugging the particular solution into equation (3.13). The reason for this result is that the
Bellman equation (3.12) is valid for x € (-b,b) which is the region in which control is never exercised.
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1+36+1(76)2 +1(76)3 +1(76)4 +(1-,6+1('b)2 -1(yb)' +1(0,)4)-2
2             6             24                           2             6             24
1                                                            1A[1 +Yb + 1 (4)2 + 1(yb)3 + -(,b)4 -(1-yb +  1(76)2 - 1('b)1 + -(Yb)4)]
2             6             24                           2             6             24
1 /1\
yib·+-7*bA 1+ __Yibl12 - 1 12 =       (A.7) ,      2 1-70 2,6+ -y'bl'I 1+-y'bz3 ) £6  j
1/ 1
}  '  } 2 <1-12720}
-11+_Yzbz 1--y2b2 =-
2/     12                  6
Equating the outcome of this approximation to the RHS of equation (A.6) and solving for b
yields equation (3.1 D in the main text.
Finally, we will examine under which conditions yb will be sufficiently small. Take the
following parameter values: 6= 0.05 ,1 1=2,a=l,C= 0.01 and a= 0.1. Plugging these
values into the expressions obtained for y and b and subsequently computing the product
yields: yb - 0.5. Since higher-order terms in the expansion of the LHS of (A.6) involve terms
like (yb)'/120 and smaller we can conclude that the approximation is quite robust.
Appendix B: Derivation of the Probability of an Interest Rate Decrease
and the Expected Time Period till the next Interest Rate Step
Follwing Dixit (1993), let Q(x) denote that probability that x will first hit the lower barrier.
Furthermore assume that x is regulated within the band (-a,b) where a,b > 0. For any x within
this band it will hold that:
11
Q(x)  = -Q(x - dr) + -0(x + dr) (B.1)22
Rewriting this equation and dividing by (dx)2 yields the following:
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0 = [0(x + cir) - Q(x)]- [Q(x) - Q(x - dr)] (B.2)
(AY
Taking the limit of the RHS of this equation as dx-+0 we have: Q"(x) = 0. Therefore the
general solution for Q(x) will be:
Q(x) = Fx + H (B.3)
where F and H are constants to be determined by examining Q(x) at the boundaries. This
yields:
Q(-a) = 1 ¢5 -aF+H=1
(B.4)
0(b)   = 0 C> bF+H=0
Solving for F and H we find:
0(x) =b-x (B.5)
b+a
Next, let T(x) denote the expected time period till the next interest rate step. For simplicity we
assume that x is regulated within the symmetric band (-b,b). For any x which is strictly in the
interior of this band we have:
11
T(x)  = dt + - T(x + dr) + - T(x - dr) (B.6)22
Rewriting this and dividing both sides by (dx)2 we have:
- 2dt  =  [T(x + dr) - T(x)]- [T(x) - T(x - dr)] (B.D
(dr)2 (dr)2
From equation (3.11) it follows that (dx)2=elaidt. Using this on the LHS of equation (B.7)
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and subsequently taking the limit for dx-*0 on the RHS yields:
T"(x) = --22 (B.8)0Za
Since the RHS of this equation is a constant we try a solution ofthe form:
T(x) = Lxl + Mx + N (B.9)
Using equation (B.8) it can be seen that L = -1/(0202). Next, from the condition that T(-
b)=T(b)=0 we can establish: M=0 and N = bl/(02<59 Plugging these values into (B.9) and
using the expression obtained for b in equation (3.17) yields equation (3.19) in the main text.
Appendix C: Derivation of the Long-Run Stationary Distribution for xt
Consider the variable x, which follows the Brownian motion described in equation (3.11) and
which is regulated within the band (-a,b) where a,b > 0. For any x, e (-a,b) let:
X,+d,   =   xi + dx with prob -
2
1                                                    (
C.1)
x,-dx with prob  -
2
From this, the stationary probability density function ($(x)) must satisfy:
11
0(x) = -0(x - dr) + -0(x + dr) (C.2)22
Rewriting this and dividing by (dx)2 yields:
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0 = [0(x + dr)- 0(x)]- [0(x) -0(x - dr)] (C.3)
BY
Taking the limit for dx-+0  on the RHS of (C.3), it follows that (1, '(x) = 0. Consequently, the
general solution for $(x) will be:
0(x) = Fx + G (C.4)
where F and G are constants which can be determined by examining the behaviour of 0(x) at
the boundaries and the resetting point. First for xt = -a + dx  it will hold that:
X,+dI    = -a+2dx with prob  -
2
(C.5)
= 0 with prob  -
2
From this we can conclude:
0(a) = 0
(C.6)
0(-a + 2dr) = 20(-a + dr)
Furthermore, since 0(-a+2dx) will satisfy equation (C.1), it can easily be shown that for nkl
and for -a <x<O,i t holds that:
0(-a + ndr) = n0(-a + dr) (C.7)
Similarly, for the upper boundary b it can be shown that:
0(b) = 0
(C.8)
0(b - mdr) = m0(b - dr)
where the second equation holds for for m21 and 0<x<b. From equations (C.4), (C.7) and
(C.8) we can see that $(x) will be linearly increasing in x  for x c [-a,0) and linearly
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decreasing in x for x e (O,b]. It remains to examine 0(0) for which it holds that:
1111
0(0) = -0(0-dr)+-0(0+dr)+-0(-a+dx)+-0(b-dx) (C.9)2222
Rearranging and taking limits (see also Bertola and Caballero (1990)) we can write:
lim + lim0(0) - 0(0 - dr) 0(b) - 0(b - dr)
dxfo                        dx                                          At o dx
(C.10)
lim I lim0(0 + dr) - 0(0) 0(-a + dr) -0(-a)
drto        dr             60          dr
From this equation it follows that while 4(x) is continuous at x=0 (this is ensured by (C.9)), it
is not differentiable at this point since the RHS and the LHS derivatives at x=0 have opposite
signs.
Consequently, the Brownian motion process for x, subject to barriers -a and b will give rise to
a triangular steady state probability density function the support of which is determined by
the control thresholds (see Figure 3.2).
Finally, 0(0) can be determined by the requirement that f.: 0(x) dx = 1. From Figure 3.2 it
can be seen that this boils down to the the condition that  !4 (a+b) 0(0) =1. Using this, we
obtain equation (3.20) in the main text.
Appendix D: Proof of Propositions
Proposition 3.2:
The sign of the partial derivatives of  I i, - io I with respect to C, D and a can be
unambiguously inferred from equation (3.18). As for the parameter a we can compute:
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a l i. -4 1 =(3a- 24)(6Cal )4      >                               B     <     3of-- (D.1)
                                3 <            a>22al(B-af
Proposition 3.3:
From equation (3.19) in the main text we can compute:
.l3(B-a)
DT(x) = %2 > 0
Bc                     a  4.c
aT(x) =    aT(x) - a /6-- - 2(B - a)xl (D.2)
BB     Ba         a
Z
OT(x) =    (B- a)Icr /6-£-2(B -a)xll
Ba            a
From this it can be seen that for T(x) to be increasing in 11 and decreasing in a and a we need
to have:
(a 13        ba /62->2(B- a)xi     c>     Ix' < 1 1 *>  I x I< -F' (D.3)
(2(B-a))             42
Proposition 3.4:
From equation (3.20)  in the main text we can compute (note that x  €(-a, b))  :
8(2(x)- a+x 80(x)_    x-b> 0 ; -- < 0 (D.4)
Db         (a + b)2                                   Da         (a + b)1
a and b (together with two constants of integration) are determined by the two Value
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Matching Conditions: L(-a)-L(0) = (1  , L(b)-L(0) = C  and the two Smooth Pasting
Conditions: L'(-a) = L (b) =0. From these it can easily be shown that ab/8Ch>0 and that
284#2,> 0 (see Dixit (1993)). Consequently we have: DQ(x)/8Ch> O and aQ(x)/OCE< 0.
Proposition 3.5:
To prove that A' is increasing in C , and decreasing in Ct it is sufficient to prove that this holds
for E(x). From equation (3.21) we have:
aE(x) = 1 DE(x) = _1
ab 3 Da          3
Using the results obtained  in the proof of Proposition  3.4 then yields the proof of this
proposition.
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Appendix E: Figures 3.1 and 3.2
Figure 3.1: The Optimal Band Width
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Part II : The Optimal Relative Weight on Output Stabilisation in
an Inilation Targeting Regime
Although central bankers are concerned with maximising social welfare this does not
necessarily mean that their preferences should perfectly reflect society's preferences
concerning inflation and output stabilisation. One of the first contributions which formalised
this important point was made by Rogoff (1985). He showed that i f the monetary policymaker
is tempted to push output above the natural rate systematically, society will gain if it appoints
a central banker whose relative weight on output stabilisation is lower than society's relative
concern for output stabilisation. The reason is that such a conservative central banker will
generate a lower average rate of inflation (i.e. the credibility of monetary policy will improve).
However, this will come at the cost of a diminished flexibility to respond to supply shocks in
accordance with social preferences.
This result has led other researchers to search for mechanisms which would lead to an
improved credibility-flexibility trade-off. Among these are the injection of political
uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty about the central bank's relative concern for inflation stabilisation
see e.g. Eijffinger, Hoeberichts and Schaling  (2000)), the design of an optimal central  bank
contract (Walsh (1995)) or the assignment of an explicit inflation target (Svensson (1997a))
The latter two solutions can in principle achieve the desirable situation in which the
inflationary bias disappears completely and in which output shocks are stabilised in
accordance with society's preferences.
By contrast, the literature which deals with the implementation of inflation targeting (e.g.
Svensson (1997b) and many papers based on this model) has paid relatively little attention to
this parameter in the central banker's loss function. The reason for this may be that this
literature typically assumes that the central banker does not seek to drive output above the
natural rate systematically. This assumption follows the criticism raised by some prominent
economists (e.g. McCallum (1995) and Blinder (1998)) that independent central bankers will
realise that an output target which exceeds the natural rate will induce an inflationary bias and
will therefore choose the long run natural rate as their target rate for output. At first sight, the
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absence of an inflationary bias in monetary policy then seems to obviate the need  for a central
banker who is more inflation averse than society.
An important exception in this literature is a recent paper by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999)
who show that society will gain from appointing a conservative central banker even if the
output target is equal to the natural rate if price setting depends on expectedfuture output gaps
(i.e. if the Phillipscurve is ofthe New-Keynesian variety in which inflation in period t depends
on the expectation of inflation in period t+1 conditional on the information set in period t). The
reason is that by internalising the effect o f current actions on future inflation, the central bank
will face an improved inflation-output trade-off.
The purpose of Chapters 4 and 5 is to investigate to what extent this result is robust to two
other widely used specifications of the economy's aggregate supply relationship. It may be
important to check this since there is no general agreement about the appropriate nature of this
relationship in the economics profession. Because of this Cukierman (2000, p. 14) states that
...It is likely that he G.e. the central banker)  is going to intuitively assign some non negative
weight to each  of the models...".
In Chapter 4 we will determine the optimal degree of conservatism under the assumption that
price setting is purely backward looking. In this sticky price model output will be determined
by aggregated demand. Given the level of potential output, a change in aggregate demand will
affect the output gap (defined   as   the di fference between actual and potential output)   and
subsequently the rate of inflation. We present a simplified version of the well-known inflation
forecast targeting model first introduced by Svensson (1997b) and find that in this setting it is
indeed optimal to appoint a conservative central banker. The reason is that a central banker
acting under discretion will not take the effect of current actions on future inflation into
account. Subsequently, we extend the model with uncertainty about the potential level of
output to see whether or not this will affect the optimal degree of conservatism.
In Chapter 5 we analyse the traditional linear expectations-augmented Phillipscurve (which
can be seen as the inverse of the Lucas supply function). In this model, actual output will in
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principle be determined by a combination of supply and demand factors. However, the latter
can only influence actual output to the extent that demand factors are not incorporated into
inflationary expectations. In other words, whether or not short-run neutrality holds in this
model depends crucially on whether or not the central bank has private information. Hence,
we will analyse the optimal degree of conservatism in a model where the central bank has
private information about the cost-push shock but the public can partially predict its realisation
and the case where no surprise inflation is possible. Next, we extend the model by departing
from the certainty equivalent framework in assuming that the Phillipscurve is convex. The
implications of a non-linear Phillipscurve for monetary policy in general have been analysed
by Bean (2000) in the context of loss function where output enters in a linear fashion and by
Schaling (1998) for the case of strict inflation targeting. Here we use the familiar quadratic
loss function featuring the output gap and inflation and find that some degree of output
stabilisation will improve social welfare even i f the central banker cannot generate a surprise
inflation.
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Chapter 4: Inllation Targeting and The Optimal Degree of
Conservatism with and without Uncertainty about
Potential Output
4.1:   Introduction
Since the widespread adoption of inflation targeting many researchers have addressed the
question how best to implement such a regime. One of the seminal contributions in this respect
has been Svensson (1997b) who argues that inflation targeting can be seen as a situation in
which the government assigns a particular loss function to the central bank. Basically, the
central bank's task is to minimise a weighted sum of the variability of inflation around an
explicitly assigned target and the variability of output around its potential. The latter
assumption is a marked deviation from the literature dealing with the inflationary bias problem
in which society is burdened with a suboptimally high rate of inflation due to the fact that the
monetary policymaker systematically tries to push output above potential. However, as argued
by many authors (e.g. Blinder (1998)), while an ambitious output target may represent the
preferences of politically subservient policymakers, central bankers who have been granted
instrument independence do realise the danger and the futility of this.
Rogoff (1985) suggested that the decrease in social welfare stemming from an ambitious
output target can be partly compensated by changing another aspect of the central banker's
loss function. He showed that a policymaker who is conservative in the sense that she is more
inflation averse than society will generate a lower average rate of inflation. However, this will
come at the cost of a suboptimally low degree of output stabilisation. By contrast, the optimal
relative weight on output stabilisation has received little attention in the literature dealing with
the implementation of inflation targeting. At first sight it may seem that the absence of an
inflationary bias obviates the need for appointing a conservative central banker. Nevertheless,
in a recent contribution Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) showed that social welfare will be
higher under a conservative policymaker when she is faced with a New-Keynesian
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Phillipscurve. The reason is that in this case inflation will be determined by expected future
values of the output gap. The difference between policymaking under commitment and under
discretion is that in the latter case the central banker will not take the effect of current actions
on future inflation-output trade-offs into account. For this reason social welfare will be higher
if the policymaker can commit herself. However, in the absence of a credible commitment
mechanism the commitment solution can be replicated by appointing a conservative central
banker. The purpose of this chapter is to see whether this result also holds under the
backwardlooking (or accelerationist) Phillipscurve which, despite its lack of theoretical
foundations, is still frequently used in both the academic literature and actual policymaking
(see e.g. Cukierman (2000)). Under this specification of the economy's aggregate supply
relationship the rate of inflation generated today will also affect the inflation-output trade-off
in the next period. Our main finding is that it will therefore also be socially optimal to appoint
a central banker who is more inflation averse than society in this case.
Subsequently, we extend the model by assuming that the central banker cannot observe
potential output in real time but she regularly receives updates on past values of potential
output. According Rudebusch (2000) this corresponds to the situation actually faced by real
world policymakers. This begs the question whether or not the presence of this kind of
uncertainty should make the central banker even more conservative. Clearly, uncertainty about
potential output will increase both the variability of inflation and the output gap. To the extent
that it alters these variabilities to a different degree it may also affect the socially optimal
relative weight on output stabilisation. However, we find that under the assumptions made in
this chapter (most notably the fact that the Phillipscurve is of the accelerationist variety and
the fact the central banker uses past inflation rates to optimally filter out information about the
current level of potential output), the presence of uncertainty about potential output will not
change the optimal degree of conservatism relative to  the case where potential output is fixed
and known to the policymaker.
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4.2: The Optimal Degree of Conservatism when Potential Output is Fixed
In this section we present a simplified version of Svensson's inflation forecast targeting
framework (see Svensson (1997b)). The Phillipscurve in this case reads as follows:
ir,      =     lr,-1      ta(y, -y  ') tv (4.1)
Inflation in the current period (irt) depends positively on inflation in the previous period, the
output gap and a cost-push shock (vt). The output gap is defined as the difference between
actual output (Yt) and potential output (Yt'). In this section we assume that potential output is
fixed and without loss of generality we normalise it to zero. The cost-push shock is an i.i.d.
normal with zero mean and variance avi. Since this is a sticky price model, actual output will
be determined by aggregate demand which, in turn, is given by the following relationship:
y, = -(i,-E,_,Ir,*2) + 8, (4.2)
As usual demand depends negatively on the real interest rate (it - Et.17[2+1) where the expected
rate of inflation is conditional on the public's and the central bank's information set at the end
of period t-1. Next, Yt is also subjected to a demand shock (St) which follows  an i.i.d. normal
distribution with mean zero and variance equal to 0£2.  We do not explicitly take account of
lags in the transmission mechanism but instead approximate the effect of them by assuming
that the central bank and the public cannot observe the current realisations o f the supply shock
(Vt) and the demand shock (st).
The objective of the central bank is so stabilise inflation around the assigned target (which
without loss of generality is normalised to zero) and to stabilise ouput around its potential:
4 - 2(1-5)E,lf:81-'I- 1'12 + - Cy,-yi),111           (403)
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We restrict ourselves to the case o f pure discretion in which the central bank is free to set the
interest rate at whatever it considers to be the optimal level in each and every period.
Moreover, there is nothing agents can learn from past central bank actions about either the
preferences of the central bank and/or its knowledge of the economy.49 This means that there
is no link between periods because of which the central banks problem in period t boils down
to minimising the period t loss function subject to the Phillips-curve constraint. From the
aggregate demand equation (4.2) it can be seen that Et.lyt can be regarded as an indirect
control variable for the central bank. Minimising the period t loss function with respect to Yt
then yields the following first-order condition:
E,-ty,       =      - i E,_,ir, (4.4)
This first-order condition is exactly the same as the one obtained by Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1999) and shows that the central bank essentially pursues a 'leaning against the wind' policy
by contracting the output gap whenever the conditional inflation forecast is above the target
and vice versa. To obtain closed form solutions for inflation and output we take expectations
conditional on the information set at the end of period t-1 across equation (4.1). Substituting
the resulting expression  for  Et. i m  into   (4.4) and realising  that  Yt = Et-1 Yt  +   Et we obtain   the
following for the output gap in period t:
ay, - 4, = - ir,_,   + E, (4.5)A+a'
Intuitively, the central bank will contract output whenever the inherited rate of inflation
exceeds the target while the degree of activism with which it will do so is decreasing in the
relative weight on output stabilisation (X).
49 This would be true even if the central bank had an information advantage over the public in the sense that it
knows the realisation of the supply shock when setting monetary policy. In that case past central bank actions or
macroeconomic outcomes would not help the private sector to form a better estimate of the innovation to the
supply shock.
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Plugging equation (4.5) into equation (4.1) yields the equilibrium rate o f inflation in period t:
A
ir,_1         +        v,         + at, (4.6)(A +al)
Optimal monetary policy will cause the equilibrium rate of inflation to be serially correlated
and stationary where the resulting endogenous persistence parameter for inflation will be
increasing in the relative weight on output stabilisation and decreasing in the slope of the
Phillipscurve. Hence, as in Svensson (1997b) the central bank's relative weight on output
stabilisation governs the speed with which inflation is brought back in line with the inflation
target because of which it is an important determinant of the trade-off between inflation and
output variability.




Interestingly, the effect of the central bank's relative weight on output stabilisation on the
degree of activism with which it responds to the inherited rate of inflation (lit-I) turns out to be
ambiguous. On the one hand, if :rt.1 is positive, an increase in X will cause an increase in the
expected rate o f inflation (which from equation (4.6) can be seen to be equal to
(127It-1)/(1+012)2) All else equal, this will cause the nominal interest rate to go up as well.  On
the other hand, an increased concern for output stabilisation will cause the real interest rate (rt
= (airt-1 /(kta2) ) to increase less in response to a rise in T[t.1.  In the Svensson (1997b) model,
the first effect is absent since the expected rate of inflation is completely predetermined
because o f a two period lag between a change in the interest rate and its effect on in flation.
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We assume that the choice of the optimal degree of output stabilisation is a 'once-and-for-all'
decision. In other words, it is determined in the institutional design phase and subsequently
announced to the public. Hence, to determine the optimal value of X we need the unconditional
expected value of society's loss function which is assumed to be the same as the central bank's
loss function expect for the fact that society's relative weight on output stabilisation (4) may
differ:
. \\2  
E(L) = Far(,r)+ (EOT))2    +    4 FarG-y')+(EG-y  v j (4.8)
From equations (4.5) and (4.6) we can see that E(Tr) = E(y) = 0. Furthermore, from these
equations, the unconditional variances of inflation and the output gap can be easily computed:
Far(,r) = , Ala,+20'.1CA +a'Y F   ,       1      21
(21 +a-)[ a 1
(4.9)
a i   2 1 2 1   alFar(y -y')    =  11 I a. + -:.0-'  1   -   «-
C         (21 +a l) ) [    .        a-          .1                 a-
We can now obtain the optimal degree of output stabilisation (1*) by inserting equation (4.9)
50into the social loss function (4.8) and minimising the resulting expression with respect to k:
1* = (4.10)
-  a2   +  a 4 al   +  44
2
50 This minimisation will yield two solutions for k*, one of which is negative and one of which is positive.
Obviously, the latter one is the relevant solution here.
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Proposition 4.1:
If the central bank is faced with an accelerationist Phillipscurve and if potential output
is fixed and known, it will be optimal to appoint a conservative central banker (0 < 1*
< 4) even if the central banker's output target is equal to potential output. Moreover,
the optimal degree ofconservatism in that case will decrease (i.e. 1* will increase) if:
1.        the slope ofthe Phillipscurve (a) increases
2. society's relative weight on output stabilisation (2&) increases.
Proof: see Appendix A
The intuition is that a central bank acting under discretion will not internalise the effect of its
current decision on next period's optimisation problem. Nevertheless, the accelerationist
Phillipscurve does introduce a link between periods since the rate of inflation in period t will
affect the inflation-output trade-off in period t+1.  If the central bank could commit, it would
explicitly take this into account when setting monetary policy in period t. This recognition
would lead to an improved trade-off between inflation and output variability. However, as in
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), if commitment is not feasible social welfare can be improved
by appointing a conservative central banker.
As for the parameters affecting the optimal degree of conservatism, an increase in the slope of
the Phillipscurve (a) corresponds to a decrease in the endogenously induced persistence of
inflation as can be seen from equation (4.6).5' As a result, the variability of inflation caused by
the variance of supply shocks (Ov2) will decrease and there will be more room for the central
bank to engage in output stabilisation. Furthermore, an increase in society's optimal relative
weight on output stabilisation (4) will spill over into a lower degree of optimal central bank
conservatism.
5I It should be noted that this endogenous persistence is induced by the fact that the central bank cares about
output stabilisation (k > 0).  In the case of strict inflation targeting, A, would not depend On m.i
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4.3: Optimal Monetary Policy with Uncertainty about Potential Output
In this section we assume that the central bank faces uncertainty about supply side
developments. The possible importance of such uncertainty is highlighted by Bullard and
Schaling (2000) who analyse the implications for monetary policy when the cost-push shockis
subjected to a Markov regime switching process in the context of strict inflation targeting.
*
Here we will assume the central bank faces uncertainty about the level  of potential output  (y  )
and will try to assess the implications of this uncertainty for the optimal relative weight on
output stabilisation. In particular, we assume that potential output is subject to the following
serially correlated process:
y; = py,_1 + r, (4.11)
This equation can be thought of as a situation in which potential output fluctuates randomly
along some long-term trend where the latter is normalised to zero in this model. We also
assume that these fluctuations are persistent and stationary (i.e. 0< p< 1). The innovation to
potential output (rt.1) follows an i.i.d. normal distribution with mean zero and variance ari.
Because of the persistence in potential output, the central bank can use its past realisations to
estimate the current level. In particular, we assume the central bank has a perfect observation
on potential output in period t-2 (yt-2')· As observed Rudebusch (2000) this corresponds to a
situation actually faced by many central banks in which data on potential output are hardly
ever available in real time and in which current estimates of potential output are frequently
revised at a later date.  If in addition we assume the central bank knows the realisations of
inflation and demand in the previous period (,It-1 and yt-1, respectively), its estimate of the
current level ofpotential output will be (see Appendix B):
 2 62
E,_l Y        -      f'2 y:-1                                 ,-1
- n where e=
a                                                             a2(72 + af
(4.13)
and Q,_,     =    -ar,_, + v,_,     =    ;r,_,  - 14.2 - 00,t-1
-
P ly:-2
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Basically, an observation on 7rt.i amounts to an observation on what could be termed last
period's inflation residual (fit.1)· This is simply the part of last period's inflation rate which
cannot be accounted  for by the realisations of variables which are known to the central bank at
the end of period t-1 (i.e. by %-2 , Yw and yt. ') Since the central bank knows that the
realisation of flt-i is caused by a linear combination of last period's innovation to potential
output (rt.1) and last period's cost-push shock (vt. I), it will use its knowledge of the probability
distributions ofthese shocks to optimally filter out information on Tt-t · 52
Minimising the central bank's loss function (4.3) with respect to yt yields the following first
order condition:
a           02 v' -220 (4.14)E,a Y,       =      - i.E ,- m ,
+
„        3   1 -2                                           1 -1a
Hence, the extent to which the central bank will contract or expand output also depends on its
estimate of supply side developments. First of all, the central bank's update of potential output
in period t-2 will spill over into the central bank's optimal output target today because of the
persistence in the process driving potential output. Next, all else equal, a positive realisation of
last period's inflation residual (flt. I) will induce the central bank to contract demand since part
of it will be attributed to adverse supply side developments (i.e. a negative realisation of rt. i)
Taking rational expectations based on the central bank's information set at the end  of period t-
1 across equation (4.1), inserting the result into equation (4.14) and realising that Yt- yt'  = Et.
lyt + Et - Pzyt-1    -prt-1  - rt   , we obtain the following expression for the output gap in period t:
a                         P0y,-f, = A •_,       -       P(j -  0')T,_l       -      -V,_1        +       6,       - T, (4.15)A+az  '.                    a
52 In the terminology of Bullard and Schaling (2000), variables such as last period's acceleration in inflation (An,.
t), last period's aggregate demand (Mi) and the update of past potential output (y,-2') become leading indicators
of supply side developments and will therefore also influence the current monetary policy stance.
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First   of  all,  both last period's persistent shock to potential output   (·rt.i)   and last period's
transitory cost-push shock (vt-1) will influence the output gap indirectly through their effect on
the  rate of inflation  in the previous period  (At.1 ).  As in Section  4.2, the impact  of this indirect
effect will be influenced by the central bank's relative weight on output stabilisation (k)
Secondly, there will also be a direct effect of these shocks on the output gap because for a
given value   of  the    inflation    forecast   (Et. Im)   the   central   bank   will   try   to   move   aggregate
demand in step with its forecast of aggregate supply (Et.iyt'). In this respect, a positive
realisation of last period's shock to potential output will only be partly recognised by the
central bank (the extent to which this is the case is measured by the signal-to-noise ratio 0).
This means that aggregate demand will not fully reflect the size of this shock because ofwhich
it will induce a decrease in today's output gap. Similarly, a positive realisation of last period's
transitory cost-push shock will be partly interpreted as a decrease in potential output. This will
cause the central bank to contract aggregate demand and therefore also the output gap since
this shock does not actually influence potential output itself.
It should also be noted that the central bank's relative weight on output stabilisation does not
influence the direct effect of these shocks in any way. The reason for this is that the direct
effect affects the output gap through the central bank's estimate of potential output. The
central bank's relative weight on output stabilisation only affects the trade-off between
inflation and output gap variability.  The fact that the central bank tries to minimise the latter
by allowing demand to grow in line with its estimate of potential ouput does not affect this
trade-off in  any way.
Plugging equation (4.15) back into the Phillipscurve equation (4.1) we find that inflation in
period t will be equal to:
A
A, =   .A,_1 -apO-0)'r,_  - pGv,_t - aT, + ag, + 4 (4.16)A+a'
Since the output gap is one of the variables driving inflation, the afore-mentioned effects of
last period's shock to potential output (rt.i) and the cost-push shock  in the previous period (vt-
1) will equally apply to the current rate of inflation.
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From the aggregate demand equation  (4.2)  it  can  be  seen  that  it  =  -  Et-!Vt  +  Et-11rt.1 · Using
equations (4.15) and (4.16), the optimal nominal interest rate in period t will be equal to:
a(,1,+a2)+Al
i,    =       (A +a2)2     'r,-1    -   pzy:-1    +P8[-ar,_, + v,-1 ] (4.17)
When comparing this equation with the optimal interest rate obtained when there is no
uncertainty about potential output it can be seen that the interest rate will also react expected
supply side developments. In particular, the interest rate will be lower than the one obtained in
equation (4.7) if the central bank expects potential output to be above its  long term trend.
Next, we will consider the question whether or not the central bank should be more
conservative if it faces uncertainty about potential output. From equations (4.15) and (4.16) we
can see that E(Tr) = E(y-y') = 0 so minimising the social loss function with respect to k again
boils down to examining the trade-off between inflation and output gap variability. Before we
start analysing this formally it is instructive to consider what might cause this trade-off to be
different in the face of uncertainty about potential output. Comparing the expressions for
inflation and the output gap without and with uncertainty about potential output (i.e.
comparing equation (4.5) and (4.6) to equations (4.15) and (4.16) ) we can see that the trade-
off between inflation and output gap variability may be different because of the interaction
between the direct and indirect effects of last period's shock to potential output and last
period's cost-push shock. In other words, what makes the trade-off different from the one
examined in Section 4.2 is that it will be influenced by the unconditional covariance between
tt.1 and vt.1 on the one hand, and ;rt.1, on the other. After all, the indirect effect itself is
incorporated into Trt.1 and in this respect there is no difference with the case where there is no
uncertainty about potential output. Next, as argued before, the direct effect taken on its own
will not influence the trade-off either since the central bank's relative weight on output
stabilisation has no impact on this.
Using equations (4.15) and (4.16) the variances of inflation and output will be equal to (see
Appendix C):
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Far(;r)=
(21+ai) (1+P2(1-0)2)Cr: |    az    a., +a 2 
(,1.+a 2)2 [/ A   i     (1 + P202 )    2          1
f    a2   1/t . 1   -      (1 +  282) , . 1        a.i
(4.18)
Far(y-y')=111 , liu+p.(1-8)2):r; 1 a: + al  1 -ItC (21+a.)1        az    ] a
Obviously, due to the variability in potential output and the central bank's inability to make a
perfect ex ante distinction between persistent movements in potential output and transitory
cost-push shocks, both the variance of inflation and the variance of the output gap will be
larger than in Section 2. This can be seen by setting the parameters p and 0,2 equal to zero in
equation (4.18) in which case we obtain equation (4.9).
Plugging these expressions into the social loss function (4.8) and minimising the resulting
expression with respect to X we obtain exactly the same optimal value for the central bank's
relative weight on output stabilisation as in the case where there is no uncertainty about the
level of potential output. Hence, under an accelerationist Phillipscurve and optimal signal
extraction by the central bank concerning movements in potential output, uncertainty about the
latter will not warrant any additional degree of conservatism compared to the case where
potential output is fixed and known. The intuition for this is that the long run effects of the
interaction between the direct and indirect effects of the innovation in potential output and the
cost push shock on the variability of inflation and the output gap will exactly cancel out. For
instance, in Appendix C we show that the variance of inflation will be influenced by the
unconditional covariances between Tt. i  and  vt. 1,  on  the one hand, and At-1  on the other. These
covariances will exert opposite effects. In particular, Covert-1.7[t-1) - -aic,2 will have a
positive effect on Var(7r) since 7:t.1 affects m Positively while rt.i has a negative effect on irt-1
(see equation (4.16)). Similarly, Cov(vt.1, T[t-I)=av2 will have a negative effect on Var(ir). The
effect of these covariances on the variability of inflation is influenced by the fact that the
central bank optimally filters out information about supply side developments. For instance, an
increase  in  a: will increase Cov(Tt. L  At-1 )·  Due  to  the  fact  that the central  bank is engaged  in
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optimal signal extraction,  it will similtaneously induce a decrease in the effect of this
covariance on Var(ir) Hence, the fact that these covariances are weighed by the signal-to-
noise ratio 0 ensures that their effect on Var(A) cancels out exactly.
The economic intuition behind this result is that optimal signal extraction in conjunction with
the fact that the process driving potential output is stationary will ensure that the central bank
will not make any systematic mistakes in its estimates of potential output.  Since we assumed
that the optimal relative weight on output stabilisation is chosen from an ex ante perspective
(i.e. it will be determined by the unconditional variances of inflation and the output gap),
uncertainty about potential output put will therefore have no effect on its optimal value.
4.4: Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we have analysed a simple model of inflation targeting in which price setting is
purely backward looking and in which output is therefore demand determined. The
government instructs the central bank to minimise the variation of inflation around the
assigned target and to minimise the variability of output around potential. Moreover, the
government also explicitly assigns a relative weight on output stabilisation to the central bank.
Since the central bank does not have an ambitious output target, there is no inflationary bias in
this model in the sense that inflation will not deviate from the target systematically. At first
sight it may seem that the government should therefore appoint a central banker who shares
society's preferences concerning output stabilisation. However, as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1999), who analyse the case of purely forward-looking price setting, we find that it will be
optimal from society's point of view to appoint a central banker who is conservative in the
Rogoff (1985) sense. The reason is that the accelerationist Phillipscurve introduces a link
between periods which is something a central banker acting under discretion will not take into
account when setting the interest rate. Moreover, we relate the optimal degree of conservatism
to some underlying structural economic parameters.
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Next, we assume that the central banker is uncertain about the level of potential output when
setting monetary policy. As described by for instance Rudebusch (2000), this corresponds to
the situation faced by real world central bankers who, among other things, base their
instrument settings on current estimates of supply side developments which are frequently
revised at a later date. We then explore the question whether this kind of uncertainty will alter
the optimal degree of conservatism compared to the case where potential output is fixed and
known. In this respect we find that optimal signal extraction by the central bank concerning
supply side developments will not alter the balance between the unconditional variances of
inflation and the output gap. Therefore, the optimal relative weight on output stabilisation will
be exactly the same as the one obtained when there is no uncertainty about potential output.
Nevertheless, we would like to emphasise that one should be very careful in drawing
conclusions from this result for real world monetary policy. In particular, this result will be
less useful when there is a suspicion that there may be a structural break in the time series of
potential output.53  Such a structural break occurred in the early 1970's in which the Western
world experienced a significant decrease in productivity growth. It has been argued that the
failure of policymakers to recognise this and the concomitant overestimation of potential
output was partly responsible for the high rates of inflation experienced in this period (see e.g.
Orphanides (2000)). Similarly, supply side developments may have undergone a significant
change since the mid 1990's, even though no unequivocal conclusion  can be drawn about  this
at this point in time. Following Orphanides (2000), we feel that it may very well be true that
the concern for output stabilisation should decrease in the face of such structural breaks.
Next, our model assumes that the relative weight on output stabilisation is determined ex ante
(i.e. in the institutional design phase) and that it will remain fixed and known to the public
forever after that. As argued by Cukierman (2000) this may not be entirely realistic since
many central bank's remain opaque about this parameter of their loss function and, moreover,
since this parameter may change over time (see Cukierman and Meltzer (1986)). The latter
may be the result of a continuously shifting balance of power within the central bank council
53 Our model clearly does not take account of this possibility as can be seen from equation (4.14).
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but following our discussion earlier it may also be a response to changing circumstances in the
economy. In our view, it would be certainly be interesting to investigate the consequences of
opaqueness about the relative weight on output stabilisation and/or the possibility for this
parameter to vary over time for the optimal degree of conservatism.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 4.1
First we will prove that X* < 4 which using equation (4.10) boils down to the following
condition:
-az+aval +44 < 24 <=> al(az +44) < (24+al)2 c> 0 < 442
Q.E.D.
Next, the partial derivatives of X* read as follows:
I2
8.1'  =  Ca- la'+44
1 DR *            a
>0  ;  = > 0
Ba
24 al + 44 Ba      Jal  + 44
Appendix B: Derivation of Equation (4.12)
From equation (4.11) we have:
E,-,Y' = Ply,-2 + E,_,T,-, (B.1)
While the central  bank does  not  have a direct observation on It. 1,  it does observe last period's
inflation residual (ilt.1) which is equal to:
Q,_t     =    -ar,_, + v,_,     =    m,_1 -,r,-2 - 0,-1 + apy,-2 (B.2)
Using equation (B.2) the central bank's optimal estimate for 4., will be equal to:
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E     r          =      COV,-1 (fl,-1, 4-1 ) fl           =           - ac;1-1 1-1 ,-t , 0/-1 (B.3)
Far,-1 (Q,-1 ) az a:  + ai
Plugging this into equation (It.1) will yield equation (4.12) in the main text.
Appendix C: Derivation of Equation (4.18)
From equation (4.16) we can see that inflation follows a stationary AR( 1 ) process and that the
covariance between all the other shocks affecting inflation will be equal to zero. Taking the
square of equation (4.16) and applying the unconditional expectations operator to both sides of
the equation we obtain:
E(,r,)2 = .    E(;r._.) 2 +02(1+P2(1 -8)2)a +(1+ p282)a  +a 20&
/2
(A  +a' )             '   '
(C.1)
2 -& ) E(,r,-IT,-1)     ('  /   E(,r,_I v,_1)
Here we have used the fact that E(·rt.1)2= E('rt)2=a,2, E(vt.1)2= E(vt)2=av2 and E(Et)2=0%2.
Next, lagging equation (4.16) one period it can be seen that E(7[t. itt.i )=-aaTz and that
E(Trt.1 vt.1 )=av: Using the expression obtained  for 0 in equation  (B.3),  the last two terms on the
RHS of equation (C.1) can be rewritten as follows:
2»  [al(1-8)06 -ea ]  = 0 (C.2)(A+al)
Using this in equation (C.1) and realising that E(lit)2=E(Tit.1)2=Var(A) we obtain the first
expression in equation (4.18). Moreover, Va«y) can be obtained by applying a similar
exercise.
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Chapter 5: The Optimal Degree of Output Stabilisation under
An Expectations-Augmented Non-Linear
Phillipscurve
5.1:   Introduction
Recently, the literature has seen a revival of the idea that the economy's aggregate supply
relationship may be non-linear. In a nutshell, because of capacity constraints booms may be
more inflationary than recessions are disinflationary. I f this is the case, it may have important
implications for monetary policy. Recent contributions in this respect include Clark, Laxton
and Rose (1995), Bean (2000) and Schaling (1998). Clark et al. analyse the implications of
several exogenous back- and foIWard-looking policy reactions functions. They show that in
the case of an accelerationist convex Phillipscurve the mean level of output will be inversely
related to output variability. This is because the increase in inflation as a result of a period of
excess demand has to be compensated by a period of greater excess supply to disinflate the
economy. Therefore, there will be an additional gain to output stabilisation i f the central bank
is  faced with a convex accelerationist Phillipscurve.  Next,  they show there  will  be a strong
case for pre-emptive strikes against inflation ('a stitch in time saves nine'). These results are
confirmed by Bean (2000) who studies the optimal endogenous policy rule in a model where
the output gap enters linearly in the central banker's loss function and where she observes a
noisy signal of the demand shock. In particular, he shows that, compared the linear case,
optimal policy will be more contractionary and that disinflations will be implemented more
gradually. Schaling (1998) reaches similar conclusions by introducing a convex Phillipscurve
in the Svensson (1997b) inflation forecast targeting framework for the case where the relative
weight on output stabilisation is equal to zero.
In this chapter we will focus on the first result, i.e. we will study the question to what extent an
endogenously derived (and hence, by definition, optimal) monetary policy rule will feature an
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additional return to output stabilisation compared to the linear case. As a benchmark, we first
analyse the socially optimal relative weight on output stabilisation in a model with a linear
expectations-augmented Phillipscurve. Contrary to the accelerationist Phillipscurve, the need
to induce a negative output gap to squeeze an inflationary shock out of the economy will
crucially depend on the central bank's credibility. We assume that the central bank cares about
the variability o f inflation around the assigned target and about the variability of output around
potential. The latter assumption ensures that monetary policy will not be burdened by an
inflationary bias of the Barro-Gordon type (see Barro and Gorden (1983)). Finally, we assume
inflation is also influenced by a cost-push shock which is serially correlated. In the linear
model we make a distinction between the case where the central bank has private information
about the realisation of the cost-push shock and the case where there is no information
asymmetry. If the central bank has private information it will be able to stabilise output and
therefore a policy of strict inflation targeting will not be optimal. However, because the public
can partially predict the cost-push shock we find that it will still be optimal to appoint a
conservative central banker. Moreover, we will determine the determinants of the optimal
degree of conservatism and contrast them with the results obtained in a situation where the
central banker tries to push output above the long run natural rate systematically.
Under symmetric information the central bank will not be able to affect output at all. In other
words, since the return to output stabilisation is zero in this case we find it will be optimal to
appoint a central banker whose relative weight on output stabilisation is equal to zero as well.
In Section 3, we analyse the implications of a convex Phillipscurve under symmetric
information. As shown earlier by Schaling (1998), we find that a policy of strict inflation
targeting (which is optimal in the linear case) will induce a deflationary bias. Essentially, this
is because the convexity of the Phillipscurve causes the risks surrounding the optimal
conditional inflation forecast to be asymmetric. However, whereas in the Schaling model the
optimal inflation forecast will be constant over time we find that the presence of persistent
cost-push shocks will cause this forecast to be state-dependent. As a result, in addition to
demand uncertainty, uncertainty about inflationary shocks will induce a further downward bias
in the long run average rate of inflation. This bias is also the reason why there is a social return
to output stabilisation if the Phillipscurve is convex even if the central bank cannot affect
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output at all. This is because the long run average rate of inflation turns out to be strictly
increasing in the central bank's relative weight on output stabilisation.  As a result, the
deflationary bias can be made less severe and welfare can be improved by the central bank's
futile attempts to stabilise output.
5.2: The Optimal Degree of Conservatism with and without Private
Information: the Linear Case
In this section we present an extenstion ofone of the models studied by Svensson (1997a).  The
aggregate supply relationship is given by the expectations-augmented Phillips-curve:
Ir,          =           ir             + ay, + Mt (5.1)
This equation can be seen as the inverse of the Lucas supply function. Consequently, whether
or not monetary policy can affect output in the short-run depends crucially on the central
bank's ability to generate a surprise inflation. In this model, where we abstract from
uncertainty on the part of the public concerning central bank preferences, this boils down to
the question whether or not the central bank has private information about the realisation of
the cost-push shock (A). The latter follows a serially correlated and stationary process where
the innovation to the cost-push shock (vt) follows an i.i.d. normal with mean zero and variance
Ct.2:
A = pg,_i + 4 (5.2)
At this point is useful to make a distinction between the natural rate of output and potential
output. As argued by Cukierman (2000), these two concepts are often used interchangeably
but are not necessarily identical. The natural  rate  of output  can be defined as the output level
that will prevail  in the absence of inflationary surprises.  In this model the natural  rate o f output
will therefore vary with the realisation of the cost-push shock. In particular, a positive cost-
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push shock will, in the absence of inflationary surprises, induce a decrease in the short-term
natural rate which corresponds to a supply side induced decrease in the output gap.54 BY
contrast, potential output corresponds to the long-run capacity of the economy to produce
goods and services as determined by factors such as the capital stock, the labour force and the
state of technology. In other words, this concept pertains to the level of output that will prevail
in the absence of inflationary surprises and transitory cost-push shocks.55 In this model,
potential output is time-invariant and normalised to zero. Furthermore, since the Phillipscurve
is linear and since we assume that cost-push shocks follow a stationary process, there will be
no systematic deviation of the natural  rate of output from potential.
Next, TrZ denotes the rational expectation of inflation in period t conditional  on all information
available to the public at the end ofperiod t-1. Throughout we assume that the public does not
know the realisation of the supply shock but, due to the fact that this shock is serially
correlated, can predict its realisation partially.   As  far  as the central  bank' s information  set  is
concerned we will distinguish between two cases. In the first case the central bank has an
information advantage in the sense that it knows the realisation of the innovation to the supply
shock (vt) when setting monetary policy. In the second case, which will serve as a benchmark
for the analysis in Section 3, we analyse the situation where there is no information
asymmetry.
54 Note that equation (5.1) can be rewritten as follows: 14 = Ate + a( (y, - yt') + Cy,"-y.) ) + 111 where yt' denotes the
short-run natural rate and y' denotes potential output (the latter is implicitly normalised to zero throughout this
chapter). If there is no surprise inflation (i.e. if lr,-1Tte) actual output (y,) will by definition be equal  to the short-
term natural rate which implies: y,«=-B,/a. The output gap is defined as the difference between actual output (y,)
and potential output (y'.) Hence, actual output will be determined by a combination of demand and supply (i.e
cost-push) factors. However, since this is essentially a flex-price model (at least as far as prices on the goods
market are concerned), demand factors will only be able to influence output (i.e. to generate a deviation of yt
from yt')  to the extent that they will induce a deviation of the actual rate of inflation (,r,)  from the  rate of inflation
expected by the public (*,D'
55 According to Cukierman (2000) the potential level of output is the level of output that will prevail in the
absence of real business cycle effects. In our model this real business cycle effect corresponds to the cost-push
shock since this shock will generate supply side induced variations in actual output.
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Aggregate demand (yt) is given by the following equation: 56
y,       =      -  (i,  -  :r ')       +       E, (5.3)
First of all, demand is decreasing  in  the real interest rate (it-7[te). For analytical convenience we
assume that aggregate demand is influenced by the same expected rate of inflation that
features in the Phillipscurve. Next, demand is also influenced by a demand shock (Et) which
follows an i.i.d. normal distribution with mean zero and variance 0£2. To approximate the
effect of lags in monetary policy we assume this shock is unobservable to both the central
bank and the public when they respectively set the nominal interest rate and the expected rate
o f in flation.
The central bank's objective is to stabilise inflation around the target assigned by the
government and to stabilise output around potential where the latter is normalised to zero: 57
Fl , A  z11L, = 2(1-8)E,  5'-'[21': + 2"y, _1 1                        (5.4)
5.2.1: Central Bank has Private Information
Since we assume that the central bank cannot commit and since private agents cannot distill
any additional information from past policy actions, the central bank's problem boils down to
56 Since the demand shock (4) is by assumption not incorporated into inflationary expectations, actual output will
essentially always be demand determined. Moreover, potential output is fixed and normalised to zero. Hence
throughout this chapter the variable y, will denote three concepts: aggregate demand, actual output and the output
gap.
57 This assumption is made in most of the literature. Alternatively, we could assume the central bank tries to
stabilise output around the short-term or long-term natziral rate. The latter will in the linear model be equal to
potential output. However,  if the Phillipscurve is convex, the long-run natural rate will be below potential output
but will still be constant. For an analysis of a state-contingent output target which is equal to the short-term
natural rate see Svensson (19973).
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minimising the period loss function subject to the Phillipscurve constraint. This yields the
familiar first order condition:
a
E,-ly, = - -i E,_,Ir, (5.5)
To obtain solutions for inflation and output in the case where the central banker has an
information advantage we take expectations conditional on the central bank's information set
in period t-1 across the Phillips curve equation (5.1) and subsequently substitute the
expression obtained for Et. Im into equation (5.5) which yields the following expression for the
central bank's optimal expected value of the output gap:
a r.  1
E,_ty, = . Pr; +.u, 1 (5.6)A+a*
Plugging this expression into the Phillipscurve equation (5.1), taking rational expectations
across the resulting expression based on the public's   information   set in period t-1 (i.e.
excluding vt) we obtain the equilibrium expected rate of inflation: 58
Xp
lr;    =    -i 11'-1 (5.7)a
Since the supply shock is to some extent predictable to the public, part of the central bank's
reaction to it is anticipated and incorporated into inflationary expectations. This in turn will
inhibit the central bank's attempts to stabilise output. However, since the central bank follows
a discretionary policy it will not take the effect of its stabilisation efforts on expected inflation
into account. In other words, the cental bank is faced with a time-inconsistency problem.
Given the fact that its efforts to stabilise the effect of the anticipated part of the cost-push
shock (ppt-t) on output will be futile, it would be better if the central bank could commit to not
reacting to this part of the cost-push shock. However, if the public were to believe this, the
58 In the terminology of Svensson (19973) this equation represents a state-contingent inflation bias.
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central bank would have an incentive to cheat. Using equation (5.6) and (5.7) in the aggregate
demand equation (5.3) yields the optimal interest rate in period t:
FA+al                 a
L-az ]pv,-, + -4 (5.8)90(A + a.)
The effect of the central bank's relative weight on output stabilisation on the nominal interest
rate will be ambiguous. On the one hand, due its effect on inflationary expectations, a larger
relative concern for output stabilisation will induce a stronger reaction to the realisation of the
supply shock in period t-1 (lit.1). On the other hand, the central bank's reaction to the
innovation of the supply shock (vt) will be less strong if it attaches more weight to output
stabilisation.
Next, substituting the expected rate of inflation back into equation (5.1) and realising that yt =
Et.lyt + Et we can compute the equilibrium output gap in period t:
a
t.      =     - - 8.-1
- -V. + EAtal i (5.9)
The first term on the RHS of this equation is simply a reflection of the fact that a positive
realisation of the cost-push shock (or equivalently a negative supply shock) which is fully
anticipated by the public will decrease the natural rate in period t. The second term on the
RHS shows that the effect of the innovation to the supply shock on output can be diminished
by the central bank's stabilisation efforts by virtue of the fact vt will not be incorporated into
inflationary expectations. Finally, the third term reflects the central bank's imperfect control
over the output gap.
Next, by inserting equations (5.7) and (5.9) into the Phillips-curve we obtain the following
equilibrium solution for inflation in period t:
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K,=  32           12 A-1 + .V, + aE, (5.11)a       A+a-
The first expression on the RHS is equal to the expected rate of inflation. Obviously, the
central bank would do better not to react to the part ofthe supply shock which is also known to
the public but cannot commit to doing so. The second part on the RHS represents the effect of
the innovation to the supply shock where we can see that the degree to which this shock will
feed through into inflation will be an increasing function o f the central bank's relative weight
on output stabilisation (X) Finally, the last expression on the RHS denotes the effect of the
unexpected demand shock on inflation.
The fact that the central bank tries to stabilise the effect of the supply shock on output but is
partly prevented from doing so due to the fact that the supply shock is partially predictable
begs the question as to what extent the central bank should seek to stabilise output in the first
place. To evaluate this question we need the unconditional variances of inflation and output
which are equal to:
F    Al pl           A.
Far(;r) = ' ,a Z        +      a-a;La (l-pw) 1 (A+az)2-1 0
(5.12)
FarG) = F p  1  al 1
Lai<1-pl) (A+a')2Jav + cri
The optimal value of X can now be obtained by inserting the expressions in equation (5.12)
into the unconditional expected value ofthe social loss function:
E(L) = Far(,r)+ (E(,r))2     +    4IFar(y) + (EG))21
(5.13)
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Here the parameter 26 denotes the socially optimal relative weight on output stabilisation.
Minimising equation (5.13) with respect to X we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1:
If the central  bank is faced  with a linear expectations-augmented Phillipscurve,  i f it  has
private information concerning cost-push shocks and if the public can predict these
shocks partially, it will be optimal to appoint a conservative central banker (i.e. a
central banker for whom it holds that 0 < 1* < 4) even if the central banker's output
target is equal to the long run natural rate. The central banker's optimal relative weight
on output stabilisation (1*) will increase if:
1.        the slope ofthe Phillipscurve (a) increases
2.             the persistence of supply shocks (p) decreases
3. society's relative weight on output stabilisation (4) increases
Proof see Appendix A
Hence, the seminal result obtained by Rogoff (1985) that society gains from appointing a
central banker who is more inflation averse than society does not necessarily require a
temptation to systematically push output above potential provided supply shocks are partially
anticipated by the public. The reason for this result resides in the fact that, even though the
choice of k does not affect the unconditional expectations of inflation and output59, it does
affect their variances. In particular, an increase in the relative weight on output stabilisation
will decrease the variance of output at the expense of an increase in the variance of inflation.
Intuitively, in the presence of such a trade-off not paying any attention to output stabilisation
cannot be optimal.
59 The latter is of course a direct result of the natural rate hypothesis implying no systematic effect of monetary
policy (including the central bank's preference parameters) on output. Furthermore, at the risk of repetition, it
should be noted that the  long run natural rate of output E(y) is equal to potential output.
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Next, the fact that the optimal degree of output stabilisation is lower than society's preference
for output stabilisation stems precisely from the fact that the public can partially predict supply
shocks. This creates a problem which is similar in spirit to the well-known inflationary bias
problem even though such a bias is not present in this model.60 The central bank's efforts to
limit the impact of the predictable part of the supply shock on output will in equilibrium only
affect the (expected) rate of inflation. This means that, as far as its reaction to the predictable
part of the supply shock is concerned, the central bank will end up injecting more inflation
variability  into the economy without reducing output variability.6 1 Hence, society would  be
better off i f the central bank were  able to commit  to not reacting  to the predictable part  of the
supply shock.62 In exactly the same spirit as in the Rogoff (1985) model, in the absence of a
commitment mechanism society gains from appointing a conservative central banker.
Next, we will examine the determinants of the optimal degree of conservatism and compare
them with the results obtained by Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998). These authors analyse the
optimal degree of conservatism  in a framework where the central bank's output target exceeds
the long run natural rate and in which there is no persistence in supply shocks. In that case
there  is a trade-off between credibility and jlexibility. In other words, by appointing  a  more
conservative central banker, society will gain since this will lower the .first moment of the
unconditional distribution of inflation towards society's bliss point. However, this will come at
the cost of an increase in the second moment of the unconditional distribution of output which
will be suboptimal since output will no longer be stabilised in accordance with social
preferences. We emphasise that in our model society is concerned with a trade-off between the
second moments of both distributions. The comparison is summarised in Table 5.1.
60 Throughout this chapter we will define an inflationary/deflationary  bias as a positive/negative deviation of the
unconditional expectation of inflation from the target.
61 The variability in inflation caused by the central bank's reaction to pp,-1 corresponds to the first term on the
RHS in equation (5.12).
62 Note that such a commitment would not be credible for exactly the same reasons a commitment to a zero-
inflation rule is not credible in models dealing with the inflationary bias problem in monetary policy (see e.g.
Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogoff (1985) and Lohmann (1992)).
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Table 5.1: Effect of Model Parameters on the Optimal Degree of Conservatism63
Effect on Optimal Degree of Conservatism Effect on Optimal Degree   of
with Output Target Exceeding Long Run  Conservatism with Output Target equal
Natural Rate (see Eijffinger and   to Long Run Natural Rate (this model)
Hoeberichts (1998)
a                -       if 4 relatively high                       -
+      if 2& relatively low
P         0                                 +
4          +                                    -
0          +                                         0
First of all, the parameter a can be seen as the inverse of the slope of the Lucas supply
function.64 In the model with an ambitious output target, a decrease in a would increase the
effect ofany given surprise inflation on output supply. Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998) show
that this will increase the temptation for the central banker to generate surprise inflation if
society already attaches a relatively high relative weight to output stabilisation. Since this will
aggravate society's credibility problem (i.e. it will increase the inflationary bias) the central
bank needs to be more conservative. However, in the model analysed in this paper there is no
systematic temptation to spring surprise inflation on the public. Consequently, there is no long
run inflationary bias but instead there will be excessive inflation variability if the central
banker inherits society's preferences. The very fact that central banker cares about output
stabilisation (X >0) will cause the rate of inflation to be influenced by supply shocks.
However, given this dependence,  an increase in the slope of the Phillipscurve (a) will diminish
63 Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998) abstract from persistence in supply shocks. However, based on the results
obtained by Svensson ( 1997a),  it  can be argued  that  in the model  with an ambitious output target the optimal
degree of conservatism will be increasing  in the persistence of supply shocks as well.
64 Note that the Lucas supply function corresponding to equation (5.1) would be. y,  = -  r,  - pr;  - p, ja
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the variability of inflation which is caused by the variance of supply shocks (av2) as can be
seen from equation (20). As a result there is more room for the central banker to stabilise the
effect of supply shocks on output.
Next, an increase in the persistence of supply shocks (p) will increase the volatility of
inflationary expectations and therefore also the variability of inflation caused by the central
bank's futile attempts to stabilise the effect of the predictable part of supply shocks on output.
These attempts were earlier identified to be the cause of the fact that society gains by
appointing a conservative central banker. Hence,  if the effect of the central bank's reaction to
predictable supply shocks on the variance of inflation increases, it will be optimal from
society's point of view to pay less attention to output stabilisation.
Third, if society shows an increased concern for output stabilisation (4) in the model with an
ambitious output target, a policymaker sharing society's preferences will produce a higher
inflationary bias. Hence, society's credibility problem will become more severe and this needs
to be counteracted by an increase in the degree of conservatism. In the present model, the
effect of an increase in & is precisely the reverse. The reason is that there is no temptation
whatsoever to push output above the long run natural rate systematically. The only relevant
thing at stake here is the trade-off between inflation and output variability. Hence, if society
displays an increased dislike of output variability relative to inflation variability, this will spill
over into a decrease in the optimal degree of conservatism.
Finally, an increase in the variance of supply shocks (Qv2) will reduce the optimal degree of
conservatism in the model with an ambitious output target because it aggravates society's
flexiblity problem relative to its credibility problem.  In our model the variance of supply
shocks drops  out   of the first-order condition,   and has consequently no effect  on   %*.
2Apparently, given that the degree of conservatism is optimal to start with, an increase in a.
will not alter the balance between the marginal benefit of an increase in the degree of
conservatism (stemming from lower inflation variability) and the marginal cost of such an
increase (stemming from higher output variability).
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5.2.2: Central Bank has no Private Information
In the next section where we analyse the case of a non-linear Phillipscurve we will drop the
assumption that the central bank has private information in order to be able to obtain analytical
results. As a benchmark it is therefore instructive to analyse the outcome in the linear model
where the central bank has no private information. In particular we will assume that the
realisation of the innovation to the supply shock is not known to the central bank when setting
monetary policy. Since the computations are in the same spirit as in the private information
case we will restrict ourselves to presenting the outcomes:
Xp
;r;   =   7B,-1
lr,       =      -  p,-1       +      v,       +      aE,a




Far(,r)  =       '12 P2 .   1 1 avz   +  aza 
La4(1-PL) ]
(5.14)
Far(y)    =    a2 ( -pi ) 0.:    +    a.




If the central bank is faced with a linear-expectations augmented Phillipscurve, if there
is no information asymmetry and if both the central bank and the public can partially
predict supply shocks, it will be optimal to appoint an ultra-conservative central banker
who only cares about inflation stabilisation (i.e. 1* =0) even if the central bank has an
output target which is equal to potential output.
The proof of this proposition is relatively straightforward since it can easily be seen that the
variance of inflation is strictly increasing in the central bank's relative weight on output
stabilisation while the variance of inflation is not affected by X Obviously, minimising the
social loss function (5.13) then boils down to minimising the variance of inflation with respect
to X.
This result should not be surprising since it is exactly the same as the one obtained in the
Rogoff (1985) model if it is assumed that the central bank has no private information about
the supply shock. The reason is relatively simple, ifthe central bank cannot affect output while
its attempts to do so will affect (expected) inflation (and hence inflation variability), it will be
optimal to abstain from output stabilisation entirely. In that case, the only thing the central
bank will do is to offset the impact of the predictable part of the supply shock on inflation
completely by setting the interest rate such that expected demand equals expected supply (-
pkit.1) at the point where the inflation forecast is equal to the target. However, in contrast to the
Rogoff model, it should be noted that the optimality o f an ultra-conservative central banker in
this case critically depends on the fact that the cost-push shock is partially predictable to the
public. If this is not the case (i.e. if p = 0), the central bank's relative weight on output
stabilisation will become irrelevant in the sense that is will not affect the variance of inflation
and output
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5.3: Optimal Monetary Policy with a Non-Linear Expectations-Augmentend
Phillipscurve
In this section we will analyse the optimal degree of output stabilisation when the central  bank
is faced with a non-linear Phillipscurve. In particular, we assume that for given values of
expected inflation and the supply shock, the inflation-output trade-off (f(yt)) becomes more
unfavourable as the output gap increases and, secondly, that an output gap which is equal to
zero has no effect on inflation (i.e. we assume f(y) >0, f'(y) >0 and f(0) = 0). To derive
some analytical results we will use the following functional form which can be regarded as a
local approximation to any arbitrary convex short-term inflation-output trade-off: 65
20 - 1
Ir,           =          Ir; + + Al, (5.15)
X
Here the cost-push shock is given by equation (5.2). The parameter x indexes the curvature of
the inflation-output trade-off. In particular, this function has the desirable properties that the
curvature does not depend on the output gap and that we obtain the linear specification as X
approaches zero:




To get some feel for the difference in the inflation-output trade-off induced by the non-linear
specification we have drawn equations (5.1) and (5.15) in a diagram for a=0.3 and x = 50:
66
65
Bean (2000) uses this formulation in empirical tests of the nonlinearity of the Phillipscurve.
66 These are the values estimated by Bean (2000) for the United Kingdom.
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Again, the expected value of the output gap conditional on the central bank's information set
in period t-1 (Et-ly,) can be seen as an indirect control variable. The first-order condition for
the central bank's problem then becomes:
E,_a[,r,y    +    Xy,]    = 0 where y          =          ffEL   =ae
ze (5.17)
/V,
Here we define y as the short-run inflation output trade-off which, in contrast to the certainty
equivalent case, depends on the output gap and which, from the point of view of the central
bank, is a stochastic variable.
Solving for the expectations operator (see Appendix B) we obtain the central bank's optimal
expected value of the output gap as an implicit function ofexpected inflation:
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Ey Xa3  , (Za)2
E,_,y, =-_1- E,_,Ir,--i-al      where      E,_,7 =aezoE,-,v, 0 1    1 01) (5.18)
In essence the central bank still pursues a 'leaning against the wind' policy by contracting
demand if the conditional inflation forecast exceeds the target. However, as indicated by the
second term on the RHS, uncertainty about the current inflation-output trade-off will cause the
central bank to  set the expected value of the output  gap  so  as  to  'err on the  side of caution'.  In
other words,  even i f the inflation forecast is equal  to the target (implying Et.iF - 0) the central
bank will contract output. The reason is that the risks surrounding the central forecast are not
symmetric in the sense that a given absolute value of the realisation of the demand shock will
be more inflationary if it is positive than deflationary when it is negative. Consequently, the
optimal expected value of the output gap will be lower than in the certainty-equivalent case
(see also Schaling (1998) and Bean (2000)). Obviously, the central bank will be more cautious
if the degree of uncertainty (as measured by the variance of demand shocks) increases and if
the curvature of the inflation-output trade-off increases. An increase in the relative weight on
output stabilisation  (X) will diminish the degree  of caution.
In order to obtain closed form solutions for Et.'Yt and Et.Im we use the Phillipscurve
relationship (5.15) and take rational expectations on both sides of the equation. From this it
follows that the conditional expected value of the output gap is restricted to be equal to (see
Appendix B):67
1[, f  (.ra)2  211




This equation represents the short-term expected natural level of output and acts as an
(expected) short run supply constraint for monetary policy. This is because the central bank
67 Here it holds  that    i  E,_i y,   =  -  p,_,   ,  i.e.  as x approaches  zero the model will collapse  into the linear
symmetric information model (see equation (5.14)).
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cannot intentionally spring a surprise inflation on the public.68 Therefore, Et.lyt will be
determined by the predictable part of the supply shock and the variance of demand shocks,
both of which will be incorporated into inflationary expectations. Since the Phillipscurve is
convex, a given positive realisation of the supply shock will decrease output by a larger
amount than a negative realisation of equal magnitude will increase output. Next, private
agents know that symmetric risks surrounding the output gap (as measured by Gs2) will be
translated into asymmetric risks for expected inflation.  This will induce an upward bias in
expected inflation and will therefore decrease the expected value of the output gap compared
to the certainty equivalent case.
Equation (5.19) also allows us to pin down the value o f the expected inflation-output trade-off.
In Appendix B this is shown to be equal to:
EMI141    =     E,-ly,     = a(1-,rep,_ ) (5.20)
L oy, J
This equation shows that the fact that cost-push shocks are partially predictable will cause the
expected slope of the Phillipscurve to be state-contingent. In particular, the conditional
expected inflation-output trade-off will be more favourable (in the sense that inflation will be
less sensitive to the output gap) in the presence of positive cost-push shocks. This is because
the latter will induce a contraction in the expected output gap because of which the central
bank expects the economy to be on a flatter part o f the Phillipscurve.
Plugging equation (5.20) into equation (5.18) and equating the latter to the expected output
gap dictated by the structure of the economy as given by equation (5.19) yields the following
68
Of course, the actual level of output will be influenced by the demand shock (4) However, the central bank
does not know the realisation of this shock when setting monetary policy.
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solution for the conditional expected rate of inflation: 69
r   f      (.ra)2     2          6




First of all, output gap uncertainty (captured by az2) has two opposing effects on the
equilibrium conditional expected rate of inflation. On the one hand, an increase in output gap
uncertainty will induce the central bank to contract demand so as to 'err on the side of
caution', i.e. ceteris paribus it will seek to achieve a lower value of Et- 1 Yt because of the
asymmetric risks surrounding the conditional inflation forecast. This is captured by the last
term on the RHS of equation (5.21). On the other hand, an increase in output gap uncertainty,
through its effect on inflationary expectations will induce a decrease in the conditional output
gap dictated by the structure of the economy (i.e. it will make the short run supply side
constraint more severe). As in the case of a linear Phillipscurve, the fact that the central bank
also seeks to stabilise output induces it ceteris paribus to implement a more expansionary
policy to offset this effect. However, since this is fully anticipated by the public the only result
will be an increase the expected rate of inflation.
The second interesting feature about equation (5.21) is that even under strict inflation targeting
(1=0) optimal monetary policy will result in a state-contingent optimal conditional inflation
forecast. This result stands in marked contrast to earlier analyses ofoptimal monetary policy in
the case where the central bank only cares about stabilising inflation around the assigned
target. In the case of a linear Phillipscurve, the optimal conditional inflation forecast will then
simply be equal to the inflation target (see Svensson (1997b)). If the Phillipscurve is convex
and if there is no persistence in the process driving cost-push shocks, the optimal conditional
inflation forecast will also be constant over time but will be lower than the target because of
the asymmetric risks surrounding it (see Schaling (1998)). In essence this is because the
69 Where  it holds that  lim E.  .,r. = ZMA (see equation (5.14)).rk ,-, ' a
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expected slope of the Phillipscurve will be constant in that case.  This can be seen by setting p
equal to zero in equation (5.20). In this model the expected inflation-output trade-off is a
function of last period's cost-push shock. For instance, a positive realisation of this shock will
reduce the expected slope of the Phillipscurve resulting in an increase in the optimal
conditional inflation forecast. This is because the central banker now expects demand shocks
to have a smaller effect on inflation. Because of this the need to hedge against the fact that a
positive demand shock will be more inflationary than a negative demand shock of equal
magnitude will be deflationary, will diminish.
70Equations (5.19) and (5.21) also allow us to compute the optimal interest rate in period t:
i,      =          1     1                   1                 1[              (.ra) 1
1 1 ze'Ql
11 ln(1 + - , (5.22)
C.ra       'ra z (1  -Xplt,-1 ) A                       2
- )- ln<1 - Xpki,-1) f    (1 - WPB,-3)
Intuitively, a non-linear Phillipscurve will result in a non-linear policy rule in which the
reaction coefficients to the determinants of inflation are no longer constant but rather a
function of these determinants themselves. Furthermore, the impact of output gap uncertainty
(cez ) on the optimal interest rate is ambiguous since it has two opposing effects on the
equilibrium expected value of the output gap.
Using equation (5.21) we can derive an expression for the unconditional expectation of the
output gap by applying the law of iterated expectations and taking a 2nd order Taylor
expansion around E(Pt-1) which yields:
1    f      UP) 2 0,1EG) = -|
1   -  In 1 1 (.ra)1 al
11 (5.23)
.ral      2(1 -p' ) 2   *))
[A+al
'a Where limi. =  2 pp,_, (see equation (5.14) ).rk  '         a
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Since we assumed that potential output is fixed and normalised to zero, this expression can be
interpreted as the long-run natural rate.  As noted by Bean (2000) and Schaling (1998), the
convexity of the Phillipscurve will cause the long run natural rate to be below potential output.
In these models, this effect is entirely attributed to uncertainty about demand shocks (captured
by a£2) which causes the contractionary bias in monetary policy described in equation (5.18)
and corresponds to the last term on the RHS of equation (5.23). In addition, the current model
shows that the presence ofpersistent cost-push shocks will cause a further decrease in the long
run natural rate over and above the decrease caused by demand uncertainty. The reason is that
realisations of the supply shock are symmetric around zero and will be translated into
decreases of the output gap which on average will be larger than the increases.
Next, we can compute the unconditional expectation of inflation by applying the law of
iterated expectations and taking a 2nd order Taylor expansion around E(lit.I) = 0 in equation
(5.21):
Eor)     =    _12- In l  i  (1':)3  0-:}    -     .ra,a:Xa
(5.24)
C     (wa)2    2 11
'r'0203  31
-21'2040-; + 21 Intl  '      2     0-' jj
+
2a2 (1 -pi)
One  of the interesting implications of equation  (5.24)  is that the central bank's relative weight
on output stabilisation (k) affects the first moment of the long run (i.e. unconditional)
distribution of inflation. It has long been recognised that this preference parameter could be
one of the determinants of the well-established positive correlation between the unconditional
mean and variance of inflation (see e.g. Cukierman (1992)). However. theoretical explanations
for this usually rely critically on the assumption that the central bank has an ambitious output
target. As shown by the analysis in Section 5.2, ifthis assumption is dropped the relative
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weight on output stabilisation will cease to influence the unconditional expected rate of
inflation. Nevertheless, as indicated by equation (5.24), the introduction of a non-linear
Phillipscurve (or indeed, any deviation from the certainty equivalent framework) re-establishes
the link between the unconditional expected rate of inflation and the central bank's relative
weight on output stabilisation.n In particular, an increase in this preference parameter will also
increase long run average rate of inflation (E(7[)). The reason for this is twofold: First of all,
abstracting from the presence of cost-push shocks, demand uncertainty (as2) will cause the
natural rate to systematically fall below potential output. Since the central bank tries to
stabilise output around potential, its attempts to counteract this will result in a ceteris paribus
higher long run average expected rate of inflation. Next, for a given degree of demand
uncertainty, the central bank also tries to stabilise the effect of the predictable part of the  cost-
push shock on output. However, because of the convexity of the Phillipscurve, cost-push
shocks which are distributed symmetrically around zero will on average result in a decrease in
output below potential. Hence, the central bank's reaction to the cost-push shock will on
average cause a further ceteris paribus increase in the average expected rate of inflation.
It is instructive to first consider the case where the central banks abstains from output
stabilisation entirely (i.e. 1 = 0) since this was shown to be optimal in the case where the
central bank also does not have an information advantage over the public but is instead faced
with a linear expectations-augmented Phillipscurve. In that case equation (5.24) simplifies into
the following expression:
Eer)|A=o    =
- -      Xa2al (5.25)f (12  Pl atat
(1 - pz 
71 Cukierman (2000) shows that an inflationary bias will also emerge under the realistic assumption that the
central bank cares more about negative output gaps relative to positive ones even i f the central bank does not seek
to drive output above the natural rate systematically.
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From this expression we can derive:
Proposition 5.3:
If the expectations-augmented Phillipscurve is non-linear and ifthere is no information
asymmetry, a central bank which engages in strict inflation targeting (i.e. X = 0) will
induce a dejlationary bias which will become more severe if:
1.       the variance ofdemand shocks (GE2) increases
2.             the variance of supply shocks (ov2) increases
3.               the curvature indexation parameter (%) increases
4.        the average slope ofthe Phillipscurve (a) increases
5.             the persistence of supply shocks (p) increases
The proof of this proposition follows immediately from equation (5.25). First of all, the
intuition for this proposition rests on the combination of uncertainty about demand (a£2) on the
one hand, and the fact that booms are more inflationary than recessions are deflationary, on the
other. The latter explains why parameters which increase the curvature of the Phillipscurve
(%a) will cause a decrease in the long run average rate of inflation (E(7[)). After all for a given
level of demand uncertainty an increase in the curvature will enhance the skewness of risks
surrounding the central inflation forecast. As a result, the central bank will step up the degree
to which it hedges against these risks by aiming for a lower rate of inflation. Similarly, the
central bank will also become more cautious if (for a given curvature of the Phillipscurve) the
variance ofdemand shock increases.
The deflationary bias in equation (5.25) can be broken down in two parts. The first part,
represented by the last term on the RHS of this equation, reflects the bias which would obtain
if, due to the absence of persistence in cost-push shocks, the central bank were faced with a
constant expected slope of the Phillipscurve. As argued before, in that case the optimal
inflation target will be constant over time (see equation (5.21)). Next, the first part on the RHS
ofequation (5.25) represents that part of the deflationary bias which can be ascribed to the fact
that the expected slope of the Phillipscurve changes over time. A state-contingent expected
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inflation-output trade-off will result in a more severe deflationary bias than would obtain in
the absence of persistent cost-push shocks. A negative realisation of kit.1 will cause a decrease
in the optimal conditional inflation forecast, relative to the constant value it would have in the
absence of persistent cost-push shocks (i.e. relative to E(Tr)1 x=p=o = Xaza&2), which will be
larger than the increase resulting from a positive realisation of  lit.1 of equal magnitude. In
essence, this is because the central bank expects the slope of the Phillipscurve to be steeper
than average if last period's cost push shock was negative. In that case the need to hedge
against the afore-mentioned asymmetric risks surrounding the forecast will become more
pressing. This also explains why an increase in the parameters p and avi (alongside an
increase  in the curvature o f the Phillipscurve) will cause the deflationary bias to become  more
severe since both will serve to increase the volatility of the expected slope of the
Phillipscurve.72
In the previous section it was shown that it will be optimal to appoint a central banker who
only cares about inflation stabilisation   i f  both the central   bank   and the public can predict
supply shocks partially. Given our results sofar it is interesting to see whether this claim still
holds in the case ofa non-linear Phillipscurve. To assess the effect of X on welfare we start by
noting that from equations (5.20) and (5.23) we can see that neither the mean nor the valiance
of output will be affected by this parameter. Hence, minimising the social loss function (5.13)
with respect to k boils down to minimising the Mean-Squared Error of inflation (MSECK)-
E( 2) = Var( ) + (E(,r))2). Due to the non-linearity of the Phillipscurve, the value of E( 2) is
very difficult to obtain analytically. However, the actual rate of inflation will only differ from
its conditional forecast (given by equation (5.21)) because of shocks to which the central bank
cannot react (i.e. because of vt and st). Therefore, we will use the MSE of the conditional
inflation forecast (Et-1(xt)) as an approximation: 73
72 From equation (5.20) it can be seen that Et-I'It is normally distributed with mean a and variance (xap)2a.2.
73 This expression can be obtained by taking the square of equation (5.21) and computing the unconditional
expectation of the resulting expression using a 2nd order Taylor expansion around E(B,-1).0
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Taking the first derivative of equation (5.25) with respect to X and setting the resuling
r
expression equal to zero yields:
74
2 4 2F I (.ra)2  7 1
%  a
a,lzpa: + 2(1 - p2 +Xpaf)ln(1  I      2     ai ) X = (5.26)
ya)1  2/ 1 (Za)2 2  
2 ln(1 + 0&)[.rpcr; + (1 - pl + Zpa:) ln(1  1      2     cr, )-]
74 Alternatively, welfare could also be improved by selecting an optimal combination of the central banker's
relative weight on output stabilisation and her output target. Our intuition is that these two would be inversely
related. This can be seen by adding a constant non-zero output target to the central bank's preferred value of the
output gap in equation (5.18). In that case it can be shown that the optimal conditional inflation forecast in
equation (5.21) will be strictly increasing in this output target. Hence, for instance choosing an output target
which exceeds potential will result in an optimal value of X which is lower than would be the case if the output
target were equal to potential output.  This is because the ambitious output target  in itsegwill already  make  the
deflationary bias less severe.
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Proposition 5.4:
If the expectations-augmented Phillipscurve is non-linear and i f there is no information
asymmetry, the central bank's optimal relative weight on output stabilisation will be
strictly greater than zero (1* >0)
The proof of this proposition follows immediately from equation (5.26). Proposition 5.4 can
be illustrated graphically by plotting the MSE of the actual rate of inflation (i.e. (E( 2))
against the central bank's relative weight on output stabilisation using some plausible values
of the other parameters  in the model (see Figure 5.2). Later on we will  use this 'baseline case'
to assess the effect of several parameters on X* graphically. The parameter values are: a-0.3,
%-50, a:2=ovl= 0.0004 and p=0.5. The first two correspond to the estimates obtained by Bean
(2000) for the United Kingdom while the latter two correspond to a standard deviation of
demand and supply shocks equal to 2%.
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The figure shows that given our choice of parameters the MSE of inflation (ECT[)2) will be
decreasing (and hence welfare will be increasing) in X for relatively small values of this
parameter. Hence, whereas in the linear model the appointment o f a strict inflation targeter (or,
equivalently, ultra-conservative central banker) was shown to be optimal, society will gain i f it
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appoints an individual who attaches some weight to output stabilisation if the Phillipscurve is
convex. This result holds even though (due to the absence of an informational asymmetry
between the central banker and the public) the central banker cannot stabilise output at a// in
equilbrium (i.e. even though her relative weight on output stabilisation will not influence the
Mean Squared Error ofoutput).
The intuition is that a policy of strict inflation targeting will induce a deflationary bias (see
Proposition 5.3). As argued before, this bias can be made less severe by the central banker's
(futile) attempts to stabilise output since these will cause the unconditional expected rate of
inflation to increase. Hence, moving from a situation of strict inflation targeting to a relatively
small degree of flexible inflation targeting will reduce the deflationary bias and will therefore
increase social welfare.
Finally, we can investigate the effect of changes in several parameters on %* by plotting the
expression obtained for MSE in equation (5.25) against X and each of these parameters
separately. Implicitly, the relationship between the optimal level of X and the parameter
considered is then given by the line which traces out the minimum value o f MSE in the three-
dimensional plane. These Figures are displayed in Appendix D. First of all these figures show
that the effect of changes in the variance of demand shocks (a/) and the variance of the
innovation in supply shocks (ov2) on X* is very small. Next, for the baseline case there seems
to be a clear positive relationship between the average slope of the Phillipscurve (a) and the
extent to which the central bank should seek to stabilise output. This confirms the intuition
obtained in Section 5.2. The same holds for the persistence of cost-push shocks (p). Finally,
the parameter which indexes the curvature of the Phillipscurve (X) seems to be negatively
related to the optimal degree of output stabilisation.
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5.4:   Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we analyse the optimal degree of conservatism in a world of flexible goods
market prices where the economy's aggregate supply relationship is given by the expectations-
augmented (Lucas-type) Phillipscurve. In particular, our main question is to ascertain whether
or not a convex Phillipscurve of this type would entail an additional return to output
stabilisation which is not present in a linear world. Obviously, such an additional gain is
present if price setting is purely backward-looking since then any increases in output above
long-run potential will have to be matched by more severe decreases in output to disinflate the
economy. Hence, under an accelerationsist convex Phillipscurve there will be an inverse
relationship between the mean and the variance o f output (see Clark et al. (1995)) However,
such an additional gain from output stabilisation is not immediately obvious within a Lucas-
type transmission mechanism since the need to decrease output to disinflate the economy will
critically depend on the central bank's credibility in that case.
As a benchmark we first analyse a linear model in which the central bank tries to stabilise
inflation around the assigned target and to stabilise output around potential. Hence, we abstract
from the type of Barro-Gordon (1983) credibility problem which leads to a systematic
inflationary bias. However, on the assumption that cost-push shocks are persistent over time
there will another type of credibility problem in monetary policy. This is because the public
can partially predict the realisation of the cost-push shock. As a result, given that there is no
uncertainty about central bank preferences, the central bank's reaction to this predictable part
will be incorporated into inflationary expectations.  This  will  lead  to a suboptimally  high
variability of inflation, which could be avoided i f the central  bank were able to commit to not
reacting to the predictable part of the cost-push shock. In the absence of a credible
commitment mechanism social welfare can improved by appointing a central banker whose
relative weight on output stabilisation is lower than society's relative weight. Moreover,  if the
central bank does not have private information and hence cannot affect output at all, it will be
optimal to appoint an ultra-conservative central banker who only cares about inflation
stabilisation.
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Next, we extend the symmetric information model with persistent cost-push shocks by
assuming that the Phillipscurve is convex. In this respect, we find that a policy of strict
inflation targeting (which was shown to be optimal in the linear case) will  lead to a systematic
deflationary bias. Essentially, this is because the risks surrounding the conditional inflation
forecast are asymmetric. We also show that, in the case of flexible inflation targeting, the
unconditional expectation of inflation will be strictly increasing in the central bank's relative
weight on output stabilisation. This effect arises because of the credibility problem discussed
earlier. In particular, the central bank tries to stabilise output around potential and will
therefore try to offset the effect of uncertainty about demand shocks and the effect of the
predictable part of cost-push shocks on output.  In the long run these attempts will on average
cause a ceteris paribus increase in the expected rate of inflation since policy is always
correctly and fully anticipated by the public. As for demand uncertainty the positive relation
between the relative weight on output stabilisation and the unconditional expected rate of
inflation arises because demand uncertainty in itself will cause output to systematically fall
below potential. Furthermore, since the Phillipscurve is convex, cost-push shocks which are
distributed symmetrically around zero will be translated into decreases in output which will on
average be larger than the increases in output.
In a way this credibility problem can be used to improve social welfare compared to the case
o f strict inflation targeting. In other words,  in this model there  is an additional return to output
stabilisation. This does not arise because it reduces the variance and increases the mean of
output but because a flexible inflation targeter will induce a less severe deflationary bias than
an ultra conservative central banker.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 5.1
Plugging the expressions obtained in equation (5.12) into the social loss function (5.13), taking
the first-order condition of the resulting expression with respect to X and rearranging we
obtain:
DE(L)    =    (,1 - 4»2  1 '4,2 = O  0DA  (a2+1)1 a.'(1-pi)
(B.1)
A = *(A) E Cab (1 - 22)a«(1 -pl) + p](al + 1)3
The function *(k) implicitly defines X*. In particular, * (X) has the following properties:
0(0)     =    4(1 -P2)
84)(A) = -34.(r6(al +2)2P2(1-P2) < 0 (B.2)8/        (22(al+,1.)3+a6(1- 2 2
2: 09) = 0
Using this equation we can determine X* graphically in Figure 5.3 where the downward
sloping line represents the function *(k)
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Figure 5.3: The optimal value of k
*(A)
A* X
From this figure we can see that proving that %* < 4 amounts to proving that (D (26) < 4:
fab (1 -p2)
3 < < 4 Pl(al + 4,     > 0 (B.3) 6(1-22)+P2(al+4)
Q.E.D.
Finally, by computing the following partial derivatives of (D(X) we can determine how the
other parameters in the model affect k*:75
75 The parameters p and 4 will also influence F(0). However, since it holds that 8FCO)/Op <0 and OF(0)/04>0,
these effects do not change the conclusion reached in Proposition 5.2.
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8(I)(A) 6<as,1(a2 +R)222(1 -P2)- =               >0
Ba (a6 + 3(z#,1. 2 + 3a2,12pZ + Alpi )2
84)(A) -2<Pa«(al +1)3= .<0 (B.4)Bp        (a6+3a4,1 2+3a2,12pl+,13pz),
24)(A) a6(1 - p )- =            >024     a6(1-p2)+pl(az+,1,1
Appendix B: Solving the FOC under a Non-Linear Phillipscurve
Solving out for the expectations operator across equation (5.16) yields:
aE,Air, E,-,(ex«'.') + Cov,-1\1r"aeze'Y, 1 + AE,_iy, = 0 (B.1)
As far as the first expression on the LHS is concerned we use the following second order
Taylor-expansion:
(la)2   2
E,_t (exg, )    =    ex"E,-'Y' (1  '      2     a€ ) (B.2)
The second expression on the LHS of equation (B.1) can be approximated as follows:
Cov,_, Im.,ae"Y, 1   =    -14,r,_, If'"' 1   - Za'«: (B.3)
X
Here we have used the fact that e - 1+Xay. Plugging equations (B.2) and (B.3) back intoXay
equation (B.1) and rearranging we obtain equation (5.17).
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Appendix C: The Equilibrium Conditional Expectation of Output in the
Non-Linear Model
Taking rational expectations on both sides of the Phillipscurve equation (5.1) (where f(yt) is
determined by equation (5.14)) yields:
Ew ze}   -    1 + pvit = o (C.1)
XI





11      al(.ra) 2   1
2
Taking natural logs on both sides ofthis equation will yield equation (5.18) in the main text.
Next, equation (C.1)  also pins down the value of the expected inflation-output trade-off since
the latter is equal to:
E,_,y,    = aE,_ (exm') (C.4)
Substituting equation (C.1) into this equation yields equation (5.19) in the main text.
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Appendix D: The effect of Several Parameters on X* in the Non-Linear
Model
Figure 5.4: Relationship between optimal value of X and ael
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Figure 5.5: Relationship between optimal X and avl
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Figure 5.7: Relationship between optimal value of k and a
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The Advantage of Hiding Both Hands
Part III: Sterilised Foreign Exchange Interventions
in an Inflation Targeting Regime
It is often argued that the approach of a large economy towards nominal exchange rate
developments  can be described  as  one of 'benign neglect'.  In a world where capital  can  flow
freely across national borders the authorities either have to choose to use the instrument of
monetary policy to stabilise domestic objectives or to use it to stabilise the external value of
the currency. However, if they choose to target domestic objectives this does not mean that
monetary policy will not react to exchange rate movements. This is because the latter have a
direct effect on the consumer price index (since it also includes imported goods) and an
indirect effect via the real exchange rate which in turn affects the relative demand for home-
produced goods. In other words, if for instance the central banker targets domestic objectives,
a large and persistent depreciation of the nominal exchange rate will eventually lead to a rise
in the domestic interest rate. However, this does not come about because of an exchange rate
objective but rather because such a depreciation induces a risk of higher futuer inflation. In
this respect, the relatively small effect of the nominal exchange rate on monetary policy in
areas such as the US and the Euro-area should be ascribed to the fact that the share of imports
and exports in GDP is relatively small. Hence, the fact that the previous chapters dealt with a
Closed economy can be justified by arguing that this may serve as a relatively close
approximation for a large and relatively closed economic area provided the volatility of
exchange rate movements is relatively small.76
Nevertheless, since the break-up  o f the Bretton-Woods system  in the early 1970's the world
has witnessed considerable misalignments in the exchange rates of major currencies. These
large and often persistent movements of an exchange rate away from its estimated
fundamental value do worry central bankers. Often, their first line of defence is the
employment of foreign exchange market interventions. In principle these interventions can
effect the exchange rate in three different ways.
Mof course, analytical convenience also serves as an important justification.
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First of all, there will be an effect on the interbank money market if the central bank buys or
sells foreign reserves. The resulting change in the interbank interest rate will, for a given value
of the expected future exchange rate, cause a change in the nominal exchange rate. However,
most of the time central banks choose to sterilise this effect by conducting an opposite
transaction using domestic government securities.
Secondly, a foreign exchange intervention may be effective because of the portfolio balance
effect. This effect will only arise i f investors do not consider the two currencies in question to
be perfect substitutes, i.e. if uncovered interest parity does not hold because of which investors
will demand a risk premium. However. even if currencies are not perfect substitutes it is
unlikely that the intervention will have much effect since the intervention volume is generally
very small compared to the daily turnover on the foreign exchange markets.
Finally, foreign exchange interventions may directly alter the market's expectation of the
future exchange rate through the signalling effect. For instance, the central bank may use
foreign exchange interventions to 'announce' a future change in monetary policy.
Alternatively, the central bank may 'put its money where its mouth is' by backing up
statements that it feels that the exchange rate is out of line with its fundamental value. As
documented by Dominguez and Frankel (1993) such interventions are most likely to be
effective when there are clear indications that the current exchange rate cannot be supported
by economic fundamentals and when the intervention is supported by all the central banks
involved.  When the market doubts whether or not a sustained appreciation or depreciation of a
particular currency can be maintained for much longer, a coordinated intervention may 'prick
the bubble' and cause the market sentiment to turn around. Given the importance of the
signalling channel with respect to the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions the
central bank must have an information advantage over market participants.
The purpose of Chapter 6 is to study the effect of this information advantage which comes
about because of two reasons. First of all, the central bank has private information about its
exchange rate target and, secondly. it provides a noisy signal of the actual intervention
volume. We study a repeated game between the central bank and speculators in which the
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latter use reported intervention volumes to learn about the central bank's exchange rate target
over time. This allows use to determine the effect of several parameters on the intervention
bias (i.e. the amount of foreign exchange the central bank buys or sells without this having any
effect on the exchange rate). We also determine the effect of ambiguity on the covariance
between exchange rate movements and the central bank's target and on the variance of
exchange rate movements.
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Chapter 6: The Advantage of Hiding Both Hands: Foreign
Exchange Intervention, Ambiguity and Private
Information
6.1:     Introduction
Since the demise of the Bretton Woods system, sterilized foreign exchange interventions are
regarded as the main exchange rate policy tool for a large industrial country which chooses to
focus its monetary policy stance almost exclusively on domestic objectives. As documented
by Almekinders and Eijffinger (1991) and Edison (1993) these interventions (which by
definition do not affect the interbank money market) may derive their effectiveness from two
sources. First of zt, I -ovided otherwise ii ntical domestic and foreign dssets are imperfect
substitutes, the exchange rate may be affected via the portfolio balance channel. It is not
likely, however, that central banks can induce a significant imbalance in investors' portfolios
since the amount of official reserves is dwarfed by the daily turnover in the foreign exchange
markets77. Hence, ifthe central  bank  is to have any hope of pursuing an independent exchange
rate target it will have to rely exclusively on the signalling or expectations channel. The idea
behind this is that sterilized interventions can have a direct impact on exchange rate
expectations  i f they transmit hitherto privately held information  to the market.
One approach to study the attempts on the part of the central bank to exploit the possible
effectiveness of this channel is to model intervention policy as a game between speculators, on
the one hand, and the central bank, on the other. In this respect, Almekinders (1995,1996) has
developed a static exchange rate policy game of symmetric information in which the central
bank's attempts to exploit the signalling channel will always be futile. The basic reason for this
is that the central bank has no private information because of which interventions will not
provide the market with information it did not have beforehand. A certain degree of policy
77 It should be mentioned that the evidence on this presumed ineffectiveness is not clear cut. Dominguez and Frankel
(1993b) have provided new evidence on  the statistical significance of the portfolio balance effect. Nevertheless. because
this paper focusses on the signalling channel we will assume the portfolio balance channel to be completely ineffective.
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secrec)28 thus seems to be crucial in rendering effectiveness to sterilized interventions. This
observation is central to the model constructed by Bhattacharya and Weller (1992) who
interpret this policy secrecy as private information about the central bank's (short-term)
exchange rate target. The aim of this paper is obtain a better understanding of observed
intervention behavior by extending the theoretical insights of the afore-mentioned papers. To
this end we decompose policy secrecy into asymmetric information concerning the central
bank's objectives, on the one hand, and ambiguity about its actions, on the other. Moreover,
we also allow for reputational effects by studying a dynamic game.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will outline the model.
Subsequently we present the dynamically consistent solution in Section 3. Section   4   will
assess the effect of asymmetric information on the equilibrium intervention volume in general,
and on the intervention bias, in particular. Furthermore, we will provide an investigation of the
political and institutional factors which determine the size of this bias. Next, Section 5 will
investigate the effect of ambiguity in the context of intervention policy. Finally, Section 6 will
summarize our main conclusions.
6.2: The Exchange Rate Policy Game
In this section we will extend the static exchange rate policy game developed by Almekinders
(1995,1996). It is a well-established fact that structural models fail to explain short run
exchange rate movements (for a survey see MacDonald and Taylor (1992)). For instance,
Meese and Rogoff (1983) found that a simple random walk outperforms these models for
forecast horizons up to one year. In the light of this evidence we assume that the spot rate is
(sj79 is determined by the following equation:
As,=a+ 6(INV,m - INV;) + £, with 4  =  <4 -1   +  5       ;       0<<<  1
, (6.1)
B, - NCO,op)
7% The practical relevance of policy secrecy is extensively documented in Goodfriend (1986)
79
4 is defined as the amount of domestic currency per unit of the foreign currency.
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The parameter a can be interpreted as the underlying exchange rate trend which is based on
long run fundamentals (e.g. the PPP-implied trend). Secondly, exchange rate returns are
assumed to be subject to a stochastic (demand) shock (4) which results from the interaction
between various exchange market participants and their reaction to all sorts of 'news' which
hits the market continuously. To allow for the possibility of bandwagon effects (for instance
caused by the widespread use of technical analysis, see Taylor and Allen (1992) and Goodhart
(1988)) we assume that this shock follows an AR(1) process where the parameter Q denotes
the degree of exchange rate persistence. Finally, the second term on the RHS captures the
effect of 'news' about intervention operations. In other words, this term represents the
signalling channel of intervention. It will be shown that intervention operations are driven by
the central bank's preferred rate of depreciation which is unknown to the market.
Consequently, upon observing a discrepancy between the reported intervention volume
(INV,R), on the one hand, and the expected intervention volume (INV,D, on the other, the
market will receive new information about the central bank's preferences in this respect.
Analogous to the effect of other sorts o f'news' this  will lead agents to revise their forecast  for
future exchange rates.
The intervention volume reported to the foreign exchange markets via the financial press and
Reuters screens (INV,R) Will typically not be equal to the actual intervention volume (INVt)
This is because central banks never reveal the exact magnitude of the latter.  On the other hand,
as documented by Dominguez and Frankel (1993a), their presence in the foreign exchange
market rarely goes unnoticed. We model this by assuming that the market's perception of the
actual intervention volume is subject to a random control error (71,)
INV  = INV, + 4, with nt - N(0,04) (6.2)
The central bank is assumed to minimise an intertemporal loss function (ACB) which consists
of the discounted value of expected 'period' loss functions (L,cB):
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ACB -E o[ I;10 11'L,cB]  with  O I B i l
CB    1
(6.3)
L,   = -2(kINV, f + 9  As,-T,9
The parameter 11 denotes the central bank's discount factor while (p denotes the central bank's
relative weight on exchange rate stabilisation. The presumption is that there will be a loss
whenever the change in the spot rate (As,) differs from the central bank's target (T,). Undesired
exchange rate movements can potentially be mitigated by means of sterilized interventions
(INV,)S0 which induce a cost of k per unit of foreign exchange traded. This cost can be
explained by the bureaucratic costs involved and the fact that the central bank may incur a loss
on its purchases (sales) of foreign exchange if these turn out to be unsuccessful in preventing
the domestic currency from appreciating (depreciating). It can be argued that these costs may
be offset by potential gains. However, a risk averse central banker will be inclined to limit the
amount of reserves to be put at stake.
The central bank's short-term target consists of the long run exchange rate trend a and a
Stochastic shock pt which reflects the central bank's private information. The latter follows an
AR(1) process where p denotes the degree of target persistence:
T,= a + pt with p,= pp, 1 + 5  ,  0<p<1
and        v,- N{,0.ot)
(6.4)
In traditional signalling models (Mussa (1981)) there is a strong and direct relationship
between sterilized interventions and future changes in the money stock. However, in our view,
this explanation is inconsistent with the fact that interventions are meant to be an independent
policy tool. Clearly, this does not suggest that there should be any systematic relationship
between sterilized interventions and subsequent changes in the money supply. By contrast,
Kenen (1987) has suggested that interventions can be used to transmit the central bank's view
. A positive (negative) value of INV, denotes a purchase (sale) of foreign exchange by the central bank.
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on exchange rate developments to the markets8'. The presumption in our model is that thus
that p, reflects the central bank's changing assessment of what it considers to be the appropriate
rate of depreciation. While this assessment will undoubtedly contain private information about
future fundamentals, it should be stressed that this is markedly different from stating that the
central bank will systematically change the money stock every time it intervenes.
Finally, the sequence ofevents in the stage game can be summarised as follows:
Figure 6.1: Sequence of events
1 2 3 4 5 6
4   speculators p, CB sets 4 realizes, As, is
realizes set realizes INV, subsequently realized
INV,e INV,R is
revealed
6.3: The Dynamically Consistent Solution
To simplify the calculations it will be assumed that speculators have a perfect observation on
the state of the central bank's target realized two periods earlier (pt.2)· This means that the
current intervention volume (INVj will only influence the expected volume in the next period
(INV, 1'). In reality the learning process involved will probably extend to more than one period
and will fade out gradually (in the sense the public will place a higher weight on more recent
periods relative to less recent periods). Nevertheless, the main implications of asymmetric
information and the essence of the learning process can also be demonstrated by means of a
"  In  this  respect  Kenen  notes  that  '..Intervention  can be used for underscoring the authorities' commitment to
current policies or for trying to persuade the market that the prevailing exchange rate is inconsistent with the
fundamentals...(it) can also be used to change the market's confidence in its own projections...' (Kenen 1987,p. 198)
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short-lived information advantage. The equilibrium concept 2 we will use is of the Nash-
variety and can be formulated as follows:
* In every period the central bank selects the intervention volume so as to minimize its
intertemporal loss function (ACB) given the exchange rate constraint (6.1) and given its
perception of the market's expectations formation process.
* Given their perception of the policy rule followed by the central bank and the information
currently available, speculators form their expectations about the intervention volume so as
to minimize the conditional mean squared forecast error (E[ (INVt - INV,92 1 It ]) in each
period83
*  The policy rule as perceived by speculators is identical to the policy rule that comes about
in equilibrium and, conversely, the perceptions of the central bank concerning the
expectations formation process is identical to the actual process used by speculators in
equilibrium.
Hence, the actual volume of interventions (INV,) and the expectation of this volume (INVe,)
will be determined simultaneously. When substituting equations (6.1), (6.2) and (6.4) into the
expression for L,CB in equation (6.3), it can be seen that INV, will depend upon 4, A , INV, 
and, because of the link between periods, also on E,(P,+1), E,(INV,+111-INV't.,) and Et(et.,)84.
Since the loss function of the central bank is quadratic in both terms we will postulate the
following linear intervention reaction function in which Di , i=1,..,6 are the coefficients to be
determined:
n The solution concept used is that of dynamic consistency which is weaker than the concept of subgame perfection
(see  Cukierman  ( 1992), Chapter 11). Dynamic consistency requires that the player's actions be optimal  at each point  in
time along the equilibrium path only while subgame perfection (or its equivalent in games of incomplete information)
puts requirements on beliefs and actions off the equilibrium path as well.
;3 This 'loss function' can be justified on the grounds that, by assumption, strategic interaction between the central
bank and the speculators will take place after the realisation of 4. Hence. the model allows speculators to be
heterogeneous with repect to their access to and reaction to 'news' in general. It is only for the purpose of studying the
reaction of speculators to 'news' about the central bank's objectives that we implicitly impose the condition that all
speculators have the same information. This, in turn. allows us to analyse the model as a game between the central bank,
on the one hand, and a representative speculator, on the other.
84 Throughout this paper we will use the following convention: expectations conditioned on the central bank's
information set in time t will be denoted as 4(...) while expectations conditioned on the Information set of the
speculators in time t will be denoted as E(...l It)
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INV,- D,£, + Dlpt + D3INV; + D4E,(P,.0 + DSE,(INV, .t-INV,10 + D6Et(£,.1) (6.5)
These coefficients  can be determined by writing  out the central bank's intertemporal  loss
function  (AcD for periods   t   and t+1, taking expectations conditional   on the central   bank' s
information set in period t. Computing the first-order condition of the resulting equation and
using the expression obtained for BINV,+1'/DINV, in Appendix A, we arrive at an equation
which has the same form as equation (6.5). Equating coefficients across these two equations
yields the following:
D =_    96I






4 =    62




D. = flgazpe = - 6,[)
kz
D = #*6pe . -D
6     k 2        4
The model thus yields explicit solutions for D1 , Dz and D,. Through the dependence of 0
(which is defined in Appendix A) on the coefficient D4 it also yields an implicit solution for
D# and, thereby, also for Ds and D6· Using the results obtained in Appendix A, this implicit
solution can be written as follows:
B*6p[%6/(ki+962) + pi)4]202
DA=- s F(04) (6.7)
kiCI%6/(ki +962)   +  PL)4]2(4  +  01)
In Appendix B it is shown that there always exists at least one solution for I)4 for which it
holds that:
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1 96 <D4<0 (6.8)
P  (ki+962)
Using equations (6.5) and (6.6) and observing that E,(4. ) = <4 and E,(pt.t) = ppt, we can now
derive the following expression  for the central  bank' s reaction functionRS:
INF, =  -      96      Ie,-p,-OINF,e]  - i[)4 [Ce,-pp,+6E,(INF,4 -INF,ft)] (6.9)
(k 2 +Q62)
The economic interpretation of this equation is quite intuitive. The first term between brackets
represents the current undesired depreciation of the spot rate (As,-Tt) under the condition that
the central bank abstains from interventions. Provided this term is strictly positive the 'period'
loss which results from this can be mitigated by selling foreign exchange (INV, < 0).
However, as a side effect this will lead the market to expect the central bank to buy less
foreign exchange in the next period as well (DINVt.1'/DINV, > 0). The second term between
brackets denotes the expected undesired depreciation in the next period conditional on the
information   set in period   t   (E,(Ast.,-Tt.,)).   On the assumption   that   the   this   term is strictly
positive as well the central bank faces a ceteris paribus incentive to buy foreign exchange
(INV, > 0). After all, the concomitant increase in next  period' s  expected  intervention  volume
will lower next period's expected loss since it will give the central bank more scope to counter
the expected undesired depreciation by means of surprise interventions. Hence, the central
bank is basically faced with an intertemporal trade-off. Lowering the loss caused by undesired
exchange rate movements in the current period will make it harder to mitigate the expected
loss in the next period.
Having obtained the central banker's intervention reaction function we now derive the
speculators' reaction function. In Appendix C it is shown that the latter is given by:
" Since E,(11,.t) =0. the expression E,(INV,+IR - INV,.t') has been replaced by E,(INVt., - INVt.:')
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96+<04(kl +962)
INVi = - I ]4+
kz
(6.10)
+  [                                 1  [pip,-2  +  pe(v,-1 +
,  11,_,)]
 6+Pl)4(ki+(P62) (k 2 +962)
ki                              96+Pl)4(k2+96-)
This equation shows that the market essentially reacts to the exchange rate shock (4) on which
it has the same information as the central bank, on the one hand, and to its perception ofthe
current state of the central bank 's target (p,), on the other. The latter can be broken down into
the innovation realised two periods earlier (p„) which is contained in the market's information
set and an optimal prediction of the innovation to the target realised  in the previous period  (v,
I)
6.4: The Impact of Asymmetric Information on the Equilibrium
Intervention Volume and the Intervention Bias
Next, we can calculate the equilibrium volume of intervention by inserting equation (6.10)
into (6.9) and using the expression obtained for E,(INV,+1-INV,+ &) in Appendix D:
96+094(k2+962) 96 +Pl)4(ki+962)
INV,=- I 14 + I ]p28-2 +
ki                  ki
(6.11)
I(k·2 62)+pD,Il[1+01 -]pv,-1  + [(k·2  62 +PL)4][1-6pl) (1-0)]v,  + .c -pen,
To interpret this equation it turns out to be instructive to compare it with the equilibrium
intervention volume which will result in the presence of symmetric information: In that case
the current stance of the central bank's short-term target (pt) will be contained in the market's
information set. Consequently, the game will be completely transparent for both players and
86 Symmetric information should be clearly distinguished from a case in which the central bank announces its
exchange rate target. As argued by Stein (19891 given that the public believes these announcements, the central  bank
faces an incentive to cheat because of which the central bank cannot make any precise and credible announcements on its
exchange rate target. In the case of symmetric information the central bank is completely transparant to the public
because of which it docs not need to make any announcements.
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reported intervention volume will always be equal to the actual volume:
INVIR - INV, V 1 - 02 - 0 (6.12)
Furthermore, since speculators no longer need past intervention volumes to predict the current
state of the target, the game will simpli fy  into a string of unrelated one-period problemt: The
central bank's reaction function can then be obtained by plugging (6.1) and (6.4) into the
'period' loss function (6.3). Taking the first order condition of the resulting expression and
rearranging yields the following:
INF, = -    96   [E,-p,- 6/NI/,e] (6.13)
(kl +%62)
Taking rational expectations across this equation and using the fact that pt = p2p,2 + pv,   + v„
we obtain the following expression for the (Nash) equilibrium intervention volume under
symmetric information:
96
INV,   =    INV       -
-
 ei    +   P[p2Pi-2    +   pv, -1    + vt] (6.14)
When comparing the expressions obtained for the equilibrium intervention volume under
asymmetric and symmetric information (equations (6.11) and (6.14) respectively) we can
derive the following proposition about the central bank's degree of policy activism:
Proposition 6.1:
The absolute value of the reaction coefficients for 4 , p,-2, v,.i and vt  will be strktly
less if the central bank retains private information about the short-term exchange rate
target compared to the situation where the central bank chooses to reveal the target
perfectly.
Proof: see Appendix E
17 i.e. aINV:.;/BINV,=OVi20.
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The intuition is that the central bank cannot manipulate future intervention expectations in the
absence of private information. This means that these expectations will not exert a deterrent
effect on the current intervention volume. Hence, the central bank has good reasons to retain
private information since this provides an instrument to mitigate the time-inconsistency
problem in intervention policy. As pointed out by Almekinders (1995, 1996), in a symmetric
world it would be optimal if the central bank were able to make a commitment not to
intervene at all. However, since the central bank cannot make a credible commitment, it will
end up in the Nash equilibrium described by equation (6.14). Not revealing the short-term
target will both reduce the degree of central bank activism and render effectiveness to
intervention policy because of which the central bank will generally be better off than in a
symmetric world.
6.4.1 The intervention bias under asymmetric information
Nevertheless, in general the central bank will still be faced with a time-inconsistency problem
since its reaction to the exchange rate shock (4) will always be fully anticipateds8. To analyse
the impact of various political and economic parameters on the severity of the time-
inconsistency problem, we will define the intervention bias (B,) as the absolute value of the
central bank's reaction to 4
96 +CD4(k 2 +962)
8, El - [ ]5l (6.15)
kz
From this equation we can derive the following proposition:




The intervention bias (Bt) at any given time will be lower,
1.  the longer the planning horizon of the central bank (13),
2. the higher the variance of the innovation in the target (a,2),
3. the lower the variance  of the misperception error (onz),
4. the higher the degree of persistence in the exchange rate shock (<),
proof see Appendix F
As for the effect of the length of the policy horizon (B) this is result is rather trivial.  When the
central bank becomes more concerned with expected future losses, it will pay more attention
to the adverse effect of its current actions on next period's expectations. An important
implication of this result is that a longer policy horizon will entail an improved ability to
counter the time-inconsistency problem because it decreases intervention costs without in
principle sacrificing the central bank's ability to influence the exchange rate. It is well-known
from the literature that the length of the policy horizon is positively related to the degree of
central bank independence (see Cukierman (1992),  Chapter  18  and Eij ffinger and  De  Haan
(1996)). In this respect, we should expect a very independent central bank, such as the
Deutsche Bundesbank, to trade less foreign exchange reserves in vain than more dependent
(i.e. more myopic) central banks.
Next, the effects on the variance of the innovation to the target (c.1) and the variance of the
market's misperception error (On) can be understood from the way in which they affect the
speed of learning (0) as shown in Proposition 6.3 below. This parameter can be seen as a
measure of the extent to which the central bank will transmits information about its
preferences on average.  As  such it is an important determinant of the link between periods  (as
measured by DINV„t'/DINV,). An increase in the relative variance 0,2/anz will strengthen this
link and, therewith, the deterrent effect of next period's expectations on the current
intervention volume.
The Advantage of Hiding Both Hands 157
Finally, a larger degree of persistence in the exchange rate shock (C) will increase the effect o f
the current exchange rate shock on next period's expected exchange rate shock. Again this will
cause the central  bank  to be more aware o f the future consequences of its current intervention
policy. This result is intuitively plausible since the degree of exchange rate persistence can be
seen as an indicator of the strength of the market sentiment underlying bandwagon effects.
Hence, irrespective of the central bank's response to its own subjective preferences, its degree
of activism towards the objectively verifiable exchange rate shock will be weaker if this
underlying sentiment becomes stronger.
6.4.2 The determinants of market's speed of learning
From the preceding discussion it will be clear that the market's speed of learning (0) plays a
crucial role in this model. In Appendix A this parameter is defined as follows:
(D2 +PD4)20<0= (6.16)
(,02 +PD,)2ct  +  oj
In each period speculators effectively observe a linear combination of last period's
misperception error (n„) and last period's innovation to the target (v,-1. Equation (6.16) is a
measure of the average fraction of this linear combination which is caused by preference
shocks. Hence, an increase in 0 means that the central bank will, on average, transmit more
information about its preferences ex post. The effect of various institutional parameters on the
speed of learning is summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 6.3:
The market's speed of learning (0) will be higher,
1.the shorter the central bank's planning horizon (11).
2. the higher the variance of the innovation to the target (0,2),
3. the lower the variance of the misperception error (cinl),
Proof: see Appendix F
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A longer planning horizon will reduce the degree of policy activism with respect to preference
shocks. This will diminish the relative weight of these shocks in the afore-mentioned linear
combination of preferences shocks and misperception errors observed by speculators. Hence, a
more independent central bank will also be more inclined to preserve its information
advantageN. Similarly, if preferences are relatively unstable over time and if the volatility of
misperception errors is relatively small (i.e. if ovl/042 is relatively large) it will generally be
easier for speculators to deduce these preferences from observed intervention operations.
6.5: The Impact of Ambiguity
Many authors (e.g. Dominguez and Frankel (1993a)) have criticized the tendency of central
banks tend to keep their intervention volumes secret. However, as noted before, this tendency
seems to be pretty persistent both over time and across different central banks. In this section
we wil concentrate on the effects of ambiguity from a positive persective.
First of all, in Appendix G it is shown that the covariance between exchange rate movements
and the central bank's target reads as follows:
Cov(As„T,)  =  6(l)2+p,94)[(1 -0)p2  +  (1 -6pD (1 -0))]o: (6.17)
This equation can be used to assess the extent to which central bank preferences will affect
exchange rate movements:
89 In this respect Dominguez and Frankel  (19934  p.  85) have noted that,  '...consistently only about one-quarter of the
variation in Bundesbank intervention is predictable..' .
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Proposition 6.4:
Maintaining a strictly positive degree of ambiguity will increase the covariance
between exchange rate movements (As,) and the central bank's exchange rate target
(T,) compared to the situation where the central bank perfectly reveals the
intervention volume.
proof see Appendix G
Although positive and negative intervention induced exchange rate movements will cancel out
on average* , a positive degree of ambiguity will allow the central bank to exert more control
over the distribution of intervention surprises over time. This stems from the fact that the
ceteris paribus effect of shocks to the central bank's preferences on both present and future
exchange rate movements (i.e. the absolute value of BAst/Ovt and 8As,/av, ) will be strictly
larger if the central bank chooses to send ambiguous signals of the actual intervention volume.
The  intuition  is that in the absence of ambiguity the intervention volume will always perfectly
reveal the short-term target to the market ex post. Consequently, the central bank's ability to
influence the spot rate through the signalling channel will be rather limited since speculators
only face uncertainty about the current innovation to the target (vt). By introducing ambiguity
the central bank can signal some of its private information without completely revealing the
current state of its preferences at the same time.
Secondly, we can investigate the effect of ambiguity on the variance of exchange rate
movements:
Far(As,) = 62(1)2+PL)4)2[(1 -0)2Pz  +  (1 -6PD,1(1 -0))2]02v  +62(1 +P.?02)024  +  czE     (6.18)
m From equation (6.17) it can be seen that E(INV,R - INV,1. this result rests on our assumption that the central bank
cannot systematically fool the markets (E(n)=0) and the assumption that the central bank does not possess any
systematic information advantage concerning future fundamentals (E(R)=0).
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Except for the last term on the RHS all other terms are directly related to intervention policy.
From equation (6.18) we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 6.5:
The introduction of ambiguity in intervention policy (0,2 >0) Will increase the degree
of intervention uncertainty (E(INV,R-INV,92) and will, consequently, also increase
the volatility of exchange rate movements (Var(As,))
Proof'. see Appendix G
The intuition is that ambiguity will amplify the variance of preference shocks (92) since it
increases the effect of these shocks on exchange rate movements. On top of that, it will also
introduce an additional degree of uncertainty via the variance of misperception errors (ani).
To sum up, it turns out that the transmission of noisy rather than clear signals may constitute
an important complement of private information since it extends the information advantage
enjoyed by the central  bank. In spite of this, it cannot be concluded a priori that the practice of
sending ambiguous signals will be in the interest of the central bank from the perspective of
minimizing its intertemporal loss function. More specifically, since both the variance of
exchange rate movements (Var(As,)) and the covariance between these movements and the
central bank's preferences (Cov(AS, , T,)) will increase as a result of ambiguity, it is not a priori
clear what will happen to E(As,-T,)2. Moreover, from Proposition 6.2 it can be seen that the
intervention bias will be strictly lower in the absence of ambiguity. This means that the
amount of futile foreign exchange transactions will increase as a consequence of noisy
signalling. However, such considerations take us away from the positive description of central
bank practices towards the normative consideration whether or not central banks should
choose a positive degree of ambiguity when given the choice. We leave this question for
future research.
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6.6: Conclusion
This paper examines the central bank's attempts to influence the spot rate by means of
sterilized foreign exchange interventions. To this end we have examined a dynamic game in
which the central bank retains private information about its short-term exchange rate target
and in which speculators are subject to ambiguity concerning the actual intervention volume.
By the very act of intervening the central bank will transmit some information about its short-
term target to the market which will lead speculators to revise their expectations about the
future spot rate.   In this respect the effect of'news' about the preferences of the central  bank  is
identical to the effect of other sorts of 'news'. The dynamic game analyzed in this paper
contains a learning process on the part of speculators which introduces a link between periods.
This link will induce the central bank to take the future consequences of its current actions
into account which will generally reduce the degree of activism. A particularly interesting
feature of this paper is that provides a theoretical foundation for the effects of ambiguity. On
the one hand, this practice will allow the central bank to engineer a closer relationship
between exchange rate movements and its preferences. However. on the other hand, it will
also increase the volatility of these exchange rate movements.
We also examine the effect of various institutional parameters on the central bank's ability to
deal with the time-inconsistency problem in intervention policy. lin this respect we find that
the futile component of intervention operations (i.e. the intervention bias) will decrease if the
central bank in question becomes more independent. This effect arises because the length of
the policy horizon is positively related to the degree of central bank independence.
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Appendix A: Calculation ofDINV le/DINVt
Leading equation   (6.5)   by one period and taking expectations conditional   on the market' s
information  set in period t+1  (It+I) we obtain:
E(INFt. 14.1) = INFt:1 - DiE(et.,|4.1) + D2E(Pt.114.,) + D3INF,:  +
(A.1)
D4ECE,.1(p,.2)14.i) + DSECE,+1(INF,+2-INF,:2)14.1) + D615(Et.,(41)14.,)
With regard to this equation the following can be noted:
E(p'.114.1) - pip,-1 + PE(v,14.t)
ECE,+1(P,+2)14.1) - E(P'.2|4.,) - P38-1 + P2E(v'll.,)
(A.2)
ECE'.1(5.2)14.1)   =  E(e +214.t) = <eti
E(Et.,(INF,+2-INF,:2)11,.,) = E((INF,+2-INF,:2)14.1) = 0
The last expression in (A.2) simply states that the expected value of surprise interventions in
period t+2 based on the information available to speculators in period t+1 should be equal to
zero. Otherwise, these interventions could not have been unexpected in the first place.
Plugging equation (A.2) into (A.1) and rearranging we obtain:
INF,:1 .
1
[(Di +096)£1.7  + 602+PD4)(plp,-1  + PE(v,14.1)] (A.3)
1-D3
To get an expression for E(v,II,+i) we note that, using (6.3) and (6.5), speculators will have
observed the following in period t:
INV,R    - CD, +CL)6)8, + D2(pp,-1 +Vt) + D3INVIe +
(A.4)
DAE,(Pzpt_x+Pvt+vt.l) + DsE,(INF,+,-INF,:1)  +  n,
While they know the exact value of the LHS of this equation, speculators will form an
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expectation about  all the terms appearing  on  the RHS based  on  I,-  .  To  keep the calculations
manageable we will introduce some bounded rationality on the part of the speculators by
assuming the following:
ECE,(INF,.,-INF,:,)14.,) - O (A.5)
Using this expression we can rewrite equation (A.4) as follows:
INV,R - go) = (L)2 +PD,1)v,  + 71,
(A.6)
where    g(t)   s   (Di +CL)6)4   +  (192 +PD4)PA- 1 + DJNV 
All the terms  in  g(t) are incorporated  into  I„ 1  but, by contrast, speculators cannot decompose
the   RHS   of  (A.6)   into its constituent shocks.   It   will be shown later  that   E,(INV,+ i -INV,+ t')
actually depends on v, (see Appendix D). So by introducing a limited degree of bounded
rationality (equation (A.5)) we prevent speculators from recognizing that the LHS of (A.6) is
also indirectly affected by v, through E,(INV,+1-INV,+t'). From (A.6) the optimal forecast for v,
can be obtained by using a Kalman filter:
(D2 +PD4)2(iE(vjl,-,) - [INF,R-g(0] where 0 = (A.7)'
. . '              (D2 + PL)4) (D2 +PD4)2ai  +  0;
Plugging equation (A.7) into (A.3), using the fact that INV , = INV, + nt and taking the first
order condition with respect to INV, then yields:
8/Nvl    .       pe- (A.8)BINVt 1-D3
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Appendix B: Proof of the existence of D4 and calculation of boundaries
for this coefficient.
From equation (6.7) in the main text we can derive the following:
BIz(,DI) 2fl(papzkzo202., -   (Dl + PDO (B.1)
aD#                 [ki((l)2 +pi[)4)201+01)12
Furthermore, from equation (6.6)  it is clear that D4 will be strictly negative  i f a solution exists.
This allows us to draw the following conclusion from equation (B.1):
1  96< 0    if   D# > -
P (kl+*62)
aFCDO 1  96-0 if D4I- (B.2)
BD4                                 P (k 2 +(1 62)
1  W6> 0  if  D4< -
P (kl + 62)
An examination of the function F(D#) yields:
F(0)  =
- =y D  where  O s y<1
Pgop 0202
k z     Df 02,02
FC -
1 96 ) =O (B.3)
P (k 2 +962)
limD, - -  -  FCD'1)       -       -    -Bceae    s   D
kz
Equations (B.2) and (B.3) can be summarized by the following picture:







Eje·ye 6.2: Equilibrium solut®«or D 
Hence, the function  F(D ) is monotonically increasing  on the interval  (  - =, - Dz'P . Within
this interval there are two possibilities. First of all, it could be that F(D4) never intersects the
45°-line in which case there   is no solution  for  D4  on this interval. Alternatively, there could
also be two intersections (as shown in Figure 2) yielding two solutions in the range under
consideration'z.    Next,  as  far  as the interval  (-  D2/p  ,  0) is concerned,  one can observe  that
F(D4) is strictly decreasing in D4 in this part of its domain. Furthermore, since F(D ) reaches a
maximum  at D# = -DUP < 0 and since  F(0) = yD < 0, it must be that there exists one and only
one solution for I)4 on the interval (- 02/P,0).
These considerations lead us to make the following assumption concerning the boundary
conditions for D :
- -D2 < D4 < 0 (B.4)
P
The reason for selecting this interval is twofold. First of all, we will ensure existence of an
equilibrium value for D4 by choosing the latter in the range described by equation (B.4).
91 Of course it could also be the case that the 45°-line through the origin is at some point in the range specified
exactly equal to the slope of the F(D,)-curve, in which case there exists exactly one solution on the interval (- . -Djp)
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Secondly, it is the only possible solution for D4 for which it holds that the central bank does
not display a 'perverse' response to a change in preferences, i.e. for which it holds that




Appendix C: Derivation of the reaction function of the speculators
Equation (6.10) in the main text can easily be obtained as follows: First of all, we plug
equation (A.6) into (A.7) and use the resulting expression in (A.3) to get an expression for
INVt.le in terms of exogenous variables and undetermined coefficients only. Subsequently, we
can replace the latter by using the expressions obtained in equation (6.6). Lagging the result by
one period yields equation (6.14).
Appendix D: Derivation of an expression for Ft(INVt+1-INVt+,9
Taking expectations conditional on the speculators' information set in period t across equation
(6.9) and subtracting the resulting expression from (6.9) we obtain:
INV,  -   INV      = t. +PD4)(P, - E(Ptl4)) -
%6
k +*62 (D.1)
OD4[Et(INF,.t -INF,:,)  -  ECE,(INF,+  -INF,:1)lIt)]
Regarding this equation the following can be noted:
ECE,(INF,+ 1 -INF,: 1)11,)    =   0
(D.2)
P, - E(P,14) -v, + p(v,_, - E(v,_,14))
Plugging the expressions obtained in this equation back into equation (D.1), using equation
(A.7) and leading the result one period yields:
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INV,., - INV,e.1 - C  96   +PDA)(vt.1 + p(1 -0)v -   Peck2+4)62,  11,)
(k 2 +*62) 96+PD4(k2+962) (D.3)
- 604Et.,(INVt.2-INV,12)
Finally, taking expectations across equation (D.3) conditional on the central bank's
information set in period t we obtain:
g6Et(INV,.,-INV,to = (S +PD4)p(1-0)vt (D.4)
ki+962
Here, we have used the fact that:
Et<Et.lINvt.2-INV,ti)) - Et(.INvt.2-INV,e.1) = 0 (D.5)
Equation (D.5) is a direct result from the observation that the expression on the LHS of
equation (D.1) is affected by shock realisations in periods t-1, t and perhaps later periods but
definitely not by shocks realized in periods t-i,i 2 2. Consequently, shocks that are realized in
period t (and that are therefore part of the central bank's information set in this period) cannot
influence surprise interventions in period t+2.
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 6.1
The proof for the reaction coefficient  for et and  the  one for p, 2 can  be seen quite easily  by
noting that the coefficient D4 is strictly negative. Furthermore, the proof for the coefficient for
v, 1 follows from the fact that the inequality assumed'z can be reduced to the following:
0263 (k 2 +962)22-(1 -6) > pD4 (E.1)ki               ki
92 By which we mean, for the sake of clarity. the inequality expressing that the coefficient under symmetric
information is strictly greater than its counterpart under asymmetric information.
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This inequality always holds because the LHS of this equation is greater than or equal to zero
while the RHS is strictly negative.
Finally, for the reaction coefficient for v, the assumed inequality can be rewritten as follows:
wa                    (k2+0.64- 6(1-0)(pl)4)2  + Pl)4 . < 962 (E.2)(ki+*62) (kl+*61)
Here, the first term on the LHS is strictly smaller than the RHS while the second term is
smaller than or equal to zero and the third term is strictly negative.
Appendix F: Proof of Propositions 6.2 and 6.3
From equation (6.15) it can be seen that for any given realisation of 4, B, will depend on the
coefficient Co  [ (q)6+<D4(kz+962))/ki], where it holds that BB (DC>0. Next,  from this we
can derive:
BC     -    ((k 2 +(062) ac D.(k2 +962)I     >0        ; -= <0 (F.1)BD4         k2                         8<          k2
The proof for the parameter < then follows immediately from this equation. As for the
parameters B, 0.2 and 0,2, the proof can be obtained by computing the following partial
derivatives from (6.7):
aF(I)4, *Op(DZ+Pi[)4)2<
- = I- <0




aci                 k 2((,92 +pl)4),ci   +  oi)2
BFCD° pgop(L)2 +PD#)20 - =                                      >0
802q                k 2((1)2 +pl)4)2 2     2.2OV + 04)
Figure 2 in Appendix B reveals that a downward (upward) shift in the F(D4)-curve implies a
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decrease (increase) in the equilibrium solution for D4, i.e. the signs of the partial derivatives of
D4 with respect to B. 0.2 and 04 2are equal to the signs obtained in equation (F.2). The
remainder of Proposition 6.2 then follows from combining these results with the fact that
ac/BD#> 0
To prove Proposition 6.3 we start by noting that from equations (6.16) and (F.2) it follows
that:
80            , ,aD.-  -  2p(,92 +PL)4)0-0.-    < 0 (F.3)
81}                                                                         "      4    all
Furthermore, to compute the sign of the partial derivatives of 0 with respect to 0,2 and 092. we
can use the following part of equation (6.6):
D. = _ Bcp6pe
ki                                                       (F.4)
From equation (F.2) it can be seen that BDA/80.2 < 0  and that BI)4/80nl> 0. Since all the other
parameters on the  RHS of equation (F.4) are not affected by these variances, it must hold that:
80/80.2 > 0 and that Be/ao,12 < 0.
Appendix G: Proof of Propositions 6.4 and 6.5
On the basis of equations (6.2), (6.10) and (6.11) the equilibrium solution for Ast reads as
follows:
, = a + 6(Dz+PD4)(1-0)pv,-, - apen,_t + 6(Dz+PD4)(1-6pD (1-0))v, + 6nt + (G.1)
Note that from equation it is immediately clear that both lads,/av,_J and  18Ast/av,1 will be
strictly larger  in the presence of ambiguity since its absence implies  92 =0-0=1. Together
with equation (6.4), (G.1) yields the following for Cov(As, , T,) = E(As,T,) - E(84)ECT,):
Cov(,As„T ) = 6(1)2 +PL)4)[(1 -0)p2 + (1 -6pl)4(1 -0))]02 (G.2).
Chapter 6 170
In the absence of ambiguity the term between brackets in equation (G.1) will be equal to one.
Cov(Ast  , T,) lon' .0  > Cov(AS,  , Tz) | .91 -o then requires the following inequality to hold:
(1 -0)p2 + (1-6(1-0)pl)4) > 1 (G.3)
Since in the presence of ambiguity it holds that 0<1 and D# <0, this inequality will be
satisfied.
Furthermore, from (G.1) Var(Ast) = E(As,)2 - (E(Ast))2 reads as follows:
Var(As)  --   62ECINV,    -INV f   +   olf
(G.4)
I  62  I  (1)2 +PD,t)2[(1 -0)2p2   +  (1-6PD4(1 -0))2]of.  +  (1 +p202)0-4  1   +  of
where E(INV,R-INVS)2 provides a natural measure of intervention uncertainty. To prove that
Var(As,)1 0,12.0  >Va«Ast )1 m12 - o asa result of E(INV,R-INV,92 1 mil =0> E(INV,R-INV,921092 -0 .
it sufficient to show that:
(1 -0)2pz + (1-6(1-0)PD,1)2 > 1 (G.5)
which is satisfied for exactly the same reasons as in equation (G.3).
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Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusion
In this book we have looked at the strategy of inflation targeting and its implications for
interest rate policy. In the past, the debate about which framework for monetary policy is most
appropriate divided economists into two camps: those who favoured non-feed back time-
invariant monetary policy rules and those who argued for a discretionary policy which can
react to particular economic circumstances. Rules which imply an 'automatic monetary policy
pilot' have the advantage of providing a clear nominal anchor by tying down inflationary
expectations but have the disadvantage of not being able to deal with shocks which affect the
real economy. This may result in severe variability of real variables over time. On the other
hand, a discretionary policy which simply reacts to the events of the day without having a
clear strategic forward-looking framework may be able to bring about a certain degree o f real
stability but this will come at the expense of high and variable inflationary expectations. At
first sight both approaches may seem incompatible, however, as eloquently described in
Bernanke et al. (1999), inflation targeting provides a framework for monetary policy which
combines the advantages of both approaches. First of all, the government instructs the central
bank to stabilise inflation around the assigned target, to stabilise certain real variables around
their natural rates and also provides a ranking for these objectives (since in the short-run these
objectives may exert conflicting demands upon policy). This ensures that in the long run
monetary policy will only have a level objective for inflation which provides a clear anchor for
expectations.
Secondly, the government grants the central bank instrument independence to reach these
objectives. This means that short-term political considerations will not influence the conduct
of monetary policy. Moreover, to reach her ultimate policy objectives over the medium term,
the policymaker will have to react to shocks hitting the economy. In other words, the rule-
based elements embodied in the ultimate objectives of monetary policy will be translated into
an endogenous policy reaction function in which the interest rate essentially becomes a
function of all the determinants of future inflation and output. Finally, the central bank is held
accountable for its performance. Since monetary policy has no level objective for real
variables, an obvious yardstick in this respect is whether or not inflation has deviated
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systematically from its target over a prolonged period of time. However, in the short run
accountability can and (probably should) also be enhanced by means of some degree of
transparency about the central bank's objectives and/or its information about the economy.
Chapter  2:   The  ejfect  of inflation  targeting  on  the  term  structure  of interest  rates
Because of time lags between changes  in the instrument of monetary policy and their effect on
the ultimate objectives of monetary policy, the implementation of inflation targeting implies
that the conditional inflation forecast based on all information currently available will become
the intermediate target of monetary policy (see Svensson (1997b)). The central bank's relative
weight on output stabilisation is an important element of this intermediate target since it
determines the speed with which inflation is returned to target after the economy has been hit
by a (supply) shock. The implication for the short-term interest rate is that a higher relative
weight on output stabilisation will cause it to respond less aggressively to the determinants of
future inflation and output. The purpose of Chapter 2 is to assess the implications of the
implementation o f an inflation targeting regime  for both short- and long-term interest rates.  To
this end we amend the Svensson (1997b) model by assuming that aggregate demand is
determined by the long-term real interest rate. The latter is related to the central bank's
instrument (i.e. the short-term nominal interest rate) through the Pure Expectations Hypothesis
(PEH) of the term structure.  In this respect  it is found that the central bank's relative weight on
output stabilisation as well as several parameters governing the structure of the economy may
have very different implications for the responsiveness of the short-term and long-term
nominal interest rate to economics fundamentals. More specifically, an increase in the relative
weight on output stabilisation will reduce the responsiveness of the nominal short-term interest
rate but will have an ambiguous effect on the reaction coefficients governing the long-term
nominal interest rate. The latter arises because the long real rate and the long-term expected
rate of inflation react differently to an increase in this preference parameter. Similarly, the
duration of the long-term bond will increase the reaction coefficients in the central bank's
optimal instrument rule since it decreases the leverage of the short-term interest rate over the
long-term rate. However, an increase in duration will reduce the responsiveness of the long-
term nominal rate to economic shocks because it will cause the long-term expected rate of
inflation to be less sensitive to economic shocks. Finally, we use this model to study the
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implications of inflation forecast targeting for the predictive ability of the term spread with
respect to future output. In this respect we find that both an increase in duration and a decrease
in the relative weight on output stabilisation will enhance this predictive ability.
Chapter  3:  What are  the macroeconomic  ejfects of interest  rate stepping?
A stylised fact of central banking is that interest rates often remain constant for prolonged
periods of time in the face of a continuously changing environment. In this chapter we
rationalise this practice of interest rate stepping by assuming that the central banker suffers a
very small  loss in utitlity every time she changes the interest rate. This small  'menu cost'  may
stem from the fact that the central banker recognises that there are many agents in the
economy which are bound into fixed nominal interest rate contracts. Alternatively, frequent
interest rate changes may render the central banker vulnerable to allegations of inconsistency
or incompetence. The central message of this chapter is that even a very small cost of
changing the interest rate will lead to a relatively large band around the in flation target within
which the central banker will choose not to change the interest rate. This is because the central
banker will take the option value of the status quo into account. In other words, the central
banker has an incentive to wait for a small amount o f time during which new information may
arrive indicating that inflation will return to target of its own accord.
The width of the inflation band is shown to be increasing in the cost of changing the interest
rate, the volatility of demand shock and the interest rate sensitivity of aggregate demand and
decreasing in the slope of the Lucas supply function. Next, we determine the effect of these
parameters on the average size of the interest rate step. Of course, the latter will be an
increasing function of the width of the inflation band. However, an increase  in the interest  rate
sensitivity of aggregate demand will have an ambiguous effect on the average size o f the step.
The effect of the afore-mentioned parameters on the expected time period till the next interest
rate step is shown to depend on how close the current rate of inflation is to one of the edges of
the band. This is because the impact of these parameters works through the volatility of the
process driving inflation in the absence of interest rate changes. An increase in this volatility
will increase the width of the band but will also make it more likely that inflation will  hit one
of its edges in the near future. Finally, we examine the impact of the cost of changing the
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interest rate on inflationary expectations. It is shown that the economy will suffer from an
inflationary bias if the cost of increasing the interest rate exceeds the cost of lowering it.
Chapter 4:  Should inflation targeting central banks be conservative  in the face  of uncertainty
about potential output?
The appointment of a central banker who is more inflation averse than society is a time-
honoured solution to the inflationary bias problem stemming from the desire to push output
above the natural rate systematically (see Rogoff (1985)). At first sight the need to appoint
such a conservative central banker may seem to disappear once the latter tries to stabilise
output around the natural rate. However, Clarida et al. (1999) showed that in the context of a
New-Keynesian Phillipscurve welfare can still be improved if the central banker is
conservative. The first purpose of Chapter 4 is to investigate whether or not this also holds in a
model in which price setting is purely backward looking. To this end we investigate a
simplified version of the Svensson (1997b) inflation forecast targeting model and find that the
optimal degree of output stabilisation will be strictly lower than society's relative weight in
this respect. The reason is that a central banker acting under discretion will not take the effect
of her current policy actions on next period's inflation rate into account. We establish that the
optimal relative weight on output stabilisation will increase when the slope of the
Phillipscurve decreases and/or when society's relative weight on output stabilisation increases.
The second purpose of this chapter is to assess the effect of uncertainty about potential output
on the optimal degree of conservatism. The idea is that this type of uncertainty may alter the
unconditional variances of inflation and the output gap to a different degree. Since the optimal
degree of conservatism is essentially determined by the trade-off between these variances, it
may be affected by this type of uncertainty as well. In particular, we assume that the central
bank does not have a perfect observation on potential output in real time but regularly receives
updates about past levels of potential output. When setting monetary policy the central banker
will use these updates as well as past inflation rates to optimally predict the current level of
potential output. On the assumption that the stochastic process driving potential output is
stationary, a rational central banker will therefore not make any systematic mistakes in her
estimates. This is also the reason why the balance between the unconditional variances of
inflation and the output gap will not be affected compared to the case where potential output is
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fixed and known. In other words, the need for a conservative central banker seems to stem
from the fact the current inflation rate is a function of the rate of inflation in the previous
period rather than from the uncertainty about potential output.
Chapter  5:   Does  an  expectations-augmented  convex  Phillipscurve  yield  an   additional  gain
from output stabilisation?
Keynes (1936) already argued that, because of capacity constraints, booms may be more
inflationary than recessions are disinflationary. The idea of such a convex Phillipscurve has
been revived in recent literature. For instance, Clark et al. (1995) show that an accelerationist
Phillipscurve implies that there is an additional social return to output stabilisation since the
mean level of output will be negatively related to the variability of output. The intuition
behind this is that any positive value of the output gap will have to be matched by a negative
value of larger magnitude to return inflation back to target. The central issue in this chapter is
to investigate whether or not such an additional return to output stabilisation is also present in
the presence of a convex expectations-augmented Phillipscurve. In this case the need to bring
about a negative value of the output gap to disinflate the economy will crucially depend on the
credibility the policymaker. We start by analysing a linear model in which the central bank
aims to stabilise inflation around the assigned target and to stabilise output around the long-
term natural rate. The latter ensures that the monetary policy will not be burned by the type of
credibility problem which leads to a systematic inflationary bias. However, on the assumption
that cost-push shocks are partially anticipated by the public, there appears to be another type
of credibility problem for a central banker acting under discretion. Since the central banker's
reaction to the cost-push shock will be either partly or fully anticipated (depending on whether
or not  she has some degree of private information about the realisation  of this shock), wel fare
would be improved if she were able to commit to not reacting to this shock. In other words, a
central banker acting under discretion will bring about a suboptimally high variability of
inflation. Hence, in the absence of a credible commitment mechanism welfare can be
improved by appointing a conservative central banker. We show that the optimal degree of
conservatism will be bounded between zero and infinity if the central banker has some degree
of private information. Moreover, we also examine the determinants of the optimal degree of
output stabilisation which is shown to be positively related to the slope of the Phillipscurve
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and society's relative weight on output stabilisation and negatively related to the degree of
persistence in the process driving cost-push shocks. If the central bank has no private
information because of which output stabilisation is impossible, we show that it is optimal to
appoint a central banker who only cares about inflation stabilisation.
Next, we analyse the case where the central banker cannot affect output under a convex
Phillipscurve. We show that a policy of strict inflation targeting which was shown to be
optimal in the linear case will cause a deflationary bias in monetary policy. This is because the
central bank essentially hedges against the asymmetric risks surrounding the central inflation
forecast. In the case of flexible inflation targeting the long run expected rate of inflation is
shown to be increasing in the central bank's relative weight on output stabilisation. This is
because both uncertainty about demand shocks and persistent cost-push shocks will cause
output to fall below potential on average.  If the central bank cares about output stabilisation, it
will try to offset these effects. However, since the central banker has no private information,
these attempts will be futile and will only cause a ceteris paribus increase in the long run
expected rate of inflation. Nevertheless, in a non-linear world this effect implies that there will
be a social return to output stabilisation. This additional return does not arise because it affects
the mean or variance of output but rather because it can be used to render the deflationary bias
less severe.
Chapter  6.   Opaqueness  in  the conduct  of sterilized foreign  exchange  intervention
In a world without capital controls monetary policymakers have to choose between either
targeting domestic objectives or controlling the nominal exchange. If they opt for the first
alternative this does not mean that monetary policy will not be influenced by nominal
exchange rate movements since the latter will affect the determinants of domestic obj ectives.
However, for a large economy with a limited degree of openness, the exchange rate will have
relatively little effect on interest rates. Moreover, central bankers usually employ sterilised
foreign exchange interventions as a first line of defense in the occurrence o f a misalignment.  It
is generally agreed that these interventions are likely to derive most of their effect from the
fact that they convey new information to the markets. Hence, in order to be effective the
central bank will need an information advantage. In this chapter we assume that this
information advantage comes from two distinct sources. First of all, the central bank has
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private information about its own preferred value of the exchange rate and, secondly, the
central bank injects a certain degree of ambiguity by providing the market with a noisy signal
of the actual intervention volume. Following the empirical evidence on short-term exchange
rate movements we assume that the exchange rate follows a random walk and that
interventions will only be effective to the extent that they are unexpected. Extending the model
developed by Almekinders (1996) we find that repeated interaction between the central bank
and speculators will reduce the reaction coefficients in the intervention reaction function
compared to the case where interaction takes place only once. However, policy will still suffer
from an intervention bias in the sense that part of the central bank's transactions will be
expected ex ante and will hence be uneffective. This intervention bias will decrease when the
central bank's discount factor increases, when central bank preferences become more volatile
over time, when the degree of ambiguity diminishes or when the degree of exchange rate
persistence increases. Next, we analyse the impact of ambiguity from a positive perspective
and find that providing a noisy signal of the intervention volume will increase both the
covariance between exchange rate movements and the central bank's target and the variance of
exchange rate movements.
Inflation targeting is a relatively new monetary policy framework which combines some o f the
lessons gained in practical policymaking during the previous decades and time-honoured and
robust results from the academic literature. This book has attempted to contribute to the latter.
In this respect we had to leave many issues aside to answer some questions and many issues
are still unresolved. Finally, from a practical perspective it is unlikely that inflation targeting
represents 'the end of history' as far as an appropriate framework for monetary policy is
concerned. Rather, we think it should be seen as an important step forward along the learning
curve. Doubtlessly, a rapidly changing world will continue to yield challenges for practical
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
In dit boek worden de strategie van een directe inflatiedoelstelling alsmede de implicaties
hiervan voor het rentebeleid geanalyseerd. In het verleden verdeelde het debat over welk
monetair raamwerk het meest gepast is economen in twee kampen: aan de ene kant diegenen
die een voorkeur hadden voor een vaste monetaire beleidsregel zonder terugkoppeling en aan
de andere kant diegenen die pleitten voor een discretionair beleid dat op specifieke
economische omstandigheden kan reageren. Regels die als 'automatische monetaire
beleidspiloot' functioneren hebben het voordeel dat ze een duidelijk nominaal anker met zich
meebrengen vanwege het feit dat ze als vast referentiepunt voor inflatieverwachtingen dienen.
Deze regels hebben echter als nadeel dat ze niet kunnen reageren op schokken die de reele
economie beinvloeden hetgeen kan resulteren in ernstige variabiliteit van reele variabelen.
Aan de andere kant zou een discretionair beleid, dat simpelweg reageert op de toestand van
het moment zonder een duidelijk strategisch vooruitziend raamwerk, wellicht in staat zijn een
bepaalde mate van reele stabiliteit teweeg te brengen. Dit zal echter ten koste gaan van hoge
en volatiele inflatieverwachtingen. Op het eerste gezicht lijken beide benaderingen wellicht
niet verenigbaar. De strategie van een directe inflatiedoelstelling biedt echter een monetair
beleidsraamwerk dat de voordelen van beide benaderingen combineert. Ten eerste instrueert
de overheid de centrale bank om de inflatie rond de door haar vastgestelde doelstelling te
stabiliseren, om bepaalde reele variabelen rond hun natuurlijke niveaus te stabiliseren en de
overheid geeft ook een rangorde voor deze doelstellingen aan (dit is van belang omdat deze
doelstellingen op de korte termijn strijdig kunnen zijn). Dit zorgt ervoor dat monetair beleid
op de lange termijn enkel het niveau van de inflatie bepaalt hetgeen een duidelijk anker voor
inflatieverwachtingen verschaft.
Ten tweede verschaft de overheid de centrale bank instrument onafhankelijkheid om deze
doelstellingen te realiseren. Dit betekent dat korte termijn politieke overwegingen geen
invloed zullen uitoefenen op de implementatie van het monetaire beleid. Om op de
middellange termijn de beleidsdoelstellingen te kunnen realiseren zal de centrale bankier
moeten reageren op economische schokken. Hierdoor zullen de, op regels gebaseerde,
uiteindelijke monetaire beleidsdoelstellingen worden vertaald in een endogene
beleidsreactiefunctie waarin de rente in essentie een functie is van alle determinanten van de
toekomstige inflatie en de toekomstige productie. Ten slotte dient de centrale bank
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democratische verantwoording af te leggen voor het door haar gevoerde beleid. Omdat het
monetaire beleid nastreeft reele variabelen rond hun natuurlijke niveau te stabiliseren biedt de
vraag of de inflatie al dan niet systematisch is afgeweken van de officiele doelstelling een
voor de hand liggende maatstaf in dit opzicht. Echter, op de korte termijn kan de mate van
beleidsverantwoording ook worden versterkt middels een zekere mate van transparantie
aangaande de doelstellingen van de centrale bank en/of de informatie die ze heeft over
economische ontwikkelingen.
Hoofdstuk  2:  Het  ejfect van  een  directe  injlatiedoelstelling  op  de  rentetermijnstructuur
Vanwege het bestaan van vertragingen tussen veranderingen in het monetaire
beleidsinstrument en het effect hiervan op de uiteindelijke doelstellingen van het monetaire
beleid, impliceert de implementatie van de strategie van een directe inflatiedoelstelling dat de
conditionele inflatieverwachting (gebaseerd op alle beschikbare informatie) als intermediaire
doelstelling van het monetaire beleid zal fungeren. Het relatieve gewicht dat de centrale bank
toekent aan the stabiliseren van de productie vormt een belangrijk onderdeel van deze
intermediare doelstelling. Dit komt omdat deze bepalend is voor de snelheid waarmee de
inflatie in de richting de officiele doelstelling zal worden teruggeleid nadat een economische
(aanbod) schok is opgetreden. Voor de korte rente betekent dit dat een hoger relatief gewicht
op stabilisatie van de productie ervoor zorgt dat deze minder activistisch op de determinanten
van de toekomstige inflatie en productie zal reageren. Hoofdstuk 2 beoogt de implicaties van
de implementatie van de strategie van een directe inflatiedoelstelling voor de
rentetermijnstructuur te analyseren. In dit verband breiden we het model van Svensson
(1997b) uit door aan te nemen dat de geaggregeerde vraag wordt bepaald door de reele lange
rente. Deze laatste is gerelateerd aan het instrument van de centrale bank (de nominale korte
rente) via de Pure Verwachtings Hypothese van de rentetermijnstructuur. In dit verband
vinden we dat het relatieve gewicht op stabilisatie van de productie alsmede verschillende
andere parameters die de structuur van de economie bepalen hele verschillende implicaties
kunnen hebben voor de mate waarin korte en lange rentes op onderliggende schokken
reageren. Meer specifiek zal een toename in het relatieve gewicht op stabilisatie van de
productie de gevoeligheid van de korte rente voor deze schokken reduceren. Echter, deze
toename zal een ambigu effect hebben op de reactiecoefficienten van de lange nominale rente.
Dit laatste wordt veroorzaakt door het feit dat de lange reele rente en de lange termijn
verwachte inflatie verschillend reageren op een toename in deze preferentieparameter. Verder
zal een toename in de 'duration' van de lange termijn obligatie de reactiecoefficienten in de
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 189
optimale beleidsregel van de centrale bank vergroten. Dit komt omdat een toename in
'duration' het hefboomeffect van de korte op de lange rente vermindert. Echter, deze toename
zal tevens de gevoeligheid van de lange nominale rente voor economische schokken
verminderen vanwege het effect op de lange termijn verwachte inflatie. Ten slotte wordt het
model gebruikt om de implicaties van de strategie van een directe inflatiedoelstelling voor de
voorspellende waarde van het verschil tussen de korte en de lange rente voor de toekomstige
productie te analyseren. In dit opzicht vinden we dat een toename in 'duration' en een afname
in het relatieve gewicht op stabilisatie van de productie deze voorspellende waarde zal
vergroten.
Hoofdstuk  3:  Wat zijn  de  macro  economische  implicaties  van  het  nemen van  rentestappen?
Centrale banken houden vaak gedurende een relatief lange periode de rente constant terwijl de
economische omgeving voortdurend verandert. In dit hoofdstuk rationaliseren we deze
praktijk door aan te nemen dat de central bankier een zeer klein nutsverlies zal lijden op het
moment dat de rente veranderd wordt. Deze kleine 'menu kosten' kunnen hun oorsprong
vinden in het feit dat de centrale bankier weet dat vele economische agenten gebonden zijn
aan vaste nominale rentecontracten. Verder kan het zo zijn dat de centrale bankier
beschuldigd zou kunnen worden van incompetentie of inconsistentie indien de rente zeer
frequent aangepast wordt. De centrale boodschap van dit hoofdstuk is dat zelfs een zeer klein
nutsverlies tengevolge van een renteverandering tot een relatief grote bandbreedte rond de
centrale inflatiedoelstelling zal leiden waarin de central bankier de rente niet zal veranderen.
Dit komt omdat de centrale bankier de optiewaarde van de status quo in zijn beslissing zal
meenemen. Met andere worden, de centrale bankier heeft een prikkel om nog enige tijd te
wachten met een renteverandering. Gedurende deze tijd komt nieuwe informatie beschikbaar
die er wellicht op zou kunnen wijzen dat de inflatie zich 'vanzelf" weer in de richting van de
centrale inflatiedoelstelling beweegt.
De breedte van de inflatieband blijkt toe te nemen als de kosten van een renteverandering
toenemen, als de variantie van vraagschokken toeneemt, als de rentegevoeligheid van de
geaggregeerde vraag toeneemt en als de hellingshoek van de Lucas aanbodrelatie afneemt.
Vervolgens bepalen we het effect van deze parameters of de gemiddelde grootte van de
rentestap. Deze zal natuurlijk een toenemende functie zijn van de breedte van de inflatieband.
Echter, een toename in de rentegevoeligheid van de geaggregeerde vraag heeft een ambigu
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effect op de gemiddelde grootte van de rentestap. Het effect van de eerder genoemde
parameters op de verwachte tijdsduur tot de volgende rentestap blijkt af te hangen van hoe
dicht de huidige inflatie zich bij een van de grenzen van de inflatieband bevindt. Dit komt
omdat het effect van deze parameters werkt via de volatiliteit van het proces dat het verloop
van de inflatie beschrijft onder de conditie dat de rente niet aangepast wordt. Een toename in
deze volatiliteit zal de bandbreedte vergroten maar zal het tevens waarschijnlijker maken dat
de inflatie een van de grenzen van deze band zal raken in the nabije toekomst. Ten slotte
analyseren we het effect van de kosten van renteveranderingen op inflatieverwachtingen.
Hieruit kan geconcludeerd worden dat de economie opgezadeld zal worden met een inflatie
die systematisch hoger is dan de officiele doelstelling indien de kosten van een renteverhoging
groter zijn dan die van een renteverlaging.
Hoofdstuk   4:   Moeten   centrale   bankiers   met   een   directe   inflatiedoelstelling   conservatief  zijn
wanneer er onzekerheid over het potentiele niveau van de productie is?
De benoeming van een centrale bankier die gekenmerkt wordt door een hogere mate van
inflatieaversie dan de maatschappij als geheel is een beproefde oplossing voor het probleem
van de inflatoire tendentie die onstaat als gevolg van het feit dat de beleidsmaker systematisch
probeert de productie boven het natuurlijke niveau te krijgen (zie bijv. Rogoff (1985)). Op het
eerste gezicht lijkt de noodzaak voor een benoeming van een dergelijke conservatieve centrale
bankier te verdwijnen wanneer deze een productiedoelstelling heeft die gelijk is aan het
natuurlijke niveau. Echter, Clarida et. al. (1999) laten zien dat in de context van een Nieuw-
Keynesiaanse Phillipscurve de welvaart toch verhoogd zal worden als de centrale bankier
conservatief is. De eerste doelstelling van hoofdstuk 4 is te onderzoeken of dit ook geldt in
een model waarin het prijszettingsgedrag volledig gebaseerd is op het verleden. We
analyseren een vereenvoudigde versie van het inflatie voorspellingsmodel van Svensson
(1997b) en concluderen dat het optimale relatieve gewicht op stabilisatie van de productie
lager zal zijn dan het maatschappelijk gezien optimale relatieve gewicht. De reden hiervoor is
dat een centrale bankier die een discretionair beleid voert geen rekening zal houden met het
effect van huidige beleidsacties op de toekomstige inflatie. We stellen vast dat het optimale
relatieve gewicht op stabilisatie van de productie zal toenemen als de hellingshoek van de
Phillipscurve afneemt en/of als het sociaal gezien optimale relatieve gewicht toeneemt.
De tweede doelstelling van dit hoofdstuk is om het effect van onzekerheid omtrent het
potentiele niveau van de productie op de optimale mate van conservatisme te onderzoeken.
Het idee hierachter is dat dit type onzekerheid de onconditionele varianties van inflatie en de
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productie in verschillende mate zou kunnen veranderen. Omdat de optimale mate van
conservatisme in principe bepaald wordt door de afruil tussen deze twee varianties, kan deze
ook door dit type onzekerheid beYnvloed worden.  In het bijzonder wordt aangenomen dat de
centrale bankier geen perfecte waameming heeft van het huidige niveau van de potentiele
productie maar dat hij regelmatig revisies krijgt van in in het verleden gerealiseerde niveaus
van de potentiele productie. Indien de tijdreeks die het verloop van het potentiele niveau van
de productie beschrij ft stationair   is,   zal een rationele centrale bankier geen systematische
fouten maken in zijn schattingen van het huidige niveau van de potentiele productie. Daarom
zal de afruil tussen de onconditionele varianties van inflatie en de productie ook niet
veranderen ten opzichte van het geval waarin het potentiele productie niveau vast ligt en
bekend is. Met andere woorden, de noodzaak van het aanstellen van een conservatieve
centrale bankier blijkt voort te komen uit het feit dat de huidige inflatie de toekomstige inflatie
bernvloedt en niet uit het bestaan van onzekerheid omtrent het potentiele productieniveau.
Hoofdstuk   5:   Impliceert  een  convexe   Phillipscurve  met   rationale   inflatieverwachtingen   een
additioneel maatschappelijk voordeel van  het stabiliseren van de productie?
Keynes betoogde reeds   in   1936 dat, vanwege het bestaan van capaciteitsrestricties,   een
situatie van economische oververhitting de inflatie relatief meer zal verhogen dan dat een
recessie deze zal verlagen. De recente literatuur heeft het idee van zo'n convexe Phillipscurve
nieuw leven ingeblazen. Clark et. al. (1995) laten bijvoorbeeld zien dat een
accelerationistische convexe Phillipscurve impliceert dat er een additioneel maatschappelijk
voordeel van het stabiliseren van de productie bestaat. Dit komt omdat het gemiddelde
productieniveau dan negatief gerelateerd is aan de variantie van de productie. De centrale
vraag in dit hoofdstuk is of een dergelijk additioneel voordeel ook bestaat onder een
Phillipscurve met rationele verwachtingen. In dat geval hangt de noodzaak van het induceren
van een reductie in de productie om de inflatie te verlagen af van de geloofwaardigheid van de
beleidsmaker. Als eerste analyseren we een lineair model waarin de centrale bankier de
inflatie stabiliseert rond de officiele doelstelling en de productie stabiliseert rond het lange
termijn natuurlijke niveau. Dit laatste zorgt ervoor dat de inflatie niet systematisch hoger zal
zijn dan de officiele inflatiedoelstelling. Echter, als we aannemen dat aanbodschokken
gedeeltelijk door het publiek voorspeld kunnen worden blijkt er een ander type
geloofwaardigheidsprobleem te zijn. Omdat de reactie van de centrale bankier geheel of
gedeeltelijk door het publiek geanticipeerd wordt (afhankelijk van de vraag of de centrale
bankier al dan niet enige mate van private informatie heeft) zou de welvaart hoger zijn indien
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de centrale bank zich zou kunnen binden aan de afspraak niet op het voorspelbare gedeelte
van de schok te reageren. Met andere woorden, een discretionair beleid zal in dit geval tot een
suboptimaal hoge inflatievariantie leiden. Indien een bindende afspraak niet mogelijk is wordt
de welvaart daarom verhoogd wanneer een conservatieve centrale bankier benoemd wordt. De
optimale mate van conservatisme blijkt tussen nul en oneindig te liggen en blijkt positief
gerelateerd te zijn aan de hellingshoek van de Phillipscurve en het maatschappelijk optimale
relatieve gewicht op stabilisatie van de productie.  De mate van persistentie in de aanbodschok
heeft een negatiefeffect hierop.
Indien de centrale bankier geen private informatie heeft is het optimaal om een beleidsmaker
te benoemen die enkel en alleen oog heeft voor het stabiliseren van de inflatie. Vervolgens
wordt de casus waarin de centrale bankier de productie niet kan bernvloeden, en waarin de
Phillipscurve convex is, geanalyseerd. Een beleid dat alleen gericht is op inflatiestabilisatie
(hetgeen optimaal is als de Phillipscurve lineair is) zal er in dit geval voor zorgen dat de lange
termijn gemiddelde inflatie onder de officiele doelstelling zal blijven. In essentie komt dit
omdat de centrale bankier zich zal indekken tegen de asymmetrische risico's ronde de centrale
inflatieprojectie. Indien de centrale bankier ook aandacht heeft voor het stabiliseren van de
productie blijkt de onconditionele inflatieverwachting positief gerelateerd te zijn aan het
relatieve gewicht op stabilisatie van de productie. Dit komt omdat zowel het bestaan van
onzekerheid over vraagschokken alsmede het bestaan van persistente aanbodschokken ervoor
zorgen dat het lange termijn gemiddelde niveau van de feitelijke productie onder het
potentiele niveau zal blijven. De centrale bank zal dit trachten tegen te gaan. Echter vanwege
de afwezigheid van private informatie zijn deze pogingen tevergeefs en veroorzaken ze
slechts een toename in de verwachte inflatie. Desalniettemin zorgt dit effect ervoor dat er in
een niet-lineaire wereld zonder private informatie toch een additioneel sociaal voordeel van
het stabiliseren van de productie bestaat. Dit additionele voordeel komt niet voort uit het feit
dat de centrale bank het lange tel:mijn gemiddelde niveau van de productie kan verhogen
indien zij de variantie van de productie verlaagt maar uit het feit dat het ervoor zorgt dat de
mate waarin de inflatie systematisch onder de officiele doelstelling blijft verminderd wordt.
Hoofdstuk 6: Niet volledige openheid in de uitvoering van valutamarktinterventies
In een wereld zonder kapitaalrestricties moet de monetaire beleidsmaker kiezen tussen het
nastreven van binnenlandse doeleinden of het beinvloeden van de nominale wisselkoers.
Indien men kiest voor het eerste betekent dit niet dat het monetaire beleid niet beYnvloed zal
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worden door veranderingen in de nominale wisselkoers omdat deze immers tevens invloed
heeft of de determinanten van binnenlandse doeleinden. Echter voor een grote economie met
een relatief beperkte mate van openheid zal de wisselkoers relatief weinig effect op de
nominale rente hebben. In dat geval gebruiken centrale bankiers veelal gesteriliseerde
valutamarktinterventies als eerste verdedigingslinie indien zich een
wisselkoersonevenwichtigheid voordoet. Veel economen zijn het er over eens dat deze
interventies het merendeel van hun effect ontlenen aan het feit dat ze nieuwe informatie aan
de markten overbrengen. Dit betekent dat een informatievoordeel essentieel is voor de
effectiviteit van gesteriliseerde interventies. In dit hoofdstuk komt dit informatievoordeel uit
twee verschillende bronnen. Ten eerste heeft de centrale bank private informatie over de eigen
gewenste waarde van de wisselkoers. Ten tweede injecteert ze een zekere mate van
ambiguiteit door de markten een met ruis doorspekt signaal van het werkelijke
interventievolume te geven. In navolging van vele empirische studies op het terrein van korte
termijn wisselkoersbewegingen nemen we aan dat de wisselkoers een 'random walk'
(dronkemansloop) volgt en dat interventies alleen effectief zijn voorzover ze niet door de
markt verwacht worden. Voortbouwend op een model ontwikkeld door Almekinders (1996)
concluderen we dat herhaalde interactie tussen de centrale bank en speculanten ervoor zorgt
dat de reactiecoefficienten in de interventiereactiefunctie in absolute waarde lager zullen zijn
dan in het geval waar interactie slechts een keer plaatsvindt. Echter, het is nog steeds zo dat
een deel van het interventievolume ex ante door de markt verwacht wordt en derhalve geen
effect zal sorteren. Deze 'interventie bias' zal lager zijn indien de disconteringsfactor van de
central bank toeneemt, indien de preferenties van de centrale bank volatieler worden, als de
mate van ambiguiteit afneemt of wanneer de mate van persistentie in wisselkoersbewegingen
toeneemt. Vervolgens analyseren we het effect van ambiguiteit vanuit een positieve
invalshoek en laten we zien dat het afgeven van een met ruis doorspekt signaal van het
interventievolume zowel een toename in de covariantie tussen wisselkoersbewegingen en de
wisselkoersdoelstelling enerzijds. als een toename in de variantie van wisselkoersbewegingen
anderzijds teweeg zal brengen.
De strategie van een directe inflatiedoelstelling is een relatief nieuw raamwerk voor monetair
beleid dat enkele lessen die getrokken zijn uit de praktische uitvoering van dit beleid
combineert met robuste resultaten uit de academische literatuur. Dit boek heeft een poging
gewaagd om een bijdrage te leveren aan het laatste. In dit opzicht moesten we vele
interessante vraagstukken links laten liggen om ons in staat te stellen enkele vragen te
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beantwoorden. Echter, er zijn nog vele zaken die om verder onderzoek vragen. Tenslotte,
kijkend vanuit een praktische perspectief, lijkt het onwaarschijnlijk dat de strategie van een
directe inflatiedoelstelling 'het einde van de geschiedenis' zal zijn in de zoektocht naar een
passend raamwerk voor monetair beleid. Het moet wellicht veleer gezien worden als een
belangrijke stap voorwaarts langs de leercurve. Ongetwijfeld zal een snel veranderende
wereld in de toekomst steeds nieuwe uitdagingen blijven vormen voor beleidsmakers en zal
deze interessante vragen op blijven leveren voor academische economen.
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